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DAESH RECRUITMENT

HOW THE GROUP ATTRACTS SUPPORTERS

PREPARED BY THE
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METHODOLOGY

This report provides information about Daesh's 'recruitment support strategy', following on the previous research publication, *'Daesh Information Campaign and its Influence'* from the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. The main focus of this publication is on understanding what is important from the perspective of Daesh recruitment teams—How do they select target audiences for recruitment propaganda? What motivates potential recruits? What are the stages of the Daesh recruitment process?

The methodology used for this study is based on content analysis of the main Daesh products. To understand the narratives currently being used, roughly three hundred Daesh publications of various types, released between January and June of 2016, were analysed for information pertaining to recruitment and radicalization,¹ including fourteen issues of *Dabiq*, magazine prepared for English speaking audiences. A deductive approach was used in analysing the content of the publication in order to reveal the possible motivations of Daesh supporters. The extrapolated objectives and observable

effects of each Daesh product provide the Centre with information that can be used to surmise what attracts people to support the terrorists' cause. Content analysis and deductive reasoning are used to formulate conclusions about the proportion of the recruitment support strategy spent in Daesh communication, as well as how many products may potentially be of interest to possible supporters.

Since many nations have government personnel and independent institutions working on the recruitment and radicalization problem, the Centre analysed reports and publications from other researchers pertinent to understanding how extremist organizations, such as Daesh, draw prospective recruits into their violent strategy.

Moreover, the Centre project officer responsible for this study travelled to a number of seminars and conferences where he had the chance to discuss the most important issues from a strategic communications perspective. Expert subject matter discussions led the author to an understanding of those aspects of Daesh's communication strategy that focus on recruitment support.

¹ The products with Daesh banner or logotype designed specifically for one of the province media branch. Simple tweets, pictures taken from the videos, as well as Twitter conversation were not the subject of the research.

INTRODUCTION

To be successful, an organization must have a carefully prepared strategy communicated through the proper channels, which leads to the implementation of actions that will result in the desired end state. The process used to achieve coherence between communication and information activities, closing the gap between words, visuals, and actions is known as strategic communication. In order to be effective, strategic communication must involve both charismatic leaders and active communicators. A well thought out recruitment campaign is essential to identifying and acquiring sufficient human resources. Recruitment is a function of human resource management and refers to the process of attracting, selecting, and appointing suitable candidates for specific positions within an organisation. Just as legally operating institutions choose the best people they can find to fulfil specific needs, organized crime and terrorist organizations must recruit people to carry out their plans. The main goal is to attract the attention of potential audiences and draw them into the organisation, either regionally or globally. Daesh has been working in its strategic communications to attract the attention of people who may be willing to support Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's ideology.

Daesh youth recruitment has history of its own, which is as old as the organization itself. Their approach to recruitment plays a vital role in sustaining the number of foreign terrorist fighters and many other kinds of supporters who are an essential part of the overall strategy. If we only think of Daesh recruits as foreign fighters, we are not thinking broadly enough.

Of course, any recruit could potentially become a foreign or domestic fighter. A 'foreign fighter' is a terrorist who comes from any country other than Syria and Iraq to support Daesh in battle. However, it is important to keep in mind that the recruitment campaign is not reserved only for those who choose to fight. The campaign targets many other audiences, including those who stay in their own countries and support Daesh by executing a great many tasks necessary for the operation of the organisation. Therefore, to understand the communication strategy of the terrorists, we must first understand how Daesh wants to be supported and what motivates possible Daesh recruits.

This study focuses on the 'Support Line of Effort' mentioned in the previous report on Daesh published by the NATO StratCom

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CoE.² The main objectives of this report are to show who is a potentially target for Daesh recruitment, what motivates people to support Daesh, and to identify the steps recruiters take to secure new members. The Centre has been analysing Daesh products on a monthly basis. These monthly assessments have been used to calculate what percentage of the overall communication strategy is dedicated to recruitment support. They also provide some indication of what steps are being taken and what techniques Daesh has been using to staff its terrorism and intimidation projects.

² Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, *Daesh information campaign and its influence* (Riga: NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, 2016).

COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

Daesh's communication strategy clearly articulates the group's objectives for the information environment, and splitting its efforts into four main lines. These lines of effort are: soliciting support, uniting Daesh members in the fight against its enemies, frightening internal and external adversaries into submission, and informing the widest possible audience about the effectiveness of 'the Islamic State'.³ Since western countries have begun countering the narratives that attract young people, the Daesh efforts to solicit support have increased greatly. As a result, the effectiveness of Daesh's Information Campaign was observed by many countries as the number of people going to Syria and Iraq increased dramatically and finally reached 31,000 foreign terrorist fighters at the end of 2015.⁴ During that time approximately 5,000 people from different European countries were identified as directly supporting Daesh.⁵ However, there are many ways to play a role in the expansion of 'the Caliphate' apart from fighting. Based on the monthly assessments of Daesh publications carried out by the NATO StratCom CoE, 12-26% of

the strategy from the first half of 2016 was designed to gain support for the cause.

Daesh makes use of the 'commitment and consistency' technique, consciously manipulating the unwritten psychological rule that people generally do not like to back out of deals they have made. They know that their supporters are more likely to act as the organisation wants them to after they have agreed to do something for the cause. It is in our nature to strive for consistency in our commitments, and to behave in line with pre-existing attitudes, values, and previous actions. Even a recruit who is not ready to behave as Daesh requires will, most likely, over time, change their perception and become engaged in terrorist activities. The transformation of human character is what psychologist Philip Zimbardo calls 'the Lucifer Effect'.⁶ His experiments show that people adjust to the situations they face and can be encouraged to do more, step by step. Daesh encourages those who are not ready to participate directly in a suicide mission or a terrorism campaign to support the organization in a way suited to their current capabilities.

³ Ibid, p.34.

⁴ Richard Barrett et al., *Foreign Fighters, An Updated Assessment...*, The Soufan Group, p. 4.

⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

⁶ Zimbardo, Philip, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (Random House, 2007).

Month	Support	Unite	Frighten	Inform
January	24	30	12	34
February	25	27	11	37
March	26	23	17	34
April	21	26	16	37
May	12	42	14	32
June	20	27	13	40

Table 1. Percentage of the Daesh Communication Strategy dedicated to specific lines of effort.⁷

However, it is only matter of time until greater commitment will be required. For instance, Daesh circulates list of examples describing ways to support the organization taken from a transcript of an online lecture delivered by Anwar al-Awlaki on January 5, 2009.⁸ The author articulates over forty ways to participate in global *Jihad*, starting with very small actions and ending with the final sacrifice—giving one's life for the cause. According to the Daesh narrative, *Jihad* is the greatest deed in Islam and allows the *Ummah* to survive.⁹ The 'Caliphate' would not be able to preserve the *Ummah* without the active engagement of its supporters in practicing *Jihad*. Therefore, Daesh amplifies the idea that the Western world wages war against Islam and occupies land that should belong to the Muslims.

Thus, *Jihad* should not be perceived as optional, but as an obligation for every Muslim. Terrorist organisations know that family can be an obstacle to influencing a potential supporter; therefore they strongly advise candidates to join their 'holy war', even if others oppose them or advise them not to travel to the places where Daesh operates. According to al-Awlaki's speech, children should practice *Jihad* even if their parents refuse, a wife should practice even if her husband objects, etc. In advertisements of literal *Jihad*, adversaries are depicted as evil beings that want to destroy Islam and the Muslim way of thinking with a global reach. The transcript of al-Awlaki's speech has been found in the possession of several convicted English-speaking militants in Canada, the UK, and the US.¹⁰ Research into Daesh communications focusing on information campaign narratives shows that Daesh mainly uses political and social narratives to recruit support.¹¹

⁷ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

⁸ Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, was linked to a series of attacks and plots across the world - from 11 September 2001 to the shootings at Fort Hood in November 2009. After surviving several attempts on his life, he was killed in a US drone strike in western Yemen on 30 September 2011.

