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UNIFIED VOICES:

Coherence and restraint in Ukraine's wartime communication, May–November 2023

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Cover image: '*Plans Love Silence*' taken from a Ukrainian operational-security campaign released in June 2023, encouraging the public not to disclose information that could aid Russian forces. The image reflects a tension the report examines: under operational security, coordinated silence can itself be a form of alignment.

In line with the transparency principles of Article 50 of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), the authors disclose the following. The research method uses a large language model (Claude 3 Haiku) and a semantic reranking model (ColBERT), as described in Section 2. AI assistance was also used in editing the text, checking citations and preparing some figures. All content was reviewed by the authors, who hold editorial responsibility for the analysis and conclusions.

Riga, October 2026

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Foreword

Ukraine's 'One Voice' ('Єдиний голос'[1]) approach rests on the view that communicating clearly and consistently with its own citizens, allies and the wider world is integral to sustaining the country's defence and securing international support. Sustaining that consistency across dozens of institutions and communicators is the purpose of the idea.

One Voice is not a single script. Its aim is for a wide range of official and independent actors to converge, voluntarily, around a shared understanding of events. The findings suggest it depends as much on trusted voices outside government choosing to carry shared messages as on official guidance.

Building on this idea, Ukraine's Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security (CSC) produced 'Main Positions of Information Response', the material analysed in this report, and now issues its successor, 'Information Angles', daily. These products offer a common factual and framing reference, not a directive. Communicators outside government remain free to draw on them or not. The report's findings are consistent with this: uptake varied substantially, even among official accounts.

While coherence is the aim of One Voice, the extent to which it is achieved requires measurement. This report assesses that extent at scale, including the factors that constrain coherence, such as operational security, and it is open about the limits of what this kind of analysis can show. We regard that candour as the report's central value: communication that is assessed can be improved; communication that is not, cannot.

We commend this report to practitioners, researchers and partners as a contribution to the continuing cooperation between the NATO StratCom COE and the CSC.

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Riga and Kyiv, October 2026

About this report

This report asks when and where Ukraine's official and aligned communicators actually aligned with the Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security's 'Main Positions of Information Response' between May and November 2023, and what shaped that alignment. Two contrasting cases anchor the analysis: Ukraine's 2023 counter-offensive, where operational security made coherence harder to sustain, and the 16 May missile attack on Kyiv, where a clear outcome made coherence easier to achieve.

The report argues that One Voice works less as top-down discipline and more as a wider alignment process, one that depends on credible media and civil-society voices as much as on official guidance. It is intended for communication practitioners, military planners, and NATO and partner audiences seeking a practical way to monitor messaging coherence alongside reach and engagement.

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Executive summary

Strategic communication[2] is often judged by its reach, speed and creativity, and Ukraine's wartime communication has attracted wide attention on all three. Less attention has been paid to whether the many actors communicating on Ukraine's behalf say compatible things. Ukraine's 'One Voice' approach aims for exactly that: a wide range of state and non-state communicators converging, voluntarily, on shared positions. Building on that idea, Ukraine's Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security (CSC), established in 2021, has published 'Main Positions of Information Response': short statements of the state's position on current events that communicators inside and outside government can draw on.

This report examines one dimension of Ukraine's communication performance: messaging coherence, meaning how far official and aligned communicators conveyed messages consistent with these positions. Coherence is widely assumed to make communication more credible and persuasive. This report measures how far it was achieved, not whether it had that effect. It asks three questions:

1. When and where did Ukrainian official and aligned messaging between May and November 2023 remain coherent with the CSC's Main Positions across platforms, themes and account types?

2. How did different operational contexts, in particular the 2023 counter-offensive and acute missile attacks, shape messaging coherence under the One Voice approach?

3. What do these patterns reveal about how the One Voice approach functions in practice, including the role of CSC positions in structuring alignment?

Using the Main Positions as a reference baseline, the report develops an AI-enabled method for assessing whether posts from official and aligned accounts on Telegram, Facebook, Twitter/X and YouTube conveyed messages consistent with these positions. Coherence here means alignment with the CSC's framing, not a judgement on that framing's accuracy.

The analysis shows that coherence can be assessed systematically across platforms, themes and account types. It also shows that coherence is shaped by the nature of the event, the constraints under which communicators operate, the platforms through which messages circulate and the availability of clear messages that different actors can repeat. Four findings stand out.

First, One Voice works less as centralised message discipline than as a wider alignment process. Official status did not reliably predict coherence: some regional officials were less consistently aligned, while some media, expert and fact-checking accounts were among the most reliably on message.

Second, an event's strategic importance does not guarantee coherence. Coherence was harder to sustain around the 2023 counter-offensive, a large, complex and prolonged operation in which operational security (OPSEC) constraints and uneven battlefield developments limited what could be communicated publicly; part of this may reflect deliberate restraint, which the method cannot detect. By contrast, coherence rose sharply around the 16 May missile attack on Kyiv, where Ukraine reported a clear outcome (all missiles intercepted) that different actors could repeat without elaboration.

Third, CSC positions cannot be shown to cause coherence directly. Timing data suggests, however, that they may help frame messaging on difficult-to-communicate or OPSEC-sensitive topics such as the counter-offensive, where aligned actors have fewer clear messages to draw on.

Fourth, coherence and reach follow different audience logics. Telegram was central to Ukrainian-language, domestic-facing communication, and Twitter/X to international-facing visibility, while unofficial accounts often outperformed official ones in reach and engagement on both.

For NATO and partners, the main implication is that, if coherence matters as practitioners assume, it should be monitored alongside reach and engagement. Strategic communication assessment should ask whether aligned actors are repeating compatible messages, where coherence is weaker, and when additional guidance may help.

1. Introduction

Ukraine's communication has been widely praised as fast, creative and multi-platform, leading many observers to argue that it was 'winning the information war'. At least in the eyes of Western publics, a coordinated, high-volume effort helped sustain international support and reinforce domestic morale, while undermining Russia's will to fight.[3]

Much of the research on Ukrainian communication has focused on its reach, speed and creativity. Existing accounts have highlighted Ukraine's ability to communicate through a wide range of actors, from central government institutions and the armed forces to local authorities, civil society, media organisations and individual public figures. Ukrainian communication has often been described as a whole-of-society effort, in which a strong national narrative has been translated into a "polyphonic, non-hierarchical and creative strategic communication effort".[4] The result is a crowded field of communicators, many of them highly visible to domestic and international audiences.

Yet this breadth of communication also raises a coordination challenge. When many actors contribute to the same strategic narrative, the effectiveness of communication is often assumed to depend not only on visibility or speed, but also on the extent to which messages remain consistent and aligned with strategic objectives. In this context, coherence becomes central. The assumption behind this, widely held among Western governments and communication practitioners, is that consistent messaging across official channels builds credibility and trust, and thereby supports communicative effectiveness.[5] It is an assumption, not an established finding: some prominent political actors communicate inconsistently, at least at the tactical level, without obvious cost to their credibility. This report therefore treats the value of coherence as a premise of the approach examined here, not a settled fact. It measures how far coherence was achieved; it does not assess whether coherence made Ukraine's communication more persuasive.

In Ukraine, this emphasis on consistency is expressed in the 'One Voice' ('Єдиний голос') approach,[6] which seeks to synchronise state and civil-society communication around shared positions without imposing a rigid, top-down script.

The idea grew out of an attempt to reform government communications. In 2015, a Communication Reform Group working under the Cabinet of Ministers found no unified system for managing government communication, with ministries promoting their own messages that often did not reflect government strategy. Its reform concept, approved by the Cabinet in January 2016, proposed separating political from government communications and creating a central government communications office.[7] The wider reform stalled after a change of government in April 2016. The Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers later ran a government communication platform under the One Voice name, bringing communicators from state bodies together with journalists and international experts for training and exchange;[8] in December 2018, a Cabinet order formalised its activities.[9]

During the period analysed in this report, no single body coordinated Ukraine's government communication. The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy held formal responsibility for strategic communications policy, with the CSC operating under it,[10] but as one ministry among others it had no authority to direct the communication of other ministries.

