



# FOREWORD

“There is a curious dichotomy concerning StratCom in the NATO Alliance and in its membership nations. The term occupies an inordinately larger space in verbiage and documents than the function is given in the environments in which it is has the most potential to effect.

This most recent study not only re-affirms previous results but more importantly, attempts to add to them by seeking to get to the “why”. While it does get to the “why”, the integrity of the results is somewhat diminished by the disappointing level of national participation with only 11 of 28 nations responding. For a function often on the lips of leadership -- both in the Alliance and its nations -- it is rather telling that 17 nations passed over the opportunity to illuminate the function and contribute to the discussion.

Nevertheless, the report builds on the baseline understanding of how Allied nations define, organise and implement the StratCom function, and the results are as encouraging as they are concerning. Concerning because the author found that many responding nations still consider Strategic Communication to essentially be another name for what they formerly termed Public Affairs. Encouraging because the authors found that many nations acknowledged that the StratCom function needed to change from a supporting to a supported role – an understanding which is finding traction amongst experienced operators.

Having previously written a paper which included Alliance nation mapping with respect to StratCom, I welcome this report for updating and contributing more to NATO’s understanding about how its membership individually considers StratCom. It gives needed insight into NATO policy development on behalf of all nations.”

**Lieutenant Colonel (ret’d) Rita LePage**

StratCom Expert,

formerly with Doctrine, Concept & Experimentation Branch

NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I told a senior military colleague recently that I was in the StratCom business, he nodded sagely and then said “Ah yes... StratCom...Do you mean Satellite Phones or Media Handling?” Much as I found this lack of awareness frustrating, it was clear from the “Ah yes” that StratCom was a subject about which my colleague thought he should have a greater understanding. There are a host of people who really do “get” StratCom. You would be forgiven for not recognising them. Until recently they have been sitting at the back of the room waiting to be asked, after the plan was made, if there were any lines to take. The StratCom Awakening is their moment, and I am deeply grateful to them all for their unfaltering determination to register this subject in national and international consciences, without which this report would not have been commissioned.

I would like to sincerely thank the staff of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, for their patronage and support throughout this study and in particular, my project partner Elina Lange-lonathamishvili. It was her drive and infectious enthusiasm that persuaded the respondent nations to take part and I am deeply grateful. I would also like to pay particular thanks to my peer reviewers, Dr Steve Tatham, Rita LePage, Lothar Buyny, and Mark Laity for their essential advice and support in the final stages. My thanks also go to Ted Whiteside, Chris Riley and the staff of NATO HQ Public Diplomacy Division, for their excellent feedback to my project presentation to them on completion. As well as being respected colleagues and trusted friends, they are the experts to whom I will direct the next colleague who needs to “get it”.

Most of all I wish to register my deep thanks and respect for those nations who were willing to take part. Placing their heads above the parapet to question definitions, structures, processes and responsibilities took moral courage and earmarked them all as the game players of the future. I sincerely hope that more nations follow their lead to ensure that the awakening doesn’t pass NATO by.

There is only one other person without who this project would not have been completed – and she knows how much I appreciate her support in all aspects of my life.

## **Gerry Osborne**

Author of the report

Director OACOM Ltd

# INTRODUCTION

*The recent development of strategic communications as an organisational discipline has resulted not only in everything – or almost everything – being regarded as communication, but also in everything – or almost everything – being regarded as strategic communication. The scope of organisational communication has been broadened to include virtually everything an organisation says and does, and everyone who is affected by the organisation’s existence and activities.*

*Simon Moberg Torp (2014) in Hotlzhausen and Zerfass (2014). The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communications.*

There is no doubt that the concept of Strategic Communication (StratCom), whether referring to a process, a mind-set, or a collection of capabilities has undergone significant development in recent years. Such growth, although welcome, presents the newly formed NATO Strategic Communications, Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) with a critical challenge to align thinking in its first year of accreditation. At the NATO Summit of 2014, Allies welcomed “the establishment of the StratCom COE as a meaningful contribution to NATO’s efforts” in the area of Strategic Communications. There has never been a better time to confirm and finally codify NATO’s understanding of StratCom, perhaps arguing the case for communications to sit at the heart of strategy rather than existing as a latter supporting function. This project builds upon a great deal of work already accomplished by the COE, ACO, ACT<sup>1</sup> and several other national and international StratCom forums. It is hoped that it will make a useful contribution towards ongoing work by key NATO stakeholders, to cement StratCom within the policy of the Military Committee.

In order for the COE to be able to coalesce data and inform this thinking across NATO members and beyond, it must first have a baseline understanding of individual nuances on the definition, interpretation and application of StratCom at a national level. In an ever more participative global information environment, which progressively questions the justification for capability firewalls between information activities, the time is also right to investigate the structure, outputs, and organisational culture within the traditional StratCom disciplines of Public Diplomacy (PD,) Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs (MPA), Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Mutual understanding of national perspectives (and varying interpretations) in these areas is as critical as determining which - and in what combination - have relevance and resonance for the future.

Recent coalition military operations in increasingly *congested, cluttered, contested, connected and constrained*<sup>2</sup> environments have encouraged operational commanders towards greater adhocacy,

<sup>1</sup> Directly or via organisations such as the Multinational Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE). This includes the MC StratCom Capability Implementation Programme, the MC Concept for Military Strategic Communications, the Training Needs Analysis for the Senior Officials StratCom Awareness Course, and ACO’s Directive AD 95-2.

adaptation and reactivity. Conversely, NATO has witnessed the effect of condensed information bureaucracy by its adversaries, characterised by short chains of command, well-worn narratives and structured communications frameworks that match all words, images and deeds. NATO needs to fully understand the relative merits of bureaucracy and adhocacy in StratCom planning and delivery. Both are critical to achieve its goals, and both have their roots in the organisational cultures and approaches of individual member nations.

In line with the NATO StratCom COE's endorsed Programme of Work (2015)<sup>3</sup>, this study aims to fill a gap in knowledge by **investigating the key characteristics of StratCom capacity and capability in the defence sectors of NATO nations**. The research will aim to review the policy, doctrine, organisational structure, training, education and resource base, which NATO nations have in place, to deliver StratCom in the defence domain. Three research questions will be explored to achieve this:

The first research question aims to **unlock the differences in interpretation of StratCom as a process and mind-set among member nations and NATO Headquarters** and review how such interpretations determine capability and capacity in this field.

The study's second research question asks to what degree individual countries regard the **utility and priority of StratCom as a mind-set to mitigate strategic risk in the contemporary operating environment**.

The study's final research question is to assess **the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to individual nations' StratCom capacity** and capability in order to provide guidance to key NATO stakeholders for future collective development and reform within the capability.

The study builds upon work already undertaken in the military, academic and corporate sector. Most significantly it seeks to add to the academic work of Tatham and LePage (2014), who identified significant contradictions in understanding and application of StratCom among troop contributing nations, based upon their individual organisational cultures and national outlook. By further investigating the baseline of understanding and application among participating nations, the study hopes to provide input to the Military Committee Policy on StratCom, perhaps to assist in a timely and resonant codification of the capability as the Alliance faces up to new communications challenges. It will also complement wider COE research identifying the lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan.

Participating nations are sincerely thanked for their open and frank contributions to data collection since February 2015.

---

<sup>3</sup> NATO StratCom COE Steering Committee, November 2014

# 1. LITERATURE REVIEW

## DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION

Strategic Communications (StratCom) is defined in NATO Doctrine as:

---

*...the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy [PD], Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs [MPA], Information Operations (Info Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.*

---

A significant body of literature covers a wide spectrum of StratCom definitions as a mind-set, a process, a planning tool or merely a rebranding of information capabilities. Such definitions tend to lead to the creation and/or maintenance of the organisations that command or deliver various information activities. Acknowledging this variance and citing how difficult it would be to establish a holistic definition across NATO, Tatham and LePage (2014) note some key characteristics in nations’ interpretation of its components, namely:

- *Understanding, informing and engaging audiences about advance interests and objectives by affecting perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours;*
- *Aligning actions, images, words to support policy and planning, to meet overarching strategic objectives;*
- *Recognising that all operations and activities have a critical communication component, because everything that NATO says and does, or fails to say and do, has intended and unintended consequences, with intended and unintended audiences;*
- *Recognising that StratCom is not an adjunct function but integral to the planning and conduct of all military operations and activities.*

They also state that these principles of strategic communications are far better understood by civilian commercial organisations than by governments and military departments. Hotzhausen and Zerrfass (2015) cite a global awakening in strategic communication since 2007 whereby organisations now focus upon the following key elements of understanding:

- *What goes into a strategic communications process,*
- *What defines its success,*
- *What the impact is on the public sphere [audiences], and,*
- *What the commonalities are among different areas of strategic communication practice.*

A first objective of the study was therefore to augment the content of Tatham and LePage’s Summary of Current NATO and Allied Strategic Communication Understanding (2014) from data gathered in

questionnaires and interviews. It was my intent to use this increased fount of knowledge to further investigate wider influences upon individual nations' definitions and interpretations of StratCom and see if identified commonalities between them could be used to guide future development.