⁹ *Ummah* is the historical name of the Muslim community with common history.

¹⁰ *Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki*, BBC, Source: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11658920>, retrieved on Jun 16, 2016.

¹¹ MAJ Rafał Zgryziewicz, *Content analysis of the Daesh monthly products*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, 2016.

Narratives	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
Political	53	52	59	48	49	47
Religious	28	19	16	26	33	30
Social	19	29	25	26	18	23

Table 2. Percentage of narratives spent in the Daesh communication strategy.¹²

Political narratives are an essential part of the communication strategy for recruiting support. Daesh focuses on being perceived as the one true state created for the Muslim *Ummah*, stressing how good the 'Caliphate' is in managing the regional structures of different provinces. Large-scale advertisements are used to communicate these narratives to the people.¹³ Statistics regarding Daesh 'military operations' are depicted in their video products and in the *al-Naba* newsletter to promote the effectiveness of 'the Caliphate army' on the battlefield. Visuals of a strong and well-equipped 'soldiers' are paired with stories about the 'efficiency' of heavy shelling and the involvement of martyrs functioning as SVBIED drivers.¹⁴ Security forces, such as the police and their commitment to provide security were showcased as an example of the measures taken to protect the people's rights and the citizens of the 'Islamic state'. The effectiveness of widespread investigations and the punishment of perpetrators are also used to emphasize the idea that local structures are capable of

managing all regional security issues at the local level.

Daesh uses social narratives to attract those who are fascinated by the idea of the 'Caliphate', inviting them to join and become an active part of the structure. The necessity of having proper training, and the existence of training camps to satisfy that need, is advertised as the prelude to a great adventure.¹⁵ *Nasheeds* are also part of the social narrative.¹⁶ Some of the *nasheeds* are created in video style to generate stronger feelings.¹⁷ Usually such products express the beauty of being *Mujahedeen*, and the constant need to fight to protect Islam. Another approach to social narratives involves interviews with people who have decided to act as suicide drivers. Their stories are used to emphasise the value and importance of being an active part of the 'state' and the expansion of the 'Caliphate'. Product titles are designed with religious connotations in mind in order to emphasize the idea that everything Daesh does is written about in the Quran.

12 Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

13 Raqqa Province Media, *A Tour Through the Offices of the State*, propaganda video released on 03 April 2016.

14 SVBIED - Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device.

15 Sinai Province Media, *Preparation of the Defiant to Defeat the Tyrants*, propaganda video released on 31 March 2016.

16 Type of vocal music (lyrics), usually makes reference to Islamic beliefs, history, and religion, as well as current events.

17 Alhayat Media Center, *Make Takbir, Oh Muwahhid*, propaganda *Nasheed* released on 01 April, 2016.

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FPS-type products are used to make battlefield reports more attractive.¹⁸ Media products showing the beauty of Middle East region emphasize the claim that society is flourishing under the ‘Caliphate’ are also social narratives.

A comprehensive assessment of Daesh products indicates that effort spent on strategy depends on the current activities on the ground and the information space, as well as on the Islamic religious calendar. Since Daesh terrorists represent an extreme arm of Salafi ideology, and express their desire to return to the roots of Islam, it should be noted that religious issues are skilfully used for ideological and marketing purposes. Religion has long been a driver of people’s behaviour, so Daesh makes use of history and Islamic theological explanations to justify their cause. Religious narratives are a good basis for turning people toward ‘Caliphate’ ideology and manipulating them through their commitments.

¹⁸ FPS – First Person Shooter type of products, where camera is mounted on the weapon or head of the foreign terrorist fighter. An audience can see the visuals directly from the battlefield.