The CSC, set up in March 2021 as a state institution attached to the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, was designed as a

joint mechanism of the state and civil society. It was not an executive authority and had no power to issue binding instructions to ministries or the media.[11] It later began issuing 'Main Positions of Information Response'[12] for state institutions, and for journalists, news organisations and others outside government who sought official information. They were issued three to five times a week, in Ukrainian and English. The Main Positions were not a formal output of the original One Voice initiative, but they are conceptually related to it: the initiative established the principle that state and aligned communicators should speak consistently, and that principle created the space for the CSC to produce shared positions.[13] They function as a flexible 'message box' that offers factual background and recommended framing for complex issues, supporting alignment in public discussion while stopping short of directing independent outlets on how to report.

On the basis of these positions, this report uses an AI-enabled method for assessing messaging coherence[14] in official Ukrainian and aligned social media accounts between May and November 2023. It examines whether messages circulating across the monitored information environment aligned with the CSC's Main Positions. The report treats these as a practical expression of the One Voice approach, not its direct product. Section 2 sets out the method in full.

A note on terminology and legitimacy

Ukrainian public-communication practice commonly uses the terms *tezy* (тези, 'key points') and *mesedzhi* (меседжі, 'messages') for concise guidance on the points communicators should convey. Ukrainian practitioners also describe this type of product as a 'message box'. It broadly corresponds to what Western European communicators might call 'talking points' or 'lines to take'.

The CSC called its product *Main Positions of Information Response*, a label retained in this report for consistency with the source material. Functionally, it is a *tezy*/*mesedzhi*-style message box: a short set of factual context and framing points that communicators may adopt and adapt, rather than a script to be delivered verbatim.

This distinction is important because it separates voluntary communication guidance from covert editorial control. Ukraine's information environment carries the legacy of a very different practice. Under President Leonid Kuchma in the early 2000s, the presidential administration issued covert instructions to television and print media dictating which topics to cover, which to avoid, and how to frame them, known as темники (*temnyky*, literally 'themes').[15] These directives allegedly instructed editors how to treat important news items while asking them to ignore issues considered anti-government. Journalists reported receiving these directives from the president's administration, prescribing subjects to be covered and how to report them, and officials consistently denied their existence when confronted. *Temnyky* were also enforced. Outlets and journalists who ignored them risked pressure from the authorities. Such control is incompatible with a free press: it removes editorial independence while concealing the government's role from audiences. The practice — common in authoritarian states, including Russia - ceased after the 2004 Orange Revolution, though a 2024 scandal at the state news agency Ukrinform, where journalists reported internal guidance resembling *temnyky*-style instructions on topics and speakers, showed how similar pressures can resurface.[16]

The Main Positions differ from *temnyky* on the dimensions that decide whether coherence is a legitimate object of study or a euphemism for censorship. The most important is enforcement: *temnyky* were backed by pressure

on outlets that did not comply, whereas the CSC had no authority to require anyone to use its positions, and uptake is voluntary. The Main Positions also label the government's position explicitly, alongside factual background, and are distributed openly, including to allies. This report's own findings, including substantial variation in coherence by theme, account type and even among official accounts, would be difficult to explain if compliance were being enforced the way *temnyky* compliance was.

The distinction between guidance and control should not be treated as absolute. Main Positions do, by design, blend factual information with the government's interpretation of it, and this report's coherence metric measures how closely messages align with that framing, not whether the framing itself is accurate or balanced. What separates a functioning One Voice approach from *temnyky*-style coordination is transparency, enforcement and voluntariness, not the underlying act of message coordination, which is a normal feature of state communication, wartime or otherwise. Seen this way, the One Voice approach is an attempt to improve message coordination in a way that remains consistent with democratic and journalistic norms: it offers guidance without coercing or compelling outlets to cover events in a particular way.

2. Methodology

2.1. Measuring coherence in practice

This report assesses how far official and aligned sources were coherent with the positions set out by the CSC between May and November 2023. Coherence is understood here as cases where posts clearly reflect those positions, even if the wording differs across platforms, formats or communicators.

The baseline for coherence is the set of Main Positions issued by the CSC, a product conceptually related to the One Voice approach (see Introduction). These positions, circulated three to five times per week, summarise how the Ukrainian government frames specific issues and provide the reference point against which wider messaging is compared.

To make these positions comparable with large numbers of social media posts, each document was first condensed into a small set of key messages. A large language model (Claude 3 Haiku) was used to turn the main points of each position into short statements, creating a structured dataset of reference messages for every issue.


The second step was to assemble the posts to be tested for coherence. For each CSC position, posts from monitored accounts were collected within a two-day window of its publication. This window was chosen to capture most posts responding to, or aligned with, the position while limiting unrelated content that appeared much earlier or later.

In the third step, each post was compared to the key messages using a semantic text-comparison technique (ColBERT re-ranking[17]). ColBERT assigns a similarity score to every post-message pair on the basis of meaning rather than exact wording, producing a score between 0 and 29 for each post.

The threshold of 18 was set by inspecting a sample of scored post–message pairs, not by formal validation against coded data. It is a practical cut-off between posts that clearly restate a position's message and those that do not; results close to the threshold are less certain. Posts scoring 18 or above were classified as highly coherent, or 'on message'. Posts below this threshold are treated as not reliably aligned, although they remain in the wider descriptive statistics on posting activity. Because the CSC positions analysed were the English-language versions, coherence was scored on English-language posts; posts from the CSC's own accounts were excluded. Ukrainian- and Russian-language posts are included in the statistics on platforms, engagement and reach, but not in the coherence scores.

The method measures alignment only in what was published. It cannot detect deliberate silence, which under OPSEC may itself reflect alignment: communicators who refrain from discussing operational matters are following official guidance, not departing from it. Low coherence scores on OPSEC-sensitive topics should be read with this limitation in mind (see Section 3.1).

This analysis asesses whether domestic communicators conveyed messages aligned with official government positions between May and November 2023.



2.2. CSC positions dataset

A total of 163 CSC Main Positions documents issued between May and November 2023 were collected for analysis. These positions were distributed three to five times a week in English, both internally to government entities and externally to allies, and typically combined brief factual background with associated Main Positions that set out how the government framed particular issues.

Individual documents vary in length and focus. Some respond to major events, such as large-scale missile strikes or key diplomatic developments, while others provide guidance linked to ongoing military operations or wider communication priorities. Where a document covered several issues, the research team split it into separate thematic entries so that each topic could be linked to its own set of posts.

Issuance was uneven over time. Not all days carried new positions and some documents covered several days, with gaps of up to five days between releases. Coherence scores are therefore only calculated around dates for which positions were available, and the absence of a position on a given day should not be read as the absence of communication about that issue.[18]

Within this report, CSC positions serve as the analytical reference baseline against which broader messaging patterns are compared. In the next step of the methodology, these documents are transformed into short key messages that can be matched to social media posts using the coherence metric described in Section 2.1.

2.3. Social media dataset

The social media dataset consists of Ukrainian official and unofficial pro-Ukrainian accounts included in the 'Whitelist of official and reliable sources of information', compiled by the CSC in February 2024. The whitelist is a curated directory of sources that the CSC, on the basis of its own assessment, considers credible and relevant for Ukrainian public communication. It includes official government actors as well as unofficial pro-Ukrainian sources.