To achieve this it was equally important to draw upon nations' understanding of Narrative. Cited in Earle (2011), Hoffman's (2002) top two best practices of risk management are the establishment of a corporate vision and culture, and the communication of that vision to the organisation in order to foster the risk management culture. Bernadi, Lundry and Ruston (2012) emphasise the importance of a narrative, resonant to all key target audiences, as the principal component of a communication strategy to achieve behavioural change. Research was needed to determine the extent to which these concepts figured in national definitions.

## STRATEGIC RISK AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

The analysis of risk is a significant factor in all military activities, including those employing soft power. Reputational risk is critical to coalitions such as NATO and its individual members where alliance cohesion is a driver of alliance success. It follows that individual nations' and coalitions' attitudes to risk of will have a determining effect upon their definition and application of StratCom.

Risk takes many forms. Coker (2009) highlighted the rebranding of risk since World War 1 to the present day, arguing that in the modern world the defence of the citizen is more difficult than the defence of the state. Phythian (2012) suggested that the ubiquity of risk management across modern commercial, security and political sectors attests to its importance; but at the same time it injects the term into a wide range of debates with varying interpretations (and misinterpretations) of definition, emphasis and meaning.

Whilst theory has derived a wide range of scientific risk measurement strategies in these contexts, Griffin (2011) reminds us that the outcome of an event can never be truly predicted due to the myriad of factors which affect the human decision making process. Griffin further draws on the work of Knighton (2004) to account for an overemphasis in contemporary risk management upon scientific measurement, and a lack of reflection upon human injected uncertainty. He therefore contests that despite the military's prolonged commitment to, and successful operations, its adoption of scientific risk management strategies has created a generation of capable leaders willing and able to take risk, but suppressed by endemic risk aversion and process. Coker (2009) speaks of the transparency of the commander's decisions in the media, which accounts for increased risk aversion by some military leaders and their communications advisors. This also explains the primacy often given to PD departments of major headquarters, and their reluctance to forego their key advisor status. Griffin (2011) concludes that military risk is divided between analytical risk, which he says is more applicable in the financial, training and project sectors, and a subjective approach to operational risk where the role of the commander is key. The link between StratCom and Risk is therefore strong, and the study aimed consider its impact as a component of organisational culture, upon nations' interpretation and application of StratCom.

## BUREAUCRACY VS ADHOCRACY

Organisations' attitudes towards risk have a strong influence upon their structures. When conflict is conducted in an information society, [and] perception and misperception very often outstrip and overtake reality (Mackay and Tatham, 2011), contemporary experience suggests that organisations interoperating as networks at “the edge of chaos” often outperform the stove piped hierarchies of military organisations. Such theories explain the propensity of headquarters to emphasise adaption, creativity and reactivity to create dominating tempo. Bureaucratic hierarchy, as Flynn (2010) observed, impedes such agility by over emphasising detailed information and procedure in higher levels of the chain of command at the expense of wider significant cultural and political knowledge across the whole force.

But should bureaucracy in strategic communications planning be avoided at all costs? After all, dynamic and highly connected network architectures are more prone to chaotic behaviours, which as Miller (date unknown) notes, are nonlinear, frequently counter intuitive, usually manifested only under severe stress, and difficult to discern under the “artificial” conditions of training exercises. Hierarchy is widely considered to be an essential precondition for the survival of the military ethos. It creates simplicity, certainty and order in the face of “wicked problems” and can significantly support the creation and dissemination of a global narrative. The problem is that in the quest for such stability and consistency, large organisations (particularly coalitions) can be ironically driven towards dysfunctional behaviour, which creates further complexity and obscures the achievement of missions and goals by introducing internal rituals, rules and procedures, the preservation of which becomes the organisation's primary focus.

Barnett and Finnemore (1999) explored what they call the Pathologies of International Organisations that can be traced to bureaucratic behaviour. They described how, with increased control over technical expertise and focus upon procedures and rules rather than output, the very rationality aspired within a bureaucracy can become irrational, and lead the organisation towards autonomy from its creating agencies and a loss of task focus, due to the following dysfunctional behaviours:

**Bureaucratic Universalism** refers to the flattening of diversity and therefore creativity within an organisation by the over imposition of rules and procedures.

**Normalisation of Deviance** occurs when environmentally driven exceptions force the deviation from a rule in a particular manner which nonetheless becomes institutionalised later in wider contexts leading to inaccurate situational assessment.

**Insulation occurs** when parochial classification and categorisation schemes come to define reality—how bureaucrats understand the world—such that they routinely ignore information that is essential to the accomplishment of their goals.

**Cultural Contestation** has been previously referred to within the joint context where pockets of political agenda, use the bureaucracy as a forum for individual political agenda.



Some of these pathologies are evident in the structure and activity of nations' StratCom capabilities (the ongoing contest for primacy in StratCom between PA, PD and Info Ops capabilities is a well-known example). Further research to investigate the degree to which organisations encourage adhocism or bureaucracy was required to guide future thinking on how separate departments could achieve more common goals.

## BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Tatham and LePage (2014) argued that the attitudes of target audiences are far less important than their behaviours, or latent behaviours. They draw upon an increasing body of evidence that promotes behavioural rather than attitudinal research in audience profiling. And yet, attitudinal polling and surveys maintain significant traction as measures of effect in government, military and corporate communications sectors. An increase in the incidence and tempo of transformation within state organisations is a causal factor, where governments in particular, need to demonstrate rapid, tangible measurements of effect to questioning audiences. The introduction of the Military Airworthiness Authority in the UK following a tragic air accident in Afghanistan is a good example. As its Director, Air Marshal Timo Anderson, stated (2011); Conventional wisdom is that major behavioural change takes around five years; I have been given two. The gap to be filled by research in this area was to determine the relative resonance of attitudinal vs behavioural approaches among NATO nations against the backdrop of increased academic evidence in the behavioural domain.

## COALITION STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

The need to interact with others to achieve a common goal is an inherently human activity. Its roots lie in the principle of strength in numbers and the need to survive in the face of evolutionary challenge. Throughout history, humans have formed coalitions to overcome Darwinian challenges wearing the patents of religion, collective nationality, political harmony or combined power. At the lowest levels they exist to foster domestic harmony. At their most complex, within the international context, Barnett and Finnemore (1999) observe that they *classify the world, creating categories of actors and action; fix meanings in the social world; and articulate and diffuse new norms, principles, and actors around the globe.*

Martha Maurer (1994) notes that *Coalitions occur because an outside requirement overrides the inherent difficulties of creating and sustaining the coalition itself. She states that to win the battle between drivers and barriers to formation, the motivation and self-interest that underlie the development of a coalition must be powerful enough to counter the forces of separation.*

The link between allied and adversarial coalition is described by Mackay and Tatham (2011) who point out that *the military, the diplomat and the aid worker are all actors in that system and each can impact positively and negatively on each other as much as on those they are directly or indirectly seeking to influence.* Because success on contemporary operations is defined more by influence than by victory in the traditional military sense, the drivers and barriers to allied coalition are equally applicable to the achievement of operational success against an adversary.

Communication, in all its forms, is the principal means by which coalitions are maintained. Nations individual attitudes towards coalition membership will have a significant bearing upon how they communicate and were therefore worthy of further investigation in this study.

## PROACTIVITY VS REACTIVITY

Having established a propensity in military thinking to adapt, react and counter, it is not surprising that communications departments operating at the strategic level tend to focus on the here-and-now rather than think in the longer term. The problem is exacerbated in the government sector due to the influence of finite terms of office. Hartzog (unknown) cites this as a tendency towards *responsive adaptation over predictive avoidance* when seeking *Complex Adaptive Governance* in the modern world. As Aggerholm and Thomsen note in Holtzhausen and Zerfass (2015) a reactive focus, particularly during times of crisis increases *polyphonic noise*, which makes messages more confused to the audience. As a result, resources can be quickly refocused away from proactive long term strategic communications planning to furnish immediate supporting lines. And as more resources are applied to reactive communications, the capacity (Capability and will) to be proactive is reduced.

We assume that a proactive communications approach will utilise frameworks to plan and deliver influence, and that such an approach is more difficult if a wholly reactive approach is taken. The project therefore aimed to investigate the degree to which nations' StratCom organisations adopt a reactive vs proactive outlook and incorporate frameworks and measurement in their approach.

## COMMUNICATIONS AS A SUPPORTED OR SUPPORTING FUNCTION

Little academic evidence is available to promote placing communications at the heart of military strategy rather than employing communications in a supporting role once strategy has been developed. Tatham and LePage (2014) stated that *all the time that StratCom is regarded as the communications adjunct to "actions (fires)" there is no hope that StratCom will gather further, useful, traction*. Fredriksson and Pallas in Holthausen and Zerfass (2015) offer some support by stating that *Strategic Communication can be used both as a carrier and translator of institutional elements, as well as their manufacturer and creator*. The study set out to ask nations to what degree they embraced communications as a critical component of strategy, as opposed to merely another means of delivering it. It also aimed to gauge the impact of organisational culture upon this, noting one potential structural dilemma. For if StratCom is to be *embedded at the core of operational thinking* (Tatham and LePage, 2014), and therefore become the core business of strategic decision makers, what is the future requirement for specialist and potentially overlapping communications' disciplines?

## STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING AND EDUCATION

As Tatham and LePage (2014) noted, *StratCom continues to reside within the information disciplines with information specialists taking the lead on development, experimentation and implementation.* The degree to which StratCom is embedded at the core of operational thinking can be also deduced by the level and quality of specialist and generalist training each nation delivers. They also noted both the lack of a rewarding career path for communications specialists across NATO, and a particular educational deficit among generalists, which leads to a preponderance of rhetoric over substance in understanding what can and more importantly, what cannot be achieved. This study could not hope to derive the optimal balance between trained specialists and generalists within StratCom organisations or pragmatic paths of career development within each nation's StratCom domain. However the study did investigate, and has shown, the level of resource currently applied to the professional development of strategic communicators in relation to other capabilities as a measure of relevance and wider corporate support.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

### 2.1. RESEARCH DESIGN

The aims of this study sit more comfortably within an interpretive research philosophy (Anderson, 2013), focussing primarily on the essential human experience of communication. Primary research was therefore conducted in the form of questionnaires (sent to all NATO nations) and in-depth interviews (3-5 NATO nations were chosen according to the results of the questionnaire) across all of the project's primary research questions.

### QUESTIONNAIRES

The questionnaire design can be viewed in Annex B. It was originally hoped that quantifiable values could be applied to the responses in the questionnaires (such as the extent of X Govt coordination or reactivity vs proactivity in messaging) with a view to constructing Likert Scales and corresponding graphs. The variance in the content and structure of data received from the sample of respondent nations made this approach impractical and unrepresentative. The questionnaires therefore served to provide previously unrecorded in-depth viewpoints of structure, definition and interpretation, as well as a highly detailed database of StratCom contacts across NATO.

The structure of these questionnaires was based around the accepted assumption that, although member nations apply slightly different approaches and definitions in their national doctrine, most agree that StratCom is both a command and a control **process** (harmonising the outputs of PD, PA, MPA, IO and PsyOps to manage strategic risk) to ensure operational success and alliance cohesion, and a critical strategic **mindset** comprising the following generally accepted concepts:

Placing communications at the heart of strategy.

The coordination of all levers of national power (words, images and deeds) to influence the perceptions and behaviour of people.

Applying a behavioural rather than attitudinal approach to the analysis of key target audiences.

Delivering, as a result, a strategic narrative that will resonate with these audiences in order to optimise behavioural change.

Harmonising short term reactive communications with a longer term proactive strategic communication framework for a region, operation or theme.

This phase of the study focused first of all upon identifying the principal similarities in StratCom understanding across the Alliance within these areas. Data received from each respondent nation was entered collectively in tables for comparison and collation. Word Cloud<sup>4</sup> software was then applied to this

---

<sup>4</sup>[www.worditout.com](http://www.worditout.com)

collection of definitions and interpretations to identify the highest trending words used across the sample, and determine any commonality in interpretation between nations at the political and/or military level.

Through collating nations' descriptions of StratCom organisational structure the aim was to establish the degree to which StratCom is applied within individual government departments or as a whole across government.

This gave the first indication not only of the degree of cross government buy-in, but also the degree to which nations place communications at the heart of strategy rather than adopting it as a means to support its delivery. Questions were posed directly to gauge perceptions of these factors and the level of resource applied to StratCom within individual departments to assess the level of awareness of relative significance/importance placed upon StratCom relative to other capabilities.

Nations were then asked to comment on the type and amount of training they deliver across the StratCom domain and at what level this was determined. This gave a further indication of the relative importance of the capability. Asking nations if they employed foreign students or lecturers on training courses also highlighted the relative importance of the capability by indicating which nations were prepared to make up any resource deficit through creative means. Nations were also asked to provide data on their participation in NATO or other foreign courses within a 12 month period as a further measure of commitment to StratCom development.

Participants were asked to complete a SWOT analysis of their nations' StratCom capabilities in both the political and military sphere as well as further SWOT analysis of StratCom capability "as a member of NATO". It was hoped this would again identify any commonality of thinking between nations to provide steerage for future COE guidance. Summary SWOT tables for all nations were collated subjectively by the author for the political, military and NATO spheres.

## INTERVIEWS

The purpose of the structured interviews with 3 to 5 of the respondent nations was to clarify questionnaire feedback and to attempt to develop a more quantifiable insight into the relationship between organisational culture and the StratCom approach. During these interviews nations were introduced to an adapted version of the Organisational Culture Assessment Indicator (OCAI) originally designed by Cameron and Quinn (2006). This model was originally developed by the authors in 1999 to assess organisations' current and preferred culture according to the competing values of an organisation's Internal vs External focus and how it approximates to Stability and Control vs Flexibility and Individuality. In its general application employees completed a 6 stage questionnaire which measured, in percentage terms, how key characteristics of the organisation's activity (Dominant organisational characteristics, leadership, management of employees, organisational glue, strategic emphasis and criteria of success) approximated to Clan vs Market behaviour and Bureaucracy/Hierarchy vs Adhocracy. It is completed twice; once to reflect how

the organisation is now, and a second time to reflect how the respondent would like it to be post transformation. By averaging the scores obtained for each of the four component responses of the 6 questions a graphical map is produced showing the organisations preponderance to the four behaviours at the time of assessment and that aspired to post transformation.

The interviews for this study were designed to follow an adapted version of the OCAI with an increased emphasis on communication. By amending the original 6 OCAI questions to reflect key communication characteristics the aim was to assess the degree to which Clan vs Market behaviour and bureaucracy vs adhocracy in StratCom organisations led them to be internally vs externally focused and proactive vs reactive in the communications sphere. The deduced approach of this adaptation is described in the diagram below, where StratCom Roles, Ends, Means and Competencies are identified for each of the four quadrants.




Figure 1 Adapted OCAI (Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument) Competing Values Table for Strategic Communications Organisations.

The set of adapted questions that were used is given below. This was sent out in early April to all nations who had responded to the questionnaire or had indicated that they would do so. In this way those nations selected for interview were adequately prepared.

1. Dominant Organisational Characteristics		Score
A	The organisation is primarily motivated by personal interaction. It is like an extended family. People share a lot of themselves.	
B	The organisation is a very dynamic entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.	
C	The organisation is very results oriented. The primary concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement oriented.	
D	The organisation is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do.	
	Total	
2. Organisational Leadership		Score
A	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing.	
B	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk taking.	

C	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus.	
D	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency.	
	Total	
<b>3. Management of Information</b>		<b>Score</b>
A	Information is shared internally according to an ethos of teamwork, consensus, and participation.	
B	Information is shared externally and individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness are encouraged to achieve interdepartmental consensus.	
C	The management of information across the organisation is characterised by hard-driving competitiveness, and measured effect.	
D	The management of information in the organisation is characterised by departmental security, predictability, and stability in relationships.	
	Total	
<b>4. Communication as component of organisational glue</b>		<b>Score</b>
A	The glue that holds the organisation together is loyalty and mutual trust. Communication supports strategy and short term reputation management.	
B	The glue that holds the organisation together is innovation and development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge in the competition for narrative dominance.	
C	The glue that holds the organisation together is the emphasis on changing behaviour in key target audiences. Communication sits at the heart of strategy.	
C	The glue that holds the organisation together is the emphasis on changing behaviour in key target audiences. Communication sits at the heart of strategy.	
D	The glue that holds the organisation together is formal rules, policies, smooth running and long term reputation. Communication sits at the heart of strategy.	
	Total	
<b>5. Strategic Communication Emphases</b>		<b>Score</b>
A	The organisation's ethos of human development, high trust, openness and participation form the core of its message.	
B	The organisation primarily seeks to influence the real time perceptions of key audiences and emphasises innovative audience focused communications to achieve this.	
C	The organisation places behavioural change among key audiences at the heart of a measurable frame-worked communications approach.	
D	The organisations emphasis on its own permanence, stability, efficiency, control and smooth operations forms the core of a frame-worked communications strategy.	
	Total	
<b>6. Criteria of Success</b>		<b>Score</b>
A	The organisation defines communications success on the basis of effective counter narrative and the speed and quantity (output) of information flow.	
B	The organisation defines communications success on the basis of indicated perception change (out-takes). It aims to be a communications leader and innovator.	
C	The organisation defines success on the basis of measured behavioural change among key audiences (out-comes). It aims to be the dominant trader in the communications marketplace.	
D	The organisation defines communications success on the basis of preserved efficiency and reputation (in-comes).	
	Total	




Figure 2 Adapted OCAI Map for a fictional nation.

In this study, reference was required to the state of the organisation at the time of interview, hence the question set was only given once. The aim was to investigate any apparent correlation between competing organisational structures, attitudes and cultures in defence and security departments of state per-se, and their individual approach to the definition, interpretation and delivery of StratCom as a possible signpost to further detailed research. More importantly the graphical maps produced from interview responses could be used to visually compare the organisational cultures of respondent nations in StratCom terms. It was hoped that this aspect, if successful, could be used to inform future expanded audience mapping. An example of the map produced is given on the left.



## 2.2. TIMELINE

The study was introduced to all NATO nations on 11th February 2015 at NATO HQ in Brussels. An ambitious deadline of mid-March was set for nations to return completed questionnaires, which most nations indicated they could achieve. Adding headroom to accommodate late responses the project team conducted interviews following initial analysis of the questionnaires received during April and May.