Looking at the communication strategy for April and May we can see that the ‘Unite’ and ‘Support’ lines of effort are proportionally inverted. Daesh changed its strategy before Ramadan and focused its campaign more on the need for Sunni unification and on religious issues, rather than on support and social narratives.¹⁹ The products designed for this line were disseminated much more often because of the religious importance of the month. However, March and June show an increase of the messages designed specifically for recruitment support. The timing corresponds to changes in the situation on the ground, the commitment of the Iraqi forces, as well as global coalition engagement all involved in degrading terrorist effectiveness (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Percentage of effort devoted to various themes in the Daesh communication strategy.²⁰

¹⁹ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

²⁰ Ibid.

Another reason that should not be forgotten is the global engagement of Daesh sympathisers and their commitment in countries outside the Middle East. In March 2016 an opportunity to leverage the actions of supporters in Brussels, Belgium presented itself.²¹ Shortly after the attacks, Daesh claimed responsibility and glorified those who sacrificed their lives. The weekly newsletter, *al Naba #24*, mainly aimed at Iraqi and Syrian populations, described the attacks in Europe and glorified the people who carried them out. Moreover, 18% of video products released in March amplified the importance of terrorist attacks and encouraged sympathizers and supporters to act the same way.²² Most of the videos were created using foreign terrorist fighters. They spoke in their own native languages, emphasizing the alleged destructive actions of the global coalition by showing dead and wounded children and destroyed buildings. They exhorted others to join their organization and support the 'Islamic State'.²³ In June, after attacks in the US and France, the same narratives and efforts for recruitment support were used.²⁴

An important part of the Daesh 'recruitment support strategy' are the speeches of influential leaders and top-level Daesh representatives. As a one of the many examples, the speech made by Daesh spokesperson al-Adnani, released in May, was designed to inspire supporters and give them guidance about what should be done during the upcoming observance of Ramadan.²⁵ Many quotes from various *Surah* were included in the speech. Al-Adnani followed the quotations with simplified explanations, such as '*We would be defeated and you victorious only if you were able to remove the Quran from the Muslims' heart*'.²⁶ By quoting sacred scripts and then using that authority to justify his simplified interpretation of each quoted passage, al-Adnani made good use of the authoritative influence principle. The wide reach of the Internet publication of his speech in English translation has created challenges for ensuring security in Europe. The increase in the number of attacks since the speech was released may indicate the effectiveness of such products.²⁷

21 The attacks on 22 March, 2016, in Brussels occurred at *Zaventem Airport* and at *Maelbeek* metro station.

22 Global Daesh Media, *The Exile of Islam and Brussels Attacks*, propaganda video released on 24 March 2016, Tarabulus Province Media, *And What Is to Come, Will Be More Devastating and Bitter*, propaganda video released on 26 March 2016.

23 Ninawa Province Media, *An Exact Recompense*, propaganda video released on 25 March 2016.

24 Al-Battar Media, *Orlando Attack*, propaganda video released on 14 June 2016, Furat Media, *You Are Not Responsible Except For Yourself*, propaganda video released on 19 June 2016.

25 Alhayat Media Centre, *That They Live By Proof*, the speech of Daesh spokesman, and propaganda booklet released on 21 May 2016.

26 Ibid.

27 Sympathizers and supporters conducted attacks in US (June 12), France (June 13, and 14 July), Turkey (June 28), Bangladesh (2 July), Iraq (3 July) Indonesia (5 July), and Germany (19 July).

RECRUITING SUPPORT




Fig. 2. Main pillars of support recruitment.

Many places on the Internet under Daesh's supervision emphasize the need for *Jihad* and offer many solutions for those who are ready to support the cause. Six main areas of support can be identified based on al-Awlaki's lessons and narratives from the Daesh communication strategy. These include thinking about the 'Caliphate', financial support, providing help for 'Mujahedeen' families, focusing effort on jihadists, dealing with the media, and committing oneself to the cause (Fig. 2).