The accounts were grouped into official and unofficial categories.[19] For these accounts, Facebook, Twitter/X, YouTube and Telegram were monitored. These platforms were selected because Telegram, YouTube and Facebook were the three most widely used sources of news in Ukraine during the analysis period, while Twitter/X, though little used domestically, is a principal channel for reaching international audiences.[20] Other platforms used for news in Ukraine, notably Viber, Instagram and TikTok, were not covered.

In total, approximately **541,000 social media posts** were collected between May and November 2023. The dataset includes 448,700 posts in Ukrainian, 57,400 in English and 35,000 in Russian (Figure 1).[21]

Official sources


- Public authorities
- Government agencies
- Representatives of public authorities and government agencies
- Heads of regional state administrations
- City mayors

Unofficial sources

- Charitable foundations
- Media expert organisations
- Media
- Representatives of media and expert organisations
- Popular bloggers, opinion leaders

Figure 1. Distribution of posts by language

Proportion of total posts by language



For the purposes of the analysis, Ukrainian- and Russian-language posts are treated as domestic- or regional-facing messaging, reflecting that both are widely spoken within Ukraine, while English-language posts are treated as international-facing. Russian-language posts may also reach audiences beyond Ukraine, for example in the Caucasus and Central Asia, so this distinction is used as an analytical proxy: language does not always map neatly onto audience location.

Posts in other languages, as well as posts for which language could not be confidently identified, were excluded from the analysis.

Telegram accounts for the largest share of collected posts, followed by Facebook and Twitter/X, while YouTube contains a smaller but still analytically relevant volume of content. For YouTube, the analysis used the text accompanying each video, such as titles and descriptions; spoken content was not transcribed or analysed. The same applies to video and audio content on other platforms, so the coherence measures reflect written messaging only. Most posts in the dataset are in Ukrainian, with Russian and English content making up substantially smaller, though still significant, shares of overall activity.

Figures 2 and 3 summarise the platform and language composition of the dataset.

Figure 2. Distribution of posts by platform

Telegram dominates the monitored dataset




Figure 3. Number of posts by platform and language

Dataset is weighted toward Ukrainian-language Telegram content




Figure 3 shows that the dataset is heavily weighted toward Ukrainian-language and Telegram-based communication. This reflects the composition of the monitored dataset; it is not a picture of the Ukrainian information environment as a whole.

2.4. Platform and audience context

The dataset shows that different platforms serve different functions, attract different audiences and generate different patterns of visibility and engagement. Coherence should therefore be interpreted alongside platform dynamics.

To provide context for these dynamics, the analysis considers two descriptive indicators. **Engagement metrics** capture active audience interaction, such as likes, shares and reposts, while **view counts** quantify passive exposure to content. Platforms calculate visibility and engagement differently and operate according to distinct algorithmic logics. These measures provide context for understanding where communication activity was concentrated and how audiences interact with content across platforms.

Figures 4 and 5 show that platform dynamics vary sharply by language and account type.

For Ukrainian-language content, Telegram stands out as the main platform for both engagement and visibility. Official and unofficial accounts both perform strongly there, reinforcing Telegram's role as the primary channel for domestic and regional-facing communication in the monitored dataset and its longstanding centrality to coverage about the war on both sides. By contrast, Facebook, Twitter/X and YouTube play a smaller role in Ukrainian-language engagement and visibility.

English-language content follows a different pattern. Engagement and visibility are less concentrated on one platform, but

Figure 4. Average user engagement by platform

Likes, shares and reposts per post (outlier-adjusted)





Figure 5. Average views by platform and category

Passive exposure per post (outlier-adjusted)



Twitter/X is especially important for international-facing communication. This becomes clearer when exceptionally high-performing posts are included. As shown in Figure 6, English-language content on Twitter/X reaches an average of approximately 125,000 views per post, driven by a small number of highly visible posts. Twitter/X may therefore not generate high typical engagement, but it has greater potential for episodic international amplification.

A third pattern is that unofficial accounts often outperform official accounts in engagement and visibility, particularly in Ukrainian-language communication. Institutional status alone does not determine reach. This is consistent with patterns seen in other contexts, where official accounts rarely match the engagement of prominent commentators and influencers. Media organisations, commentators and other aligned actors can play an important role in amplifying messages across the wider information environment.

Figure 6. Mean views including high-performing posts

Episodic virality lifts Twitter/X English content to ~125k average





Figure 7. Zelenskyy's accounts: posts by platform

Twitter/X carries the bulk of English-language messaging



Looking at a single communicator, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, holds the account constant, so differences between platforms cannot be explained by different accounts posting on each. Because his reach is far greater than that of other accounts in the dataset, his case shows the platform pattern at its clearest; it is not typical of other accounts.

The distribution of Zelenskyy's English-language posts is consistent with the findings that Twitter/X functions as the primary channel for international-facing messaging. The scale of activity on Twitter/X was considerably higher than on other platforms, with around 900 English-language tweets compared with approximately 200 English-language posts on Telegram and 100 on Facebook (Figure 7).

Zelenskyy's messaging therefore reinforces the broader point that reach depends also on the platform through which a message circulates. Twitter/X is central to international visibility, Telegram remains important for domestic and regional-facing communication, and audience overlap complicates any simple distinction between "domestic" and "international" messaging.

3. Coherence analysis

This section applies the coherence metric to examine how messaging alignment varied across platforms, events and account types between May and November 2023. Its central argument is that coherence depends less on how important an event is than on how communicable it is: alignment is easier when events produce clear, repeatable messages, and harder when operational constraints, uncertainty or slow progress limit what can be said. The three subsections test this from different angles. Section 3.1 examines the 2023 counter-offensive, a strategically important operation conducted under OPSEC constraints; Section 3.2 contrasts it with the 16 May missile attack on Kyiv, an acute event with a clear outcome; and Section 3.3 examines whether the same pattern holds across themes and account types in the full dataset.

3.1. Coherence under operational constraint: the 2023 counter-offensive

The 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive provides a useful test case for messaging coherence because it was a large, complex operation conducted under OPSEC constraints. Communicators faced a difficult balancing act between sustaining public confidence and international support while avoiding the disclosure of information that could benefit Russian forces.

The operation unfolded between June and October 2023 following months of preparation and growing expectation, both domestic and international. Ukrainian forces launched the offensive operations across multiple sectors of the front, while Russian defensive positions, extensive minefields and entrenched fortifications limited the prospects for rapid territorial gains.[22] As the campaign progressed, public and international attention increasingly focused on the pace of Ukrainian advances and the likelihood of a breakthrough.

Prior to the launch of the offensive, Ukrainian authorities introduced a number of measures designed to reinforce information discipline,[23] including the widely publicised "Plans Love Silence" campaign.[24]This reflected a broader effort to limit speculations about operational plans and reduce the risk of sensitive information entering the public domain. The same constraints shaped official messaging throughout much of the campaign.



'Plans Love Silence': Ukrainian campaign urging soldiers and civilians to avoid sharing details about the 2023 counter-offensive.

These constraints are evident in the CSC positions analysed here. Compared to other major events, relatively few positions addressed the counter-offensive directly, with messaging focused on countering Russian disinformation, discouraging speculation, and explaining the pace of operations. By July, official messaging increasingly emphasised Russian defensive advantages and the need to preserve Ukrainian lives while degrading Russian capabilities.

Despite the strategic importance of the campaign, these messages generated relatively low levels of coherence across the monitored dataset compared with themes such as Russian atrocities, international support or commemorative events. OPSEC appears to have limited the communicability of the counter-offensive and, in turn, the coherence of messaging surrounding it. Low measured coherence should not, however, be read simply as weaker One Voice performance. Under OPSEC, coordinated restraint is itself a form of alignment: the 'Plans Love Silence' campaign explicitly asked the public not to discuss operational developments. The coherence metric captures alignment in what was published but cannot detect deliberate silence, so part of the low coherence around the counter-offensive may reflect successful restraint rather than fragmentation.