## 2.3. RESEARCH CONSTRAINTS AND SHORTFALLS

The relative newness of modern StratCom concepts, the rapid contemporary changes within the information environment, and the pressing need to establish the conditions for collective development in the face of adversarial capability prevented the application of a more longitudinal research approach to this project. This was identified as a research limitation when the project was conceived, and will be addressed by continued study in the future. Nonetheless, the project did incur setbacks during the research phase, which impacted the quality of data gathered, but provided added insights into the way which organisational culture determines StratCom capacity and capability.

## RESPONSE RATE

Of the 28 NATO Nations present at the project launch, only 8 had completed questionnaires and returned them to the COE by the March deadline. Extensions were requested by a further 5 nations who had initiated processing across departments but were awaiting cross government consensus or due process before submission. Others needed genuine guidance on completing the questionnaire for which an extension was also allowed. The eventual deadline was 22nd May 2015 (over 2 months after the original deadline), in order to permit the minimum available time for adequate analysis and report writing. At this time, despite active and consistent promotion of the project by the research and management teams, only 11 national questionnaires had been received. The respondent nations were Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

The response rate gave a very good early indication of the importance applied to StratCom by NATO Nations – after all, it measures the level of interest in the subject. The low sample in this project - less than 50% of the population (28 NATO Nations) – is revealing considering the tangible StratCom challenges NATO currently faces in the communications environment. Unsurprisingly, the majority of respondent nations were those with a direct interest in opposing current adversarial information activities – all three Baltic States being the most notable respondents. It is equally interesting to note the level of abstinence from established NATO nations who have recently taken a less potent line against these adversaries.

More significantly the nations slowest to respond were those characterised by higher levels of complexity and bureaucracy at a military and political level - often, where StratCom had previously been considered in more detail. In these nations, the existence of a cross-governmental approach necessitated a higher degree of consensus between departments on the questionnaire data before submission. In one instance a nation was unable to respond within the total project timeline (29 May) due to the level of disclaimer and caveat required for questionnaire responses. Whilst it was an obviously disappointing measure of performance, this provided a key early insight into the influence of bureaucracy upon communications at the Strategic level.

---

---

*I know that the questionnaire has left [Department A] with the views of [A] and [B] staff towards [Department B], from where it will be sent back to you. Only it might not be “in the nearest future”, as we want to answer it sincerely.*

*Respondent Nation 8 May 2015.*

---

---

The limited sample size caused by the low response rate therefore added an additional limitation to the research. It is hoped that the publication of this report will encourage more nations to contribute to further research in the future.

## LANGUAGE

Respondent nations only highlighted minor difficulties in understanding the questionnaires. Only one of the research objectives suffered impact as a result of language. Nations mostly interpreted the questionnaire’s intent to derive a distinction between their behavioural or attitudinal approach to StratCom as a description of their ability to do either or both. In most cases the answer to the question was, simply, “Yes”. Whilst a more detailed description of the question could have resulted in more tangible data, this does suggest an enduring lack of awareness of the differences between the two concepts. This is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

## SUBJECTIVE CORRELATION

It was important for this study to do more than list the structures and capabilities of StratCom components within respondent nations. A future understanding of the concept as a NATO capability is dependent on the “why” in addition to the “what” and “how”. The interpretive nature of the research approach to this study however, could only establish subjective observations of the relationships between organisational structure and culture and StratCom capability and capacity within these nations. These, nonetheless, form a baseline for future development and understanding.

## 2.4. DATA INTERPRETATION

### DEFINITIONS

Of the 11 nations who responded to the questionnaire, 6 cited the use of the NAC approved definition for StratCom, or a close derivative of it, as their national definition. The disappointingly low sample made a more precise study into this definition’s global resonance across the alliance difficult, but this figure is undoubtedly low. In order to investigate drivers for variance from the NAC definition, it was important to investigate to what degree nations accepted the generally held principles of StratCom (see earlier chapters) in their national definition and interpretation of the concept (this was more important in investigating those nations who had not established formal definitions). The following table is the author’s interpretation of the proportion of the sample who made reference to these key concepts/ attributes in responses to questions of definition (StratCom and Narrative) or in wider comments made throughout the questionnaire. Concepts have been shortened and amalgamated from principal sources.

It would appear that most nations tend towards a description of process rather than mindset in their definition of StratCom. Many described the structure and key personnel used to impart the capability when asked for a definition. There was a popular tendency for audience focus across the definitions of respondent nations, both in mindset and process. This was not matched by a significant tendency towards behavioural change and, especially in the insight domain, there was a strong tendency towards attitudinal polling as a means to gauge audience perception.

Concept/Attribute	Cited by
<b>Mindset</b>	
- Audience driven (Understanding)	9/11
- Placing communications at the heart of strategy (Words, images and Actions)	4/11
- Narrative focused (Informing and engaging)	3/11
<b>Process (Insight, Analysis, Delivery)</b>	
- Cross government coordination (dialogue & liaison)	10/11
- Integral to the planning and conduct of all military operations and activities (mostly in a supporting role)	9/11
- Cross capability (PA, MPA, PD Info Ops, PSYOPS)	8/11
- Attitudinal research	8/11
- Use of strategic communication frameworks	7/11
- Behavioural research	1/11

Table 2 Concepts and attributes of StratCom

Almost all respondent nations agreed upon the importance of cross capability coordination. At the military level this is described as the essential coordination of information activities in support of strategic goal. At the political level the importance of cross departmental consensus was emphasised



**The relative newness of the behavioural approach.** The academic credibility of the behavioural approach is not yet sufficiently proven to replace attitudinal approaches completely. It is still gaining traction in military thinking. Attitudinal change remains a more attractive and practical target for senior decision makers.

**Relevance of application at Strategic vs Operational level.** The need to change behaviour among key audiences is more relevant at the operational level where short term changes in behaviour can be specified, observed and measured in support of operational objectives. Higher political strategic issues are often concerned with influence upon attitudes.

**Reactive vs Proactive StratCom approach.** Behavioural analysis tends to be long term and resource intensive. It is more akin to organisations who take a more proactive StratCom approach. The majority of nations interviewed emphasised the short-term reactive emphasis of communications departments predominantly fixed by crises.<sup>5</sup> Here, the time and resource necessary to conduct behavioural research was generally not available and they generally relied upon attitudinal information to gauge audience perception and sentiment.

However, very few of these nations highlighted references to a behavioural approach in their wider responses. The majority cited PA type organisations and procedures as the core of their StratCom approach, which suggests a far more reactive approach (countering narrative, short term reputational management and critical announcements) than indicated above. While this capability predominates, the organisations it supports will tend towards activities that rely on high tempo audience measurement. Behavioural studies cannot generally be conducted in such timeframes and so fail to gain traction with decision makers in the communications delivery sector. Therefore while PA and MPA sit as component capabilities within the NATO definition of StratCom, it can never hope to be wholly proactive in outlook and should be structured to achieve balance.

It would seem that NATO nations are not yet unified in their preference between the two. At Alliance Headquarters level both the behavioural and attitudinal approach have relevance. The number of member nations who set aside NATO's prescribed proportion of GDP for Defence (2%) measures quite accurately nations' supportive behaviour for NATO. Yet, whilst only 4 of the 28 nations achieve this target<sup>6</sup>, most, if not all, attitudinally advocate membership. It is as important to NATO to maintain supportive attitude among key audiences to its ethos and essence as it is to maintain supportive behaviour to its activities. We should deduce that attitudinal audience insight still has relevance, and therefore buy-in, at the higher strategic level. Behavioural studies can add significantly to this insight and should be afforded the time and investment where necessary.

---

<sup>5</sup> Strongly disagree = 1; Disagree = 2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly agree = 5.

<sup>6</sup> Mirror Newspaper Group Article NATO Summit: Which Members are not pulling their weight with defence spending? 3 Sep 2014




Figure 3 Reactivity vs Proactivity in National StratCom Approaches

*We aim to focus on behavioural change. However in practice we do more on attitudes for four reasons: (a) we need to start with awareness to positively influence the attitudes of our key audiences; (b) we lack resources; (c) the need to demonstrate a return on investment in the short term; (d) non StratCom experts within Government tend to think in terms of attitudes rather than behaviour.*

*UK MOD response*

Target Audience Analysis courses currently being delivered by the NATO StratCom COE may influence the focus of approach among member and partner nations, but it would be wise for NATO to blend this approach with further study into developing contemporary attitudinal techniques, taking guidance from the corporate sector where possible.

## CROSS GOVERNMENT COOPERATION

Analysis of organisational structure gives an insight into the relevance placed upon StratCom at military and political levels. In the previous section it was noted that most nations placed a high degree of importance on cross government coordination but few had developed this beyond liaison and dialogue when incorporating communications as a supporting function to policy or operational plans.

In a further section of the questionnaire, nations were asked to describe the list key appointments and structures in each of the key disciplines described by the NAC definition, both at military and political level. By investigating which disciplines were the most highly invested and resourced it was possible

to gain an insight into each nation’s relative focus within the StratCom domain. Secondly, the seniority of key appointments in these disciplines within military and political organisations gave an insight into the degree of importance / relevance those organisations place upon StratCom. This provided a further indication of the degree to which communications sits at the heart of strategy.

The table below summarises this data by averaging the number of employees in the various capability sectors to produce an average Capability Manning Index, and also averaging the lead rank representation in each capability area<sup>7</sup>.