Thinking about the 'Islamic State'

One of the easiest ways people can support Daesh is 'to have right intentions for joining'. Allegedly, such intentions reveal a person's true will, whether or not they are ready to support the cause. From the psychological

perspective, intentions are an aspect of human mental mechanisms that explain the behaviour of people who attempt to achieve their intended goals. Their narratives are directed by specific aims. Intentional actions are necessary to accomplish a desired goal and are based on the belief that a particular course of action will satisfy a conscious desire.²⁸ In that case Daesh uses religion, beliefs, and social narratives to stress how important the intentions are for *Jihad*. Such encouragement shows that intention is only the first step and has to be followed by other actions for the 'Caliphate' cause. However, right intentions are also listed as the way for those who can't support officially by pledging allegiance or being a part of open,

²⁸ Malle, Bertram F.; Knobe, Joshua (March 1997). *The Folk Concept of Intentionality*. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 33 (2): 101–121.

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Daesh uses religion, beliefs, and social narratives to stress how important the intentions are for Jihad.

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literal *Jihad*. In that case, according to the Daesh narratives, the expressing the intention and belief that the ‘Islamic State’ is the ‘Caliphate’ for all Muslims is sufficient.²⁹

According to Daesh propaganda ‘praying to God to be rewarded with martyrdom’ is another way sympathizers can support the expansion of the ‘Caliphate’. In many official publications Daesh does not ask directly for their supporters to be ready to participate in suicide missions or engage on the battlefield. However, they make a point of showcasing those who have already decided to fight the enemy and sacrifice their lives in the name of God, so that these examples encourage others to support the organization; those who are on the brink of deciding or have at least expressed the intention to do so.³⁰ Daesh spreads information about the ‘soldiers of Caliphate’, glorifies their commitment, and stresses their religious importance. Before

every suicide mission photos are taken of the soon-to-be martyrs looking happy and ready to accomplish their task. This is an example of social proof; it emphasises the commitment and consistency principle that believers should follow in their prayers in order to be truly ready for engagement if they were to be asked. The disintegration of the *Ummah* means failure, so examples of say-do gaps are brought to the fore, stressing the fault of those who have lost their ‘love for martyrdom’. The ‘culture of martyrdom’ is glorified and ‘fear of the western world’ is leveraged in connection with the idea of ‘the fighter’s love of death’. Religious extremists see self-actualization and esteem as much more important than the other basic needs. From a psychological point of view this can be considered an inversion of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

Money as a driver of Jihad

The second pillar of the recruitment strategy is soliciting financial support. Obviously the organization couldn’t be effective without proper financing and the fundraising that goes with it. Among Daesh’s primary sources of revenue are profits from the territorial occupation, including the control of banks, oil and gas, taxation, etc., as well as kidnapping for ransom. However, it has been proven that the organization depends on donations, both from private individuals and, in certain countries, from certain non-profit organizations.³¹ The communication strategy underlines that financial support

²⁹ Dabiq #2, *Foreword*, Daesh online magazine, p. 4.

³⁰ Anbar Province Media, *An Aspect of Abu Tayba al-Ansari Battle*, propaganda video released on 07 March 2016.

³¹ Financial Action Task Force, *Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*, February 2015, p. 18.

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Social media is a vital part of Daesh's communication strategy, as it enables fundraising through modern communication networks.

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can be given in many ways. This narrative includes statements from Daesh supporters: ‘...if you cannot fight you can give money’.³² Al-Awlaki's speech encouraged people, especially Westerners, to participate in *Jihad* with their wealth because that helps those directly engaged in battle, as well as others who need support. Daesh has shown examples to emphasize the importance of such commitment. Videos of real people, speaking their native languages and encouraging others to spend their money on behalf of the ‘Islamic State’ are an extension of recruitment support, designed for countries both inside and outside of the Middle East. Many ideas for making easy money are provided including credit card fraud, PayPal or eBay scams, and phishing and hacking. If a viewer knows the secrets of a big company, they are strongly recommended to take advantage of such knowledge. The misuse of government benefits and tax avoidance are also recommended for those

residing in western countries.³³ In addition to making personal contributions, Daesh encourages its audiences to advertise these types of support to others. Social media is a vital part of Daesh's communication strategy, as it enables fundraising through modern communication networks.³⁴ Daesh encourages donations the same way crowdfunding organisations do.³⁵ ‘Fundraising to finance the *Mujahedeen*’ is encouraged as one way of fulfilling the obligation of the faithful to support the cause; from Daesh's perspective such supportive actions may precede direct engagement in battle. Paying travel expenses for foreign fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria is mentioned as another example of supporting the cause.