Consistent with this, the counter-offensive was named explicitly in fewer than 2% of Telegram posts from whitelisted accounts in June 2023, the month it began, compared with around 11% for missile attacks and air defence; heads of regional administrations and city mayors almost never referred to it.[25]

Ahead of and during the early stages of the offensive, official positions sought to manage expectations while maintaining confidence. In its first position after the dam's destruction on 6 June, the CSC emphasised that the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant would not prevent the de-occupation of southern Ukraine. This framing was consistent with the wider communication approach at the start of the campaign: acknowledging Russian efforts to slow Ukrainian advances while avoiding detailed claims about operational plans or battlefield progress.

As the campaign progressed, CSC positions increasingly focused on explaining the pace of operations. In July, messaging sought to counter claims of NATO disappointment and emphasised the degradation of Russian military capabilities while prioritising the preservation of Ukrainian lives. The coherence analysis did not detect these messages being widely echoed by monitored accounts around the time of their dissemination.

Stronger resonance emerged only from late August onwards. CSC positions increasingly highlighted identifiable battlefield achievements, including the liberation of Robotyne and progress in Tokmak, Donetsk, and Bakhmut directions. Similar patterns were observed in September. Even then, however, counter-offensive messaging generated lower levels of alignment than topics such as Russian atrocities, international support or commemorative events (see Table 1, Section 3.3).

Over time, the focus of operational messaging also evolved. From July onwards, official positions increasingly emphasised the degradation of Russian logistics and military capabilities. By September and October, successes in the Black Sea and the use of maritime drones featured more prominently than developments on the land battlefield. Towards the end of the period, messaging increasingly linked Ukrainian resilience and endurance to longer-term political objectives, including European integration and democratic reform.

The full list of counter-offensive-related CSC positions is provided in Annex 1, together with a breakdown of the number of on-message posts per position. Three patterns stand out:

First, counter-offensive messaging generated relatively few highly coherent posts during the early stages of the campaign, despite its strategic importance.

Second, coherence increased when messaging could point to identifiable achievements, such as territorial gains, Black Sea operations, or the degradation of Russian capabilities.

Third, the focus of official messaging evolved over time, shifting from expectation management and information discipline towards demonstrable successes and longer-term strategic objectives.

In this way, messaging coherence was shaped not only by the importance of an event, but by whether it could be translated into clear, repeatable messages. The counter-offensive remained central to Ukraine's war effort throughout the period, but operational security requirements limited the range of messages communicated consistently.

3.2. Coherence during crisis: the 16 May missile attack

The counter-offensive shows that an event's strategic importance does not automatically translate into messaging coherence. Across the full May-November 2023 period, messaging coherence did not decline steadily as the campaign unfolded. Instead, it fluctuated, rising and falling with the salience of specific events. Peaks tracked major incidents, not the phases of the campaign.

Figure 8 provides empirical support for this pattern by showing the daily number of posts scoring highly on the coherence metric. The distribution is characterised by short-lived spikes; outside these moments, levels of highly coherent messaging remain comparatively low.

On days when more posts were published, the share of posts closely aligned with CSC messaging also tended to be higher (Figure 9). **High-salience events appear to have increased posting volume and created conditions for greater message convergence.** When an event was widely discussed, official and aligned actors were more likely to converge around a limited set of shared frames.

Acute crises tend to produce clearer and more immediate military outcomes than prolonged operations. Compared with the counter-offensive, which was strategically central but difficult to communicate under OPSEC, missile attacks offered a story already familiar to audiences and a smaller set of messages that could be repeated across accounts and platforms.

The Russian missile attack on Kyiv of 16 May 2023 (first spike on Figure 8) is one example of this broader event-driven pattern of coherence. On the night of 15–16 May 2023, Russia conducted a large-scale drone and missile strike aimed primarily at Kyiv. Ukraine's armed forces reported that Russia launched 18 missiles: six Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from six MiG-31K aircraft,

Figure 8. Daily count of high-score posts, May-November 2023

Peaks reflect short-lived event-driven spikes





Figure 9. Daily post volume vs high-coherence share

Higher-volume days show greater message convergence



nine Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, and three land-based S-400 and Iskander-M missiles. Ukrainian air defence reported shooting down all 18, along with nine drones, including six Shahed-131/136s.[26]


The attack was significant because Ukraine quickly reported a clear, decisive outcome. Russia had launched a major strike, including missiles repeatedly presented by Russian forces as difficult or impossible to intercept, but Ukrainian air defence reported that all missiles had been shot down. This created a simple and clear message: Ukrainian air defence was working.

The CSC position (Example 2) reflected this framing, emphasising that Ukrainian personnel had demonstrated a high level of training and could master complex equipment in a short period, an argument already made in relation to multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), tanks and air defence systems, and presenting the interceptions as proof that Western-supplied air defence systems were making a difference.

The core messaging about the attack clustered around a limited and mutually reinforcing set of themes: the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defence; the rapid mastery of advanced systems by Ukrainian personnel; the value of Western-supplied equipment when operated by Ukrainian forces; and the weakening of Russian claims that the Kinzhal was unstoppable.

The coherence analysis identifies 16 May as one of the sharpest peaks in highly coherent messaging during the period examined: 16 highly coherent posts on a single day, the highest daily total in May and June (Figure 8). Counter-offensive-related positions sometimes attracted similar totals, typically between 6 and 20 highly coherent posts, but these accumulated across the matching window rather than converging on a single moment.

The event was also well suited to coherent messaging because it supported several frames at once: the value of partner support, Ukrainian military competence, the effectiveness of Western weapons and the undermining of Russian claims of technological superiority.



Example 1. Posts on the 16 May attack. The examples illustrate how the event was framed not only as a Russian attack, but also as evidence of Ukrainian air defence effectiveness.[27]

Different communicators could therefore adapt the same event to their own audiences while remaining on message.

In this way, acute attacks with clear outcomes make it easier for different actors to repeat the same core messages. This differs from prolonged operations, where uncertainty, constraints and uneven battlefield developments make alignment harder to sustain. Credibility may also play a part. Parts of Ukrainian society distrust information from government and semi-government sources when it is not backed by clear evidence, and independent communicators who echo official framing risk their own credibility. Clear, unambiguous outcomes reduce that risk, which may help explain why coherence rises around such events.



4. MISSILE ATTACK ON UKRAINE

On the night of May 16, Russia conducted a powerful combined attack with a focus on Kyiv: from the northern, southern, and eastern directions at the same time, with missiles of various types — air-, sea-, and land-based.

Six Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles from MiG-31K aircraft, nine Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, and three land-based missiles (S-400, Iskander-M) were fired.

- All 18 missiles were destroyed by the air defence forces of Ukraine. This is **a fantastic level of Ukrainian air defence effectiveness**.
- The Russian "miraculous" weapon, which frightened the West, **turned out ineffective in the face of modern Western models**. Russian myths about the "invincibility" of their army finally came to an end.
- The Ukrainian military confirmed a high level of training — they can **master even the most complex equipment in a short time**. The same was with MLRS, tanks, and air defence. This will be the case with modern aircraft, which Ukraine asks from partners.
- **International partners highly appreciate the training and work of the Ukrainian military**. After the night attack, U.S. Ambassador to Kyiv Bridget Brink has already expressed admiration for the work of air defence in Ukraine and Kyiv in particular.
- **Ukrainians are grateful to their international partners** for providing sky protection systems that guard the lives of peaceful people. We hope for further support with additional complexes and missiles.

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Should you have any comments or suggestions about this and future issues of the message box, please contact us at uastratcomcenter@gmail.com.