Discipline	Average Rank Representation Index	Average Capability Manning Index
PD	5.9	45
PA	4.5	14
MPA	3.8	39
Info Ops	2.5	6
PSYOPS	2.4	14

Table 3 Average indexes

This table indicates that the greatest emphasis in both establishment and in rank across the sample of respondent nations is in PD. The greatest delta in rank also lies at the top of this table between PD and PA. It is fair to deduce therefore that PD therefore forms the core of NATO nations’ StratCom capability and is likely to dominate developmental thinking. In lead rank terms the data suggests that status falls off progressively through the capabilities of PA, MPA, Info Ops and PSYOPS. This is mirrored in the reported data for levels of establishment, where PA has the second largest average manning index, followed by MPA, Info Ops and PSYOPS.

Increased cooperation between the StratCom sections of various government departments reported by certain nations is encouraging and there is a clear aspiration among most nations to develop StratCom into a fully-fledged command function. Some nations have highly developed communications networks across several government departments. But this can create its own problems. Most notably, the nations with the most developed communications establishments were by far the slowest to respond. Some of the stated “pathologies of bureaucracy” identified in Chapter 2 were apparent here.

This was not only a factor of institutional inertia, but also insulation and cultural contestation (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999), where nations most challenged in achieving the deadline, cited waiting for cross government approval of their responses to be achieved. One nation (who ultimately did not submit a questionnaire) highlighted that all responses would be caveated by disclaimers as the views of certain departments but not others – an example of Barnett and Finnemore’s Bureaucratic Universalism (1999), which in no way reflects upon the nation’s motivation to contribute to development.

<sup>7</sup> Where NATO O/A ranks were not specified the rank index of 7 was afforded to Senior Civil Servants / Ministers / 2 star appointments; 6 was given to Director level appointments / 1 star appointments; 5 to deputy Directors; 4 to unit commanders; 3 to sub unit commanders; and 2 to junior staff officers.

Such pathologies of bureaucracy in StratCom are not new. It is a characteristic of most military organisations that intellectual capability areas, once formally defined, soon develop into departments, which fight to achieve resources and adopt competing command structures. Preservation of internal structures, especially when defence budgets are reduced, quickly becomes the organisation’s main effort. It was therefore unsurprising that this study indicated the highest degrees of creativity in StratCom capability development seemed to lie in those nations with the smallest institutional systems (Comment by Latvia).

## TRAINING

By asking nations to submit data of the number of courses each delivered in a calendar year, the aim was to deduce which of the capabilities across the whole sample were best supported. Data was also requested on the number of students trained in order to deduce total man training days for each discipline, but this was not submitted in sufficient quantity to form a representative sample. Nations also submitted their levels of participation (students and instructors) in the NATO School-delivered StratCom courses, although again responses were not specific enough across the board to deduce factual comparison. The national results obtained within the sample are given in the table below.

Discipline	Total Training Activity (Courses delivered / year)
MPA	33
Info Ops	17
PSYOPS	11
StratCom (General)	8
PD	0
PA	0

Table 4 Total Training Activity

It is notable that the most highly valued disciplines in terms of establishment and lead rank from the previous table – PD and PA - are the least taught across the sample of respondent nations (actually they appear not to be taught at all)<sup>8</sup>. Data was available describing how the NATO School addresses the deficit in PA through the delivery of 2 courses<sup>9</sup>. However there is no evidence of PD training in the military sector, either nationally or from NATO. On the premise that the primary function of diplomacy is to avert physical conflict (ie diplomacy must lead) it is revealing that military awareness and understanding of PD, as a StratCom discipline under the NAC, is not being

<sup>8</sup> This could be attributed to the comparison between the civilian and military sectors, both in government and in NATO. Whereas the military focuses on continuous training, civilians employed by government departments and NATO HQ have less formal training and professional progression mechanisms associated with particular roles.

<sup>9</sup> Public Affairs in Operations Course and Public Affairs Policy Indoctrination Course.



raised. Aside from creating a marked shortfall in capability this prevents interoperability and mutual understanding between the PD sector and the remaining component disciplines. Cross capability tension is therefore unsurprising.

## SWOT ANALYSIS

In the final section of the Questionnaire, nations were asked to list the principal strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to/for StratCom capability development from a national perspective (political and military levels) and as a member of NATO. There was a significant degree of congruence in these observations across respondent nations. The most popular / resonant responses (the top 3 in each case) were collated (and paraphrased) for this report in each of the 3 contexts.

From a national political perspective most agreed that while the delivery of PA was done well by individual government departments, a significant lack of cross government coordination hampered the overall resonance of messaging.

The existence of information and resource silos appears to be a knock on result of this. Most nations cited their political sectors as having a good awareness of the principles and benefits of a coherent and collective StratCom approach but none had managed to achieve it in practice. There is broad agreement that opportunities abound to exploit political events and the political environment but the greatest risk to future development here is institutional inertia (caused by the pathologies of bureaucracy) in the face of highly capable and asymmetric adversaries. The predominantly military background of the research sample was united in its demand for more coherent strategic direction from its governments in order to place communications at the heart of Strategy. A summary is given below.

Strengths	Weaknesses
Political support for StratCom.	Lack of formalised “top down” StratCom mindset, awareness, guidance and coordination.
Good “communications” (PA focused) coordination and delivery.	
Capable talent base across independent StratCom disciplines.	Incoherent information and resource silos within govt departments.
Opportunities	Threats
Reinforce development/understanding through key interoperability opportunities (domestic and international).	Predominance of departmental agenda and lack of consistency.
Streamlining understanding and delivery by harnessing improved technology	Asymmetrical use of all channels by adversaries.

Table 5 Collated SWOT Analysis – Political Level

Responses to the military SWOT analysis were unsurprisingly more detailed and seemed to be based more upon placing communications at the heart of operational planning, where it was inferred that military command and control systems and a broad talent base optimise delivery of messaging. The responses suggested strongly that the ability to achieve this in the majority of nations was most severely hampered by a lack of resources (although very few nations highlighted significant resource deficits when directly questioned). Some nations actually recorded this weakness as a threat to future StratCom development. The capability area most significantly affected by a lack of re-sources was Info Ops. This could suggest a denuded interest by defence chiefs in this ca-pability relative to others.

Only one nation cited resource cuts as a future threat, notwithstanding the fact that others are facing major strategic defence reviews in the coming months. This confi-dence in an improving resource situation predominantly lends support to the growing perception of a current “awakening” in StratCom in the corporate sector (Holthausen and Zerfass 2015), which can and should be exploited by the military.

The driving factors for this were listed separately by different nations but included increased global uncertainty, adversarial asymmetrical advantage in the information domain, increasing em-phasis on soft power, a more dynamic and participative media environment, increased “buy-in” by Strategic Leaders and the rising significance of international/ collaborative StratCom alliances (COE, MNIOE). Whatever the most predominant driver, there is broad agreement to reinforce success in StratCom development while a window of op-portunity and support exists. Achieving this may involve a greater degree of reputational risk appetite than some nations are prepared to develop. This is indicated by a number of nations who place public perception mismatch as a potential threat below.

Strengths	Weaknesses
Effective operational coordination.	Lack of “top down” strategic direction.
Capable talent base across independent StratCom disciplines.	Lack of resources (turnover, training).
Opportunities	Threats
Corporate “StratCom Awakening.”	Defence budget cuts.
Ongoing Defence Reform / Modernisation programs.	National perception mismatch, loss of public trust.

Table 6 SWOT Analysis - Military level

The same StratCom Awakening is also apparent in nation’s responses in the NATO context. Most agree that NATO has a key role to play in exploiting this opportunity, provided it can overcome bureaucratic pathology and give clear direction. There is a notable desire among nations to work from an improved definition of StratCom. Some regional expectations of NATO are apparent in the sample responses; for example Denmark, Norway, Poland and the United Kingdom cite consensus as a major strength, while others note

the degree to which it can be beset by national agenda threatening the Alliance’s global reputation. The data does suggest that StratCom development is hampered by interpretive and organisational disagreement across the alliance, notwithstanding current policy documents. The establishment of a NATO MC policy on StratCom to complement current initiatives<sup>10</sup> will provide guidance to nations seeking an agreed StratCom approach.

Strengths	Weaknesses
NATO’s strong emphasis and recent development on StratCom.	Pathologies of Bureaucracy (Vagueness of documents and directives).
NATO as an alliance of collective voices and means.	
Consensus and cohesion.	Lack of clear direction (including a more representative definition).
Opportunities	Threats
Clarification of NATO Lead organisations (COE, SHAPE StratCom, PDD, ACT, MNIOE).	NATO’s cohesion and reputation can be compromised by competing national agendas.
Reinforcement of cohesion and sharing best practice via other NATO multinational opportunities and activities.	Asymmetric disadvantage.

Table 7 SWOT Analysis - as a member of NATO

## 2.5. THE IMPACT OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

The Questionnaire phase of research did much to confirm understanding of the “what” and “how” in national StratCom approaches. The interview phase offered an opportunity to go beyond confirming these insights and investigate, in a very small sample, to what degree these approaches had been influenced by organisational culture(s) – the “why”. It enabled a better understanding of potential cultural drivers and barriers to reform and development of NATO’s StratCom outlook in the selected nations, and acted as a test bed for cultural base-lining of a wider sample in the future.