Families

The next area of support is ‘social support for families’ of the people who have joined the ‘Islamic State’. Three narratives are used to encourage this type of support. The first narrative focuses on the families of those who are currently engaged in battle. The second narrative encourages support for the family members of fighters who have been captured by the enemy and are currently imprisoned. In such cases

32 AlHayat Media Center, *Al-Ghuraba – Abu Muslim from Canada*, propaganda video released on 12 July 2014.

33 *How to Survive in The West, Mujahid Guide*, Propaganda booklet, 2015, p. 14.

34 Financial Action Task Force, *Financing of the Terrorist ...*, February 2015, p. 24.

35 Crowdfunding is a method of drawing donations from a large group of people through a combination of technology and marketing. Leading crowdfunding platforms have used statistical analysis to optimize online crowdfunding campaigns through the encouragement of ‘perks’ or ‘donation tiers’.

Daesh communicates that taking care of a fighter's family is equal in reward to taking care of the *Mujahedeen*. The final narrative encourages support for the family members of the *Shaheed*, or those who sacrifice their lives for Jihad.³⁶ Social narratives, designed especially for family members represent a kind of social protection in case something happens to a fighter. They build a feeling of trust that the fighter's family will not be forgotten and somebody will take care of them. In addition to official Daesh products designed to attract males for *Jihad*, female supporters are involved in their own recruitment strategies to stress the importance of the role of women in the 'Caliphate'. For Jihadi families a woman's most important role is to raise her children as the extremists want them to be raised.³⁷ To help women fulfil their obligations social media and private conversations are used to encourage children to be brave, courageous, sensitive, and fearful of none other than God. Children should be raised in the proper spiritual tradition, and should also be trained to increase their physical abilities. Many examples of early childhood lessons are given to help mothers prepare them correctly; among them are stories of martyrs, or *Shaheed*, and famous *Mujahedeen*.³⁸ Women are also advised to exclude 'shameless' television from their lives, or at least to expose their children to

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Children should be raised in the proper spiritual tradition, and should also be trained to increase their physical abilities.

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videos that instil in them the love of Allah, Islam, and *Jihad*. If the time comes when the children demonstrate an interest in these themes, Daesh stresses that military instruction should be added to prepare them for *Jihad* from a very young age.³⁹ In addition, a great deal of advice is given on the importance of education and why 'secular' schools should be avoided.⁴⁰



Fig. 3. The indoctrination of children.⁴¹

36 Dabiq #7, *Advice For The Leaders Of The Islamic State*, Daesh online magazine, p. 16.

37 Dabiq #11, *A Jihad Without Fighting: To Our Sisters*, Daesh online magazine, p. 45.

38 The word '*Shaheed*' originates from the Quranic Arabic word meaning 'witness' and is also used to indicate a '*Martyr*', especially those who die during its commitment for Jihad.

39 A Sister's Role in Jihad, *Sisters' Role Off the Battlefield, Raising Mujahid Children*, Propaganda booklet created for women, p. 6.

40 Dabiq #12, *O You Who Have Believed, Protect Yourself And Your Families From Fire*, Daesh online magazine, p. 33.

41 Dabiq #11, *A Jihad Without Fighting: To Our Sisters*, Daesh online magazine, p. 45.

Jihadists in need

Providing help for the *Mujahedeen*, those currently engaged in global *Jihad*, is also a vital part of Daesh's recruitment support strategy. Praying for *Mujahedeen* is listed as a good opportunity to help them be stronger and more committed to the fight against the enemy. One of the pillars of Islam is paying *Zakat*, a form of tithe or tax. Some scholars have interpreted the *Quran's Surah Al-Tawba* as stating that donations ought to be distributed among eight categories of people.⁴² One of the categories is active Jihadists. According to al-Awlaki's lecture