We would appreciate your feedback!

Example 2. CSC 'Main Positions of Information Response' issued on 16 May 2023.

3.3. Coherence across themes and account types

Having examined coherence under OPSEC and crisis conditions, this section assesses how alignment is distributed across the full dataset. The preceding case studies suggest that coherence depends partly on communicability: it is harder to sustain when events are prolonged or uncertain, and easier when events produce clear and visible outcomes.

Three system-wide patterns develop this argument further. First, some themes generated substantially more alignment than others. Second, coherence varied by account type, and official status alone did not guarantee it. Third, CSC positions cannot be shown to cause coherence directly, but the timing data suggests that they may have helped structure alignment in some cases, especially around difficult-to-communicate issues such as the counter-offensive.

Variation by theme

To examine thematic variation, the CSC positions were manually grouped into broader categories. The table below presents the categories identified, the number of CSC positions within each, the total number of closely matching social media posts, the average number of on-message posts per position, and the reactive share: the proportion of on-topic posts published before the positions were disseminated. A high reactive share indicates that positions on that theme tended to follow conversation already under way rather than precede it.

Table 1. Coherence by thematic category, May–November 2023

Category	CSC positions	On-message posts	Posts / position	% reactive
Russian aggression and war crimes	76	4091	53.8	42%
International relations and diplomacy	80	2537	31.7	30%
Ukrainian operations and strategy	31	1354	43.7	38%
Military aid and equipment	23	810	35.2	41%
Economic sanctions and global support	34	802	23.6	48%
Propaganda and information warfare	33	704	21.3	35%
Humanitarian issues and civilian impact	19	704	37.1	39%
Internal affairs and cultural heritage	27	486	18.0	61%
Territorial integrity and occupation	13	275	21.2	60%

CSC positions, matching on-message posts and reactive share, by thematic category (May–November 2023).

The table shows that coherence is not evenly distributed across themes. Positions on Russian aggression and war crimes generated the highest level of alignment, with 4,091 on-message posts. Ukrainian operations and strategy also generated relatively high alignment, with 1,354 on-message posts. Several themes, including military aid and equipment, and humanitarian issues and civilian impact, also show comparatively strong levels of alignment.

By contrast, categories such as internal affairs and cultural heritage, propaganda and information warfare, and territorial integrity and occupation generated fewer on-message posts per position. This does not necessarily mean that these themes were less important. It suggests that some themes are more easily absorbed into the wider information environment because they are linked to prominent events, recurring international themes or widely shared moral frames.


English-language messaging is useful to examine separately because it captures the international-facing dimension of the monitored information environment. Within this subset, recurring content clustered around three themes in particular:

- **Commemorative events**, such as anniversaries of Ukrainian statehood, the expulsion of the Crimean Tatars, or remembrance of the Holocaust victims at Babyn Yar.
- **Support from allies**, including commitments of advanced military equipment such as F-16 fighter jets and discussions around NATO and EU accession.
- **Russian atrocities**, especially against the civilian population and infrastructure (notably the Kakhovka dam) and the abduction of Ukrainian children.

Figure 10 adds a temporal layer to the thematic table. It shows that on-message posts were not evenly distributed over time, but clustered around recurring themes and specific event spikes. Russian aggression, international support and military-adjacent themes remained prominent across the period, while individual peaks reflect moments when particular issues became more salient. This reinforces the broader finding that coherence is shaped by both prioritisation and the extent to which events produce clear messages.

Figure 10. On-message posts by theme over time

Weekly emphasis shifts sharply across themes rather than remaining evenly distributed.



Weekly totals, plotted at the end of each week; the final bar covers the last days of November 2023.


Variation by account type

Coherence varied more by category than by official status (Figure 11). Media-linked accounts scored highest in both groups, and public authorities, agencies and their representatives (0.020–0.031) were in the same range as unofficial media and expert accounts (0.024–0.041).

The account-category analysis shows that official status does not guarantee alignment. Within the official group, some categories appear more consistently on-message than others. Public authorities, government agencies and national-level representatives are generally more aligned with CSC positions, while heads of regional state administrations and city mayors appear less consistently aligned.[28]

Figure 11. High-coherence proportion by account category

Media-linked accounts show the highest-coherence proportions.



Differences in audience orientation and institutional role probably explain this better than weaker message discipline. Local and regional actors often communicate in Ukrainian and, as military administrations under martial law, focus on local operational information such as air alerts, evacuations and infrastructure. Their lower alignment is therefore better judged against that mandate than against the benchmark applied to national institutions.


Coherence among unofficial accounts was uneven, consistent with selective uptake. However, some unofficial media, expert and fact-checking actors are still among the more consistently aligned accounts.

The individual account-level analysis reinforces this point (Figure 12). The most consistently aligned actors are not necessarily central government institutions. They include senior officials, ministries and public authorities, but also public broadcasters, fact-checking organisations, expert outlets, media organisations and prominent public figures.

Coherence is not simply produced by top-down directives from central government institutions. Some media and expert voices were also among the most reliably on message, suggesting that alignment can emerge voluntarily, through credibility, shared priorities and repeated use of the same messages, rather than through formal hierarchy.

Figure 12. Most consistently on-message accounts

Top-ranked accounts span government, media and expert communities



4. CSC positions as framing anchors rather than direct causes

The timing data also suggests a cautious interpretation of the CSC's role. The coherence metric makes it possible to compare messaging patterns around CSC positions, but it cannot prove that the positions caused subsequent alignment. Highly salient events are likely to generate convergent messaging regardless of formal guidance, especially when the message is clear and easy to repeat.

The relationship between CSC positions and coherence appears uneven. Some positions were clearly reactive: they consolidated issues that were already prominent in official statements, media coverage or social media discussion. Others were followed by a meaningful share of related posts published after the position was issued, suggesting that they may have helped provide a common frame for later messaging. The data therefore does not support the claim that CSC positions caused coherence, but it does suggest that they can play a structuring role, particularly when events are difficult to communicate and clear messages are otherwise scarce.

The counter-offensive illustrates why this timing matters, though evidence is mixed. Unlike acute crisis events, it did not consistently produce clear, decisive or easily repeatable outcomes. Yet some CSC positions were followed by measurable related activity. The 8 June position on Kakhovka and southern de-occupation was matched by 108 on-topic posts, 67% published afterwards; the 12 June position on Russian propaganda about the counter-offensive was matched by 19 posts, 74% afterwards; and the 11 August position on mine clearance, air defence, artillery and missiles was matched by 12 posts, 83% afterwards. Two others (28 June and 13 July) were followed by no later posts.

Table 2. Timing of on-topic posts around selected counter-offensive CSC positions

Date	CSC position (counter-offensive)	On-topic posts	% published after position
8 Jun	Kakhovka / southern de-occupation	108	**67%**
12 Jun	Russian propaganda re: counter-offensive	19	**74%**
20 Jun	Offensive operations in the south	19	**47%**
28 Jun	Attempts to hinder the offensive	4	**0%**
13 Jul	Ukrainian counter-offensive	13	**0%**
11 Aug	Mine clearance / air defence / artillery	12	**83%**
11 Aug	Enemy attacks in the east	4	**50%**

'% published after position' is the share of on-topic posts published after each position was issued

These timing results should be treated cautiously. They do not demonstrate that CSC guidance produced alignment. Some positions generated little measurable uptake, while others were likely reacting to issues that were already circulating. However, in some counter-offensive cases, CSC positions were issued early enough to plausibly shape later messaging. They may therefore have provided a useful framing anchor for aligned actors trying to communicate in a difficult operational environment without breaching OPSEC.