Six nations were selected for interview from the questionnaire sample based upon availability and location (within travel constraints). Where possible, interviews were conducted face to face with senior communications specialists from the defence and security sector in each nation, primarily those who had supervised completion of the questionnaires in the previous phase. Additional interviewees were welcomed from other government departments, however the data capture radius of the interviews was clearly defined as the communications organisation that had been referred to in the questionnaire. The adapted OCAI approach and questions (see previous chapter) was sent to all participants in advance and formed the structure / script of each interview with additional time allocated to confirming detail from the Phase 1 Questionnaire where necessary.

<sup>10</sup> NATO StratCom Policy, SHAPE StratCom Framework and Rolling Brief.

From the 4 nations that agreed to publication of interview results (Estonia, Latvia, Norway and United Kingdom) 2 general observations emerged from the meetings. Firstly, the organisational culture associated with the “management of information” in any military organisation is heavily influenced by security classification. This has a significant bearing upon its communications culture encouraging, for good reason, the creation and maintenance of information silos and restricting the ability of organisations to adopt adhocracy or market behaviour. Secondly, bureaucratic behaviour is not necessarily a bad thing in the defence communications domain. It is synonymous with a corporately derived and consistently delivered narrative that is managed to maintain resonance among key audiences. Matching words with deeds, it seems, is a great deal more challenging in an environment that encourages initiative and risk taking at subordinate levels of command.

The combined OCAI map of six nations completed as a result of the interviews can be found below (figure 4). This includes graphical interpretation of each of the adapted OCAI questions in a summary map, which represents the average scores combined. The diagram below highlights an area of “Cultural Congruence” across the interview sample.

It can be seen that this area lies predominantly in the proactive and internally focused domain, which would suggest a mostly bureaucratic approach to communications among participants. The second most populated quadrant is proactive and externally focused, highlighting the importance of market type behaviour. This reflects these nations’ stated intent to maintain a high degree of internal control over StratCom but also their aspirations to adopt a behavioural approach to audience measurement, which have not yet been realised.




Figure 4 OCAI Summary - Combined (includes non-disclosing participants)

## CONCLUSIONS - HOW TO EXPLOIT STRATCOM AWAKENING

This project has gone some way to unlocking the differences in interpretation of StratCom as a process and mind-set among member nations and to better derive its relevance in their contemporary defence outlook. Notwithstanding a disappointingly low response rate, the questionnaire phase of research filled important gaps in understanding, highlighted in literature and previous work. The new information gained about nations’ StratCom capability will be assimilated into NATO COE compendiums of capability for use by its whole community of interest in due course.

Recommendations from this kind of interpretive study cannot hope to be absolute. They are nonetheless relevant to the organisations and individual stakeholders currently driving StratCom development at national and alliance levels, as they are formed from the thoughts of the member nations who will derive the most direct benefit.

**Re-codify to reflect Interpretation over Structure.** Most importantly, the study has gathered a significant wave of support for a step change in development. The time for NATO to lead such a transformation in StratCom awareness, understanding and application is now. A re-codified NATO definition of StratCom within a new MC Policy seems a logical place to start. As Holtzhausen and Zerfass (2014) note:

---

*Strategic Communications is not just a term used in substitution for disliked or ill-reputed concepts. It is a distinct approach focusing on the process of communication which offers complementary insights and opens up new fields for interdisciplinary research.*

---

The smorgasbord of current definitions does not help to educate the palate of generalist strategic decision makers (to whom it should eventually become core business), but the study has highlighted a workable level of congruence in national interpretations of both StratCom and Narrative, which bodes well for a future alignment of thought. There is strong evidence to suggest that both mind-set and process are equally resonant as component parts - but process still dominates, due to the predominance of PD and PA as core capabilities. Overcoming this mismatch is the first critical step required towards gaining traction with senior leaders to support development.

The following diagram illustrates how the competing values identified from research can be concurrently and not exclusively applied to aid understanding. It depicts the coexistence of the competing components of Process vs Mind-set, Behaviour vs Attitude, Proactive vs Reactive and Supported vs Supporting in varying degrees depending on the situation, operation or activity at hand and suggests that commanders may assess a desired setting according to their own understanding.




Figure 5 Future Drivers of StratCom Interpretation

**Close the PD Gap.** StratCom is still a long way from being a supported – rather than supporting - capability. For communications to sit at the heart of strategy there is a strong demand for clear “top down” direction at the military and political level, noting that this increases the propensity for increased interoperability between the PD sector and other StratCom disciplines to facilitate this. The training of military personnel in PD should be initiated by all nations and NATO organisations (NATO School, NATO StratCom COE) as a matter of priority to foster better mutual understanding and prevent role overlap and cultural contestation. Certainly the preferential levels of investment in nations’ PA/PD sectors relative to their counterparts in Info Ops, PSYOPS and organic StratCom departments is worthy of review.

**Organisational Culture.** From the smaller interview sample there is evidence to suggest that organisational culture has a significant impact upon StratCom outlook. This warrants further investigation by the NATO StratCom COE. The adapted OCAI approach suggests a significant area of cultural congruence with a predominant tendency towards internally focused proactivity. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Bureaucratic universalism may aid narrative consistency.

**Behaviour Plus Attitude.** Whilst all nations in the sample accept that “the audience has a vote”, few have embraced a behavioural approach to audience analysis. Contemporary TAA methodologies promise, without doubt, the most scientific way to baseline and measure audience behaviour in the long term. The secondary propensity towards externally focused, proactive or market behaviour in the adapted OCAI sample cites a growing aspiration for this type of behavioural audience measurement (*Outcomes*) - but doesn’t suggest it should be taken in isolation. Time constraints, cost and contexts will always challenge a wholly behavioural approach within governments focused by crises. A blended approach which also considers attitudinal *Out-takes*<sup>13</sup> is supported across the sample and has particular

<sup>13</sup> Deductions made by measuring the follow on activity of outputs such as retweets, metadata analytics viewing rates etc. The UK Government Communications Service describes this in full at [gcn.civilservice.gov.uk](http://gcn.civilservice.gov.uk)

relevance at the strategic / political level. Encouragingly, it would appear that understanding of the need for measurement in most nations has developed quickly beyond the mere quantifying of StratCom *Outputs*.

**Get into the Water.** The broad base of talent across NATO's contributing headquarters, departments and nations offers a significant opportunity to exploit the ongoing StratCom awakening armed with these insights. The NATO StratCom COE is well placed to advise transformation at a critical time through engagement, collective education, research and development. This will only be successful if greater contribution to further studies such as this can be encouraged. This is every nation's business – and every commander's. If future Op Orders should be StratCom directives with operational annexes, not operational objectives with StratCom support (Tatham and LePage 2014) then commanders must be persuaded to participate in equal measure to specialists. Talismanic leadership and a surgically planned communications strategy in its own right is needed to shift attitude and/or behaviour among NATO's senior commanders in order to achieve this goal. The opportunities listed by participant nations in this study are a call to arms for NATO's StratCom community to reinforce interoperability where it does "good", and also where it is merely doing "well", leverage NATO's brand, cohesion and network and ride the awakening. It would be a pity to watch such a good wave from the beach.

# LIST OF REFERENCES

## BOOKS

- Anderson, V. (2013) *Research Methods in Human Resource Management: Investigating a Business Issue* (3rd ed.). London: Chartered Institute of Personnel Development.
- Bernardi, D., Hope, P., Lundry, C., Ruston, Scott. W. (2012) *Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism, and the Struggle for Strategic Influence*. New Brunswick, NJ, USA: Rutgers University Press.
- Cameron, K., Quinn, R. (2006) *Diagnosing and Changing Organisational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework*. San Fransisco, CA, USA: Jossey-Bass
- Coker, C. (2009) *War in the age of Risk*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Grandstaff, M., Sorenson, G., (2000) *Strategic Leadership: The Generals Art*. Virginia : Management Concepts.
- Hoffmann, D. (2002) *Managing Operational Risks: 20 Firmwide Best Practice Strategies*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Holtzhausen, D., Zerfass, A. (2015) *The Routedledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*. New York and London: Routedledge
- Mackay, A., Tatham, S. (2011) *Behavioural Conflict : Why Understanding People and their Motivation Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict*. Saffron Walden: Military Studies Press.

## ARTICLES

- Barnett, M., Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organisation*, (53 /04), 699-732.
- Flynn, M., Pottinger, M., Batchelor, P. (2010). *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. *Voices from the Field*, (2010-04-20), DIA Center for a New American Security, USA.
- Knighton, R. (2004). The Psychology of Risk and its Role in Military Decision Making. *Defence Studies*, (4/3), 309-344.
- Maurer, M. (1994) *Coalition Command and Control*. National Defense University, Washington DC. 5.
- Paparone, C., Anderson, R., McDaniel, R. (2008). Where Military Professionalism Meets Complexity Science. *Armed Forces & Society*, (34/3), 433-449.
- Plythian, M. (2012). Policing Uncertainty: Intelligence, Security and Risk. *Intelligence and National Security*, (27/2), 187-205.
- Tatham, A., LePage, R. (2014) *NATO Strategic Communication: More to be Done? Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvia Centre for Security and Strategic Research, Policy Paper No.1.*



## GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

NATO. North Atlantic Council. (2009). NATO Strategic Communications Policy. Brussels. International Staff. Private Office of the Secretary General

United Kingdom. Haddon Cave, C. (2009). The Nimrod Review: An Independent Review Into the Broader Issues Surrounding the Loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006. London: The Stationary Office.