The system-wide findings therefore refine the case-study analysis. Coherence is not simply a function of official guidance, nor is it purely spontaneous. It emerges from the interaction between event communicability, institutional proximity and the availability of shared messages. The CSC therefore appears to help structure messaging when clear messages are otherwise lacking.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

This report developed a method for assessing messaging coherence across official Ukrainian and aligned social media accounts between May and November 2023, using AI-enabled assessment to compare CSC positions with social media posts across platforms. Because a polyphonic, creative communication effort is not necessarily a coherent one, the method identifies where official and aligned messaging converges with CSC positions, where it diverges, and which actors and themes are most consistently on message. Lower alignment with CSC positions is not the same as fragmentation: communicators may address different subjects, such as local evacuation information or international appeals for air defence, without contradicting one another. Four findings follow.

First, coherence should be understood as a wider alignment process, not only a centralised messaging effort. Official status did not reliably predict coherence: some local and regional actors were less consistently aligned, while some media, expert and fact-checking accounts were among the most reliably on message. Platform dynamics matter too; Telegram was central to Ukrainian-language communication, Twitter/X to international-facing visibility.

Second, coherence is easier to sustain when events produce clear, repeatable messages. The counter-offensive was strategically central but prolonged, uncertain and constrained by OPSEC, limiting the range of messages that could be communicated consistently. Some of the low coherence may also reflect deliberate restraint, which the method cannot detect. Stronger resonance appeared only when positions could point to identifiable achievements. The 16 May missile attack illustrates the contrast, when a clear, decisive outcome converted easily into a shared message.

Third, CSC positions appear most useful where the right message is hard to find. Highly salient events can generate convergence without formal guidance; timing data suggests CSC positions instead add most value around difficult-to-communicate or OPSEC-sensitive issues, where aligned actors need a repeatable message that does not risk disclosing operational detail.

Fourth, coherence and reach follow different audience logics, implying the One Voice approach is unlikely to work equally well if implemented uniformly across platforms. Telegram was central to Ukrainian-language, domestic-facing communication, while Twitter/X carried international-facing visibility; unofficial accounts frequently outperformed official ones in engagement and reach on both. A single message pushed identically across platforms is therefore likely to reach these audiences unevenly; adapting the framing to each platform's function and audience, while keeping the underlying position consistent, may help address this.

On this basis, four recommendations follow, each answering one of the findings above.

- **Treat credible non-official actors as potential sources of alignment**. Media organisations, expert voices, fact-checkers and public figures can reinforce coherent messaging; identifying which actors are consistently on message helps communicators spot trusted amplifiers and locate weaker alignment.

- **Assess coherence alongside reach and engagement.** Monitoring should track not only how much content is produced or how widely it circulates, but whether official and aligned actors are repeating compatible messages across platforms and audiences.

- **Develop framing guidance for difficult-to-communicate issues**. Topics constrained by OPSEC or by the scale, complexity, slow pace or uncertainty of events need guidance that offers clear, repeatable messages that do not risk disclosing operational detail, while avoiding speculation or overstatement.

- **Differentiate implementation of One Voice by platform and audience.** Rather than a single message pushed uniformly, guidance should account for Telegram's role in domestic-facing coherence and Twitter/X's role in international visibility, and should recognise unofficial accounts as a primary — not secondary — channel for reach on both.

More broadly, the pursuit of coherence is one approach to government communication among several, resting on the assumption that consistency makes communication more credible and persuasive. This report has not tested that assumption; it has developed a method for measuring coherence at scale. The findings also suggest that full coherence is neither achievable nor necessarily desirable in a polyphonic system: some divergence reflects the different roles and audiences of legitimate communicators rather than a failure of coordination.

Annex 1: CSC positions and messaging timing

This annex presents two related but distinct analyses of counter-offensive-related CSC positions, at different levels of granularity.

Table A gives the original position-level counts: for each CSC Main Position, the total number of on-message social media posts matched to it within the two-day comparison window (as used in Table 1 and Section 3.3).

Table B breaks a subset of these positions into their constituent condensed messages, and for each one reports the share of on-topic posts published *after* the position's release — the basis for the framing-anchor analysis in Section 4. Because Table B matches posts against narrower, single-message text rather than the position as a whole, its counts do not sum back to Table A's totals for the same position; a post may echo a position's overall meaning without clearing the match threshold against any one of its sub-messages individually. The two tables should be read as separate analyses sharing a common source, not as one dataset presented twice.

Table A. Counter-offensive related CSC positions

Date	Emphasis	Position	On-message posts
2023-05-07	Counter-offensive	Russia's failed Bakhmut attempts drain resources, setting up Ukrainian counterattack. — BAKHMUT DEFENCE	**24**
2023-05-30	Operation	Kremlin has no moral right to talk about terrorism after killing hundreds of Ukrainian civilians. — DRONE ATTACK ON MOSCOW	**157**
2023-06-07	Counter-offensive	Russians' Kakhovka HPP explosion won't stop Ukraine's south de-occupation plans. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	**37**
2023-06-13	Counter-offensive	Russia spreads propaganda about the Ukrainian counter-offensive and fakes about Ukrainian defeats. — COVERAGE OF EVENTS AT THE FRONT	**9**
2023-06-20	Counter-offensive	Ukrainian troops conduct offensive operations in the south with resistance support. — THE SITUATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD	**13**
2023-06-26	Successes	Ukraine's Defence Forces have experience fighting back, including against Prigozhin's mercenaries. — THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ATTACK FROM BELARUS	**17**
2023-06-27	Successes	Russia's actions hinder Ukrainian de-occupation. — ATTEMPTS TO HINDER THE UKRAINIAN OFFENSIVE	**9**
2023-07-05	Advance in Bakhmut	Ukrainian troops defend against Russian attacks. — PROSPECTS OF THE UKRAINIAN OFFENSIVE	**6**
2023-07-12	Advance in Bakhmut	Ukrainian troops advance in the south and near Bakhmut, deterring the enemy offensive. — UKRAINIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	**20**
2023-07-17	Operation	Russia attacks Ukraine's civilian transport infrastructure. — KERCH BRIDGE INCIDENT	**48**
2023-07-20	Black Sea	Ukraine can deter Russia by obstructing navigation in the Black Sea. — RUSSIAN SHIPS ARE LEGITIMATE MILITARY TARGETS	**21**

2023-07-21	Black Sea	Ukraine justifies targeting Russian civilian ships for transporting military cargo. — RUSSIAN SHIPS ARE LEGITIMATE MILITARY TARGETS	**19**
2023-07-23	Degrade	Ukrainian troops target Russian manpower, equipment and logistics to weaken them. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	**15**
2023-08-07	Degrade	Ukraine destroyed Russian supply routes in Kherson Oblast. — LOGISTICS OF THE OCCUPATION	**24**
2023-08-14	Kherson	Ukraine's Defence Forces establish bridgeheads on Kherson Oblast's left bank. — HOSTILITIES ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE DNIPRO	**2**
2023-08-15	Black Sea	Ukraine develops a marine-drone programme in response to Russian aggression. — THE USE OF MARINE DRONES BY UKRAINE	**33**
2023-08-16	Black Sea	Ukraine uses sea drones to target Russian ships and infrastructure. — THE USE OF MARINE DRONES BY UKRAINE	**12**
2023-08-24	Black Sea	Ukraine's Defence Forces make amphibious operations possible in occupied Crimea, rendering enemy coastal defence ineffective. — ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES IN THE MARITIME THEATRE OF OPERATIONS	**18**
2023-08-27	Successes	Ukraine's counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk mirrors Kherson's liberation. — COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	**36**
2023-08-28	Successes	Ukrainian Defence Forces advance and liberate Robotyne. — COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	**23**
2023-08-30	Operation	Russia targets Ukrainian military units. — NIGHT ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN RUSSIA	**29**
2023-09-11	Black Sea	Ukraine gains control of Black Sea drilling platforms, moving closer to liberating Crimea. — REGAINING CONTROL OVER OFFSHORE PLATFORMS	**18**
2023-09-12	Successes	Ukrainian troops make progress in Tokmak, Donetsk and Bakhmut, overcoming fortifications and mines. — COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	**16**
2023-09-13	Black Sea	Russian ship "Minsk" damaged in a Ukrainian attack. — A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN SEVASTOPOL	**104**
2023-09-16	Degrade	Ukrainian soldiers attack the enemy, causing losses. — SUCCESSES OF UKRAINE'S DEFENCE FORCES	**5**
2023-09-17	Operation	Ukraine targets Russian air defence and military aviation with drones. — ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN RUSSIA	**42**
2023-09-24	Black Sea	Ukraine targets Russian military facilities with precision strikes. — THE STRIKE ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET	**27**
2023-09-26	Successes	Ukraine's Defence Forces will maintain pressure, continuing offensive actions along the front line. — THE CAMPAIGN OF THE DEFENCE FORCES OF UKRAINE CONTINUES	**7**
2023-10-27	Black Sea	Ukrainian naval drones target the Russian military in Crimea and the Caucasus. — ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNMANNED FLEET OF UKRAINE	**27**
2023-11-10	Degrade	Ukraine's Defence Forces resist Russian attacks near Avdiivka and continue the offensive in the Azov Sea region. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	**47**
2023-11-12	Degrade	Ukraine targets Russian military facilities with the resistance movement's help. — STRIKING MILITARY TARGETS IN THE ENEMY REAR	**23**

Positions are listed chronologically. "On-message" posts are those scoring 18 or above on the coherence metric within the two-day comparison window (see Section 2.1).

Table B. Counter-offensive CSC positions: posting volume and timing

Condensed line to take	Date	Emphasis	On-topic posts	% after line
Russia's failed Bakhmut attempts drain resources, setting up Ukrainian counterattack. — BAKHMUT DEFENCE	2023-05-08	Counteroffensive	17	**41%**
Russia's Bakhmut capture hopes are groundless. — BAKHMUT DEFENCE	2023-05-08	Successes	4	**25%**
Kremlin has no moral right to talk about terrorism after killing hundreds of Ukrainian civilians. — DRONE ATTACK ON MOSCOW	2023-05-31	Operation	87	**25%**
Drone attack targets Russian elite areas, gains approval from ordinary Russians. — DRONE ATTACK ON MOSCOW	2023-05-31	Operation	12	**17%**
Russians' Kakhovka HPP explosion won't stop Ukraine's south de-occupation plans. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	2023-06-08	Counteroffensive	108	**67%**
Russia spreads propaganda about Ukrainian counter-offensive, fakes about Ukrainian defeats. — COVERAGE OF EVENTS AT THE FRONT	2023-06-12	Counteroffensive	19	**74%**
Ukrainian troops conduct offensive operations in south with resistance support. — THE SITUATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD	2023-06-20	Counteroffensive	19	**47%**
Russia seeks to hold occupied Ukrainian territories as sole "achievement". — ATTEMPTS TO HINDER THE UKRAINIAN OFFENSIVE	2023-06-28	Counteroffensive	4	**0%**
Ukrainian troops advance in south and near Bakhmut, deterring enemy offensive. — UKRAINIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	2023-07-13	Counteroffensive	13	**0%**
Russia attacks Ukraine's civilian transport infrastructure. — KERCH BRIDGE INCIDENT	2023-07-18	Operation	30	**0%**
Ukrainian troops target Russian manpower, equipment and logistics to weaken them. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	2023-07-21	Degrade	25	**88%**
Ukraine can deter Russia by obstructing navigation in the Black Sea. — RUSSIAN SHIPS ARE LEGITIMATE MILITARY TARGETS	2023-07-21	Black Sea	17	**47%**
Ukraine destroyed Russian supply routes in Kherson Oblast. — LOGISTICS OF THE OCCUPATION	2023-08-08	Degrade	31	**48%**
Ukraine needs mine clearance, air defence, artillery and missiles to aid counter-offensive. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	2023-08-11	Counteroffensive	12	**83%**
Enemy attacks in east to prevent Ukrainian counter-offensive. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	2023-08-11	Counteroffensive	4	**50%**
Ukraine uses sea drones to target Russian ships and infrastructure. — THE USE OF MARINE DRONES BY UKRAINE	2023-08-17	Black Sea	32	**59%**

Ukraine's Defence Forces make amphibious operations possible in occupied Crimea, rendering enemy coastal defence ineffective. — ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES IN THE MARITIME THEATRE	2023-08-25	Black Sea	53	**45%**
Ukraine obtained a combat helicopter and fighter parts as trophies to aid defenders. — OPERATION TITMOUSE	2023-08-25	Operation	7	**43%**
Ukraine's weapons surpass Russian air defence in Crimea. — ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES IN THE MARITIME THEATRE	2023-08-25	Black Sea	5	**60%**
Ukraine's counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk mirrors Kherson's liberation. — COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	2023-08-29	Successes	7	**0%**
Russia targets Ukrainian military units. — NIGHT ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN RUSSIA	2023-08-30	Operation	42	**69%**
Ukraine gains control of Black Sea drilling platforms, closer to liberating Crimea. — REGAINING CONTROL OVER OFFSHORE PLATFORMS	2023-09-12	Black Sea	10	**0%**
Ukrainian troops make progress in Tokmak, Donetsk and Bakhmut, overcoming fortifications and mines. — COUNTER-OFFENSIVE	2023-09-13	Successes	10	**0%**
Russian ship "Minsk" damaged in a Ukrainian attack. — A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN SEVASTOPOL	2023-09-14	Black Sea	86	**0%**
Ukraine's Defence Forces need modern aircraft, missiles and ammo from allies. — SUCCESSES OF UKRAINE'S DEFENCE FORCES	2023-09-15	Successes	11	**64%**
Ukrainian soldiers attack enemy, causing losses. — SUCCESSES OF UKRAINE'S DEFENCE FORCES	2023-09-15	Successes	6	**50%**
Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia: some false, some Russian partisans. — ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN RUSSIA	2023-09-18	Operation	19	**0%**
Russia destroyed air defence facilities in occupied Crimea. — THE STRIKE ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET	2023-09-25	Black Sea	12	**0%**
Ukraine's Defence Forces will maintain pressure, continuing offensive actions along the front line. — THE CAMPAIGN OF THE DEFENCE FORCES CONTINUES	2023-09-27	Successes	5	**0%**
Ukrainian naval drones target Russian military in Crimea and the Caucasus. — ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNMANNED FLEET OF UKRAINE	2023-10-27	Black Sea	57	**61%**
Ukraine's Defence Forces resist Russian attacks near Avdiivka, continue offensive in Azov Sea region. — SITUATION AT THE FRONT	2023-11-10	Degrade	111	**76%**
Ukraine targets Russian military facilities with resistance movement's help. — STRIKING MILITARY TARGETS IN THE ENEMY REAR	2023-11-13	Operation	15	**0%**

Positions are listed chronologically. 'On-topic posts' are those matching the condensed position's theme, using the same two-day window and 18-point threshold as the rest of the report (see Section 2.1). The '% after' column shows the share of on-topic posts published after the position's release date.

Endnotes

1 *Yedynyy holos*.