United Kingdom. The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. (2008). British Defence Doctrine. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, (3rd ed). Shrivenham: DCDC.

United Kingdom. The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. (2010). The Future Character of Conflict. Shrivenham: DCDC.

United Kingdom. The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre. (2012). Strategic Communication. The Defence Contribution. Joint Doctrine Note 1-12. Shrivenham: DCDC.

United Kingdom. Defence Leadership Centre. (2004). Leadership in Defence. Shrivenham: DLC.

### DEFENCE RESEARCH PAPERS:

Earle, P. (2011). A Study of Risk Management and Safety Culture in Aircraft Operations: What Can the MoD Learn from the Best Practices and Mistakes of Others? (Joint Services Command and Staff Course Defence Research Paper). JSCSC. Watchfield.

Griffin, N. (2011). Black Swans and Kingfishers: Risk and Decision Making – The Missing Link between operational success and strategic failure. (Joint Services Command and Staff Course Defence Research Paper). JSCSC. Watchfield.

Hartzog, P. (date unknown) 21st Century Governance as a Complex Adaptive System. Dissertation for the Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA.

Miller, L. (date unknown). Military Information Networks as Complex Adaptive Systems. Article for MT Division National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, VA.1.

## WEBSITES

Interview with air Marshall Timo Anderson RAF. (2011). Retrieved from the Defense News Website: <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110523/DEFFEAT03/105230301/Air-Marshall-Timo-Anderson>

Government Communications Service Handbook. (2014). Guidance <https://gcn.civilservice.gov.uk/about/government-communication-service/gcs-handbook-guidance/>


Government Communications Service Handbook. (2014). Behavioural Change - GCS guide to behaviour change and communications. <https://gcn.civilservice.gov.uk/guidance/how-to-guides/behavioural-change/>

Government Communication Service. (2104) Guide to Communications and Behaviour Change. <https://gcn.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/GCSBehaviourChangeGuideJune14Web>.

# ANNEX A ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (ADAPTED)

Instructions for completing the Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI).

The purpose of the (adapted) OCAI is to assess six key dimensions of organisational culture as it applies to StratCom in the diagram below. It basically assesses the degree to which an organisation is motivated to communicate internally vs externally and proactively vs reactively. It further offers an explanation for this behaviour by assessing the degree to which the organisation approximates to the behaviours of clans, adhocracies, markets or bureaucracies, which are also explained below. Mapping individual nations according to this model will provide the NATO StratCom COE with a simple analysis of how each nation “does business” in StratCom terms, which will empower its dealings with each nation.



In completing the adapted instrument, you will be providing a picture of your organization’s approach to strategic communication and the drivers that characterize it. No right or wrong answers exist for these questions, just as there is no right or wrong culture. Every organisation will most likely produce a different set of responses. Therefore, be as accurate as you can in responding to the questions so that your resulting cultural diagnosis will be as precise as possible.

You are asked to rate the organisation (or set of organizations) that you considered in the NATO StratCom COE Nation Mapping Questionnaires in the questions, namely those collectively responsible for the delivery of StratCom across the security and defence sector of your nations. The un-adapted OCAI model is helpful for determining ways to change organizational culture. This is not the aim of this project, but you may wish to keep in mind the parts of the organisation that can be affected by a change strategy in the future.

The (adapted) OCAI consists of six questions. Each question has four alternatives. Divide 100 points among these four alternatives depending on the extent to which each alternative is similar to your own organisation. Give a higher number of points to the alternative that is most similar to your organisation. For example, in question one, if you think alternative A is very similar to your organisation, alternative B and C are somewhat similar, and alternative D is hardly similar at all, you might give 55 points to A, 20 points to B and C, and five points to D. Just be sure your total equals 100 points for each question.

1. Dominant Organisational Characteristics		Score
A	The organisation is primarily motivated by personal interaction. It is like an extended family. People share a lot of themselves.	
B	The organisation is a very dynamic entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.	
C	The organisation is very results oriented. The primary concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement oriented.	
D	The organisation is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do.	
	Total	
2. Organisational Leadership		Score
A	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing.	
B	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk taking.	
C	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus.	
D	The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency.	
	Total	
3. Management of Information		Score
A	Information is shared internally according to an ethos of teamwork, consensus, and participation.	
B	Information is shared externally and individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness are encouraged to achieve interdepartmental consensus.	
C	The management of information across the organisation is characterised by hard-driving competitiveness, and measured effect.	
D	The management of information in the organisation is characterised by departmental security, predictability, and stability in relationships.	
	Total	
4. Communication as component of organisational glue		Score
A	The glue that holds the organisation together is loyalty and mutual trust. Communication supports strategy and short term reputation management.	
B	The glue that holds the organisation together is innovation and development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge in the competition for narrative dominance.	
C	The glue that holds the organisation together is the emphasis on changing behaviour in key target audiences. Communication sits at the heart of strategy.	
D	The glue that holds the organisation together is formal rules, policies, smooth running and long term reputation. Communication sits at the heart of strategy.	
	Total	
5. Strategic Communication Emphases		Score
A	The organisation's ethos of human development, high trust, openness and participation form the core of its message.	
B	The organisation primarily seeks to influence the real time perceptions of key audiences and emphasises innovative audience focused communications to achieve this.	

C	The organisation places behavioural change among key audiences at the heart of a measurable frame-worked communications approach.	
D	The organisations emphasis on its own permanence, stability, efficiency, control and smooth operations forms the core of a frame-worked communications strategy.	
	Total	
<b>6. Criteria of Success</b>		<b>Score</b>
A	The organisation defines communications success on the basis of effective counter narrative and the speed and quantity (output) of information flow.	
B	The organisation defines communications success on the basis of indicated perception change (out-takes). It aims to be a communications leader and innovator.	
C	The organisation defines success on the basis of measured behavioural change among key audiences (out-comes). It aims to be the dominant trader in the communications marketplace.	
D	The organisation defines communications success on the basis of preserved efficiency and reputation (in-comes).	
	Total	

## A WORKSHEET FOR SCORING THE OCAI

1A
2A
3A
4A
5A
6A
Sum (total of A responses)
Average (sum divided by 6)

1B
2B
3B
4B
5B
6B
Sum (total of B responses)
Average (sum divided by 6)

1C
2C
3C
4C
5C
6C
Sum (total of C responses)
Average (sum divided by 6)


1D
2D
3D
4D
5D
6D
Sum (total of D responses)
Average (sum divided by 6)

### SCORING

Scoring the OCAI is very easy. It requires simple arithmetic calculations. The first step is to add together all A responses in the Now column and divide by six. That is, compute an average score for the A alternatives in the Now column. Do this for all of the questions, A, B, C, and D. Once you have done this, transfer your answers to this page in the boxes provided on the right.

NOW	
A (CLAN)	
B (ADHOCRACY)	
C (MARKET)	
D (HIERARCHY)	
TOTAL	

### STRATCOM ORGANISATIONAL MAP - EXAMPLE



# ANNEX B

## QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE



NATO RESTRICTED after completion

### NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Mapping Communications (StratCom) Capacity in the Defence Structures of NATO Nations

#### Participant Questionnaire

Your country

Your name, position, email and phone

*The Project aims to fill a gap in academic knowledge by investigating the key characteristics of StratCom capacity and capability in the defence sectors of NATO nations. The research will aim to review nations' policy, doctrine and organisational structure, training and education as well as personnel which NATO nations have in place to deliver StratCom in the defence domain.*

*The development of NATO's collective and individual member nations' StratCom credibility depends first upon an authentic base line appraisal of its member nations' capacity and capability. Although member nations apply slightly differing approaches and definitions in their national doctrine, most agree on the importance of StratCom to Alliance cohesion and credibility, countering rival narratives and assuring operational success.*

*The outcomes of the Project should serve the interests of all NATO nations as well as NATO command structure as it aims to:*

- *unlock the differences in interpretation of StratCom as a process and mind-set among member nations and NATO Headquarters and review how such interpretations determine capability and capacity in this field;*
- *explore to what degree individual countries regard the utility and priority of StratCom as a mind-set to mitigate strategic risk in the contemporary operating environment;*
- *assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to individual nations' StratCom capacity and capability in order to provide guidance to NATO on the construction of a future holistic approach to optimise narrative resonance.*

*Your responses are required in the following key areas:*

- Your interpretation of StratCom as a concept and process;*
- Your nation's perception of the utility and priority of StratCom as a mind-set to mitigate strategic risk in the contemporary operating environment;*
- The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to your nation's StratCom capacity and capability.*

*We recommend that filling of the questionnaire is led either by the StratCom advisor or the Director of the Communications Department in the MoD. Please, note that other civilian and military departments will have to be involved in the process.*

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

**A. YOUR INTERPRETATION OF STRATCOM AS A CONCEPT AND PROCESS**

**GENERAL**










1. How is **Strategic Communication(s)** defined (with document references) and interpreted in the defence and security departments of your nation at political and military levels?

Political level


Department 1	Doc. reference	Definition	Interpretation
			
Department 2	Doc. reference	Definition	Interpretation
			
Department 3	Doc. reference	Definition	Interpretation
			

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

Military level

Department 1	Doc. reference	Definition	Interpretation
			
Department 2	Doc. reference	Definition	Interpretation
			
Department 3	Doc. reference	Definition	Interpretation
			

2. To what extent do any identified differences in definition or interpretation of Strategic Communication(s) proffer advantage or limitation in the communications capacity and/or capability of your nation's defence and security sector?



NATO RESTRICTED after completion



NATO RESTRICTED after completion

3. To what extent do you regard the overall Strategic Communication(s) capabilities of relevant departments within the defence and security sector to be:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Reactive	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Proactive	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cross-government	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

4. Do the departments delivering Strategic Communication(s) in this sector employ any mechanisms to enhance cross government liaison? Please describe.

5. Does the collective output of Strategic Communication(s) by the relevant departments seek to change attitude or behavior among key audiences?













6. How are audiences base-lined, measured and analysed?

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

7. If the Narrative is defined, please provide document references and explain its application in the defence and security departments (please give the department name) of your nation at political and military levels.

Political level

Department 1	Reference	Definition	Application
			
Department 2	Reference	Definition	Application
			
Department 3	Reference	Definition	Application
			

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

Military level

Department 1

Reference

Definition

Application

Department 2

Reference

Definition

Application

Department 3

Reference

Definition

Application

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

**APPLICATION OF STRATCOM**

8. Would you say that your nation develops policy and plans guided by StratCom objectives?

9. Does your nation utilize StratCom framework in planning process? (NATO StratCom Framework or one developed by your nation.)

10. Would you say that your nation does inter-agency coordination on communications issues? If yes, is there a formal body for it? At what level?

11. Would you say that your organisation can be formally assigned a cross-government lead for communications on certain issues or in certain situations? If yes, please describe.

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

12. Would you say that your communications personnel is familiar with the SHAPE/ISAF StratCom Framework and ISAF Rolling Brief? Has your nation applied them for internal (national) communication purposes?

13. Would you say that your organisation has developed guiding communications documents in accordance with NATO StratCom Policy of 2009, the NATO Military Concept for StratCom of 2010 and the NATO ACO Directive on StratCom of 2012?

14. What changes or improvements would you like to see in NATO's guiding documents for StratCom? How would that assist your nation in applying StratCom?

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

**DOCTRINE, ORGANISATION, LEADERSHIP AND MATERIEL**

**15. Communications lead – political level**

Responsible in the Organisation for **Public Diplomacy**

Since when has the department/unit been operating?

	Less than 1 year	1 year	1-3 years	3-5 years	Over 5 years
Answer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Year of last reform/restructuring (+reason):

Lead rank and position:

Reports to:

Key Responsibilities:

Directly subordinated comms personnel (nr. civ/mil):

Does it have a coordinating function?

Policy, Doctrine and other guiding documents:

Responsible in the Organisation for **Public Affairs**

Since when has the department/unit been operating?

	Less than 1 year	1 year	1-3 years	3-5 years	Over 5 years
Answer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Year of last reform/restructuring (+reason):

Lead rank and position:

Reports to:

Key Responsibilities:

Directly subordinated comms personnel (nr. civ/mil):

Does it have a coordinating function?

Policy, Doctrine and other guiding documents:

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

16. Communications lead – military level

Responsible in the forces for **Military Public Affairs**

Since when has the department/unit been operating?

	Less than 1 year	1 year	1-3 years	3-5 years	Over 5 years
Answer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Year of last reform/restructuring (+reason):

Lead rank and position:

Reports to:

Key Responsibilities :

Directly subordinated comms personnel (nr. civ/mil):

Does it have a coordinating function?

Policy, Doctrine and other guiding documents:

Responsible in the forces for **Information Operations**

Since when has the department/unit been operating?

	Less than 1 year	1 year	1-3 years	3-5 years	Over 5 years
Answer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Year of last reform/restructuring (+reason):

Lead rank and position:

Reports to:

Key Responsibilities :

Directly subordinated comms personnel (nr. civ/mil):

Does it have a coordinating function?

Policy, Doctrine and other guiding documents:

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

Responsible in the forces for Psychological Operations

Since when has the department/unit been operating?

	Less than 1 year	1 year	1-3 years	3-5 years	Over 5 years
Answer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Year of last reform/restructuring (+reason):

Lead rank and position:

Reports to:

Key Responsibilities:

Directly subordinated comms personnel (nr. civ/mil):

Does it have a coordinating function?

Policy, Doctrine and other guiding documents:

17. Materiel and Personnel

a. Would you say that your organisation has enough human resources to implement StratCom (or communications) with the desired efficiency? Please elaborate, if possible..

b. Would you say that your organisation lacks human resources for effective communication in either political, civilian or military side?

c. Would you say that your organisation has the relevant equipment, tools and technologies available for you to conduct StratCom (or communications) with the desired efficiency?

NATO RESTRICTED after completion



---

**B. YOUR NATION'S PERCEPTION OF THE UTILITY AND PRIORITY OF STRATCOM AS A MIND-SET TO MITIGATE STRATEGIC RISK IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.**

**GENERAL**

18. To what degree does your nation's security and defence sector (political and military) rate Strategic Communication(s) in importance as a risk mitigation capability relative to other military capability now and in the future? Please give details of any significant announcements made in this field.

19. To what degree is Strategic Communication(s) a supported or supporting function in your nation's defence strategy development? Asked another way, does your nation's defence sector place communication at the heart of Strategy or use its Strategic Communication(s) departments to communicate strategy crafted by other departments?

**LEADERSHIP**

20. Would you say that your organisation practices StratCom – the coordination of different communications functions? If yes, who is your StratCom lead and where does this person stand in the organisational structure?

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

21. How would you characterize the education of the leading personnel in communications (StratCom), civ & mil: (a) with university degree in Communications field; (b) no university degree in Communications field; (c) with university degree in Communications field and has received additional training in Communications (courses, seminars); (d) no university degree in Communications field but has received additional training in Communications (courses, seminars).

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

22. Communications training provided by the nation itself (incl. outsourced training - for example, hosting training provided by Mobile Training Teams from abroad)

Name of Training institution (add as necessary):

Lead rank and position:

Subordinated to:

**General Communications Intro** course:

Number of courses per year

Is the training open to other agencies? (MFA, MOIA, etc)

Involvement of outside of the agency lecturers

Involvement of foreign lecturers

**Public Diplomacy** training/course:

Number of courses per year

Is the training open to other agencies? (MFA, MOIA, etc)

Involvement of outside of the agency lecturers

Involvement of foreign lecturers

**Public Affairs** training/course:

Number of courses per year

Is the training open to other agencies? (MFA, MOIA, etc)

Involvement of outside of the agency lecturers

Involvement of foreign lecturers

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

**Military Public Affairs training/course:**

Number of courses per year	<input type="text"/>
Is the training open to other agencies? (MFA, MOIA, etc)	<input type="text"/>
Involvement of outside of the agency lecturers	<input type="text"/>
Involvement of foreign lecturers	<input type="text"/>

**Information Operations training/course:**

Number of courses per year	<input type="text"/>
Is the training open to other agencies? (MFA, MOIA, etc)	<input type="text"/>
Involvement of outside of the agency lecturers	<input type="text"/>
Involvement of foreign lecturers	<input type="text"/>

**Psychological Operations training/course:**

Number of courses per year	<input type="text"/>
Is the training open to other agencies? (MFA, MOIA, etc)	<input type="text"/>
Involvement of outside of the agency lecturers	<input type="text"/>
Involvement of foreign lecturers	<input type="text"/>

**23. Regular participation in the courses offered by NATO School in Oberammergau (NSO)**

**NATO StratCom Senior Officer Familiarization Course**

Providing lecturers/mentors in support to NSO: Yes/No	<input type="text"/>
Sending personnel to this course: Yes/No; Civ/Mil	<input type="text"/>

**NATO Operations Planners PsyOps Course**

Providing lecturers/mentors in support to NSO: Yes/No	<input type="text"/>
Sending personnel to this course: Yes/No; Civ/Mil	<input type="text"/>

**NATO Senior Officer Info Ops Course**

Providing lecturers/mentors in support to NSO: Yes/No	<input type="text"/>
Sending personnel to this course: Yes/No; Civ/Mil	<input type="text"/>

**NATO Info Ops Course**

Providing lecturers/mentors in support to NSO: Yes/No	<input type="text"/>
Sending personnel to this course: Yes/No; Civ/Mil	<input type="text"/>

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

NATO Public Affairs in Operations Course

Providing lecturers/mentors in support to NSO: Yes/No

Sending personnel to this course: Yes/No; Civ/Mil

NATO Public Affairs Policy Indoctrination Course

Providing lecturers/mentors in support to NSO: Yes/No

Sending personnel to this course: Yes/No; Civ/Mil

24. Regular participation in the courses offered by other NATO nations or partners

Topic of the courses and level of training

NATO RESTRICTED after completion

---

### C. THE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO YOUR NATION'S STRATCOM CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY

Taking your responses to all of the above questions into account, how would you describe the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats to StratCom Capacity and Capability in the defence and security sector of your nation:

At the political level:

Strengths

Weaknesses

Opportunities

Threats

At the military level:

Strengths

Weaknesses

Opportunities

Threats

As a member of NATO:

Strengths

Weaknesses

Opportunities

Threats