2 In the context of this research, strategic communications refers to "a holistic approach to communication based on values and interests that encompasses everything an actor does to achieve objectives in a contested environment": NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Terminology Working Group. (2023). **Understanding strategic communications** (Publication No. 3), p. 22. Ukrainian law defines it, within an information-security strategy, as "the coordinated and proper use of the state's communication capabilities – public diplomacy, public relations, military liaison, information and psychological operations, [and] measures aimed at advancing the state's goals": President of Ukraine. (2021, December 28). **Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 15 жовтня 2021 року «Про Стратегію інформаційної безпеки»** [On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 15 October 2021 "On the Information Security Strategy"] (Decree No. 685/2021). This report follows the broader sense but measures only one dimension: the coherence of messaging.

3 Demus, A., & Paul, C. (2022, April 5). **Don't sleep on Russian information war capabilities**. RAND Corporation.

4 Ekman, I., & Nilsson, P.-E. (2023). **Ukraine's information front: Strategic communication during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine** (FOI-R--5451--SE). Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). p. 3.

5 See World Health Organization. (2017). **WHO strategic communications framework for effective communications**. p. 20; U.S. Joint Forces Command. (2010). **Commander's handbook for strategic communication and communication strategy** (Version 3.0). Joint Warfighting Center. p. A-2. Ukraine's own capacity-building plans made the same link: Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine. (2016). **Ukraine's strategic communications capacity building: Annual report 2016**, which set the goal of a mechanism for consistent information activity across government that would ensure the credibility of government communications.

6 It is often referred to as a 'policy', but it began as an initiative. A 2018 Cabinet order established a One Voice government communication platform at the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, but the approach itself was not set out in legislation; the underlying idea nonetheless persisted.

7 Communication Reform Group & Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine. (2016). **Концепція реформи урядових комунікацій** [Government communications reform concept]. Approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 20 January 2016.

8 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2019, February 11). **Підсумки урядової комунікаційної платформи «Єдиний голос» за 2018 рік** [Results of the "One Voice" government communication platform for 2018]; Stoliarchuk, D. (2018). Єдиний голос – як Уряд змінює комунікації [One Voice: How the government is changing communications]. **Interfax-Ukraine**.

9 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2018). **Деякі питання удосконалення комунікативної роботи органів виконавчої влади** [Certain issues concerning the improvement of the communication work of executive authorities] (Order No. 985-r).

10 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2019). **Деякі питання діяльності Міністерства культури та інформаційної політики** [Certain issues concerning the activities of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy] (Resolution No. 885). Institutional responsibility for this coordination function has been reorganised more than once since the One Voice initiative began in 2016. In November 2025, the CSC was transferred from the Ministry of Culture's sphere of management to that of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2025). **Деякі питання діяльності центральних органів виконавчої влади** [Certain issues concerning the activities of central executive authorities] (Resolution No. 1509). In April 2026, the Centre for Strategic Communications signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formalising a partnership begun in 2025: Horon, D. (2026, April 22). МЗС і Центр стратегічних комунікацій уклали меморандум про співпрацю [MFA and Centre for Strategic Communications sign memorandum of cooperation]. **Detector Media**.

11 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2021, March 31). **Презентовано Центр стратегічних комунікацій та інформаційної безпеки** [Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security presented]; Ministry of Culture of Ukraine. (n.d.). **Центр стратегічних комунікацій та інформаційної безпеки** [Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security].

12 At the time of publication in October 2026, the CSC issues these coordinated messaging products daily, co-branded with Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture under the name 'Information Angles' ('Explaining complex things in simple words'). This report retains 'Main Positions of Information Response' throughout, as that is the label used in the source material collected for the May–November 2023 analysis period.

13 For an example of the CSC applying the principle, see Centre for Strategic Communication and Information Security. (2022, July 19). **Regarding the creation of a unified position ("One Voice") of Ukraine to global tech platforms to fight against disinformation and fakes**, which sets out a joint position on platform policy developed by state and civil-society organisations.

14 *Coherence* is defined here as the state in which messages, whether within one channel or across many, fit together logically and support a broader, unified narrative. In this report, a *message* is a specific point conveyed in a post or CSC position (for example, that all missiles were intercepted); a *theme* is a group of related messages on the same subject (see Table 1); and a *narrative* is the broader strategic story that messages collectively support. The coherence metric operates at the level of messages.

15 Human Rights Watch. (2003). **Negotiating the news: Informal state censorship of Ukrainian television** (Section IV, Informal state censorship through temniki); Committee to Protect Journalists. (2003). **Attacks on the press in 2002: Ukraine**; Maksymiuk, J. (2004, January 20). Ukraine: Kuchma and the media looking to 2004 "with fear." **Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty**.

16 ZMINA. (2024, May 28). **Журналісти з'ясували, як Офіс президента намагається контролювати державний Укрінформ у стилі Януковича** [Journalists find the Office of the President trying to control state-run Ukrinform in the style of Yanukovych]; ZN.ua. (2024, May 29). **ОП внедрил темники и цензуру в государственное агентство «Укринформ» — расследование** [The Office of the President introduced temnyky and censorship at the state agency Ukrinform: An investigation].

17 ColBERT is a reranking model used to compare the semantic similarity between texts on the basis of their meaning rather than their wording.

18 Not all days carried new positions, and some positions covered several days; the dataset contains gaps of up to five days between positions.

19 Among unofficial sources, the whitelist includes sixty-two media and expert organisations and thirty-seven bloggers and opinion leaders. Among official sources, the largest groups are city mayors (thirty-nine) and representatives of public authorities and government agencies (twenty-six). The list was augmented by manually identifying associated Telegram channels.

20 Civil Network OPORA. (2023). **A knock-out blow to television: How social media managed to remain the primary source of news for Ukrainians**.

21 Language was identified using the Python library langid. Coherence was scored on the 57,400 English-language posts only.

22 Atlantic Council. (2023, September 13). **What's next for Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive?** [Event].

23 Reuters. (2023, June 14). **Ukraine's counteroffensive takes shape; main test still to come**.

24 The Independent. (2023, June 5). **Ukrainian government sends cryptic message to Russia** [Video]. YouTube. The campaign video was released by Ukraine's Ministry of Defence on 4 June 2023; the still reproduced alongside this section is taken from Reuters. (2023, June 4). **Ukraine's military urges 'silence' ahead of expected counter-offensive** [Video]. YouTube.

25 Authors' analysis of 46,273 Telegram posts published by whitelisted accounts between 1 and 30 June 2023. Posts were counted as referring to the counter-offensive if they contained 'контрнаступ', 'контрнаступление' or 'counter-offensive' (including inflected forms); comparison themes were identified in the same way, for example 'ракет', 'шахед', 'ППО' and 'missile' for missile attacks and air defence. Posts about front-line developments that do not name the counter-offensive are not captured, so the figure is a lower bound: a broader keyword set that also captures liberated settlements and named sectors of the front raises the share to about 7%, still below the share for missile attacks and air defence. Among account types, the counter-offensive was mentioned in 0.3% of posts by heads of regional administrations and 0.1% of posts by city mayors.

26 Interfax-Ukraine. (2023, May 16). **Invaders attack with six Kinzhal missiles, all shot down – Zaluzhny**.

27 Suspilne News [@suspilne_news]. (2023, May 16). **Overnight, #Russia launched 18 missiles at #Ukraine, including 6 #Kinzhal missiles** [Tweet]. X.; StopFake [@StopFakingNews]. (2023, May 16). **The Ukrainian Armed Forces have destroyed this night 6 (!!!) #Kinzhal "hypersonic" missiles** [Tweet]. X.

28 Under Presidential Decree No. 68/2022 of 24 February 2022, regional state administrations and their heads acquired the status of regional military administrations and heads of regional military administrations for the period of martial law. This report retains the category label used in the CSC whitelist. See President of Ukraine. (2022, February 24). **Указ Президента України №68/2022 «Про утворення військових адміністрацій»** [Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 68/2022 "On the establishment of military administrations"].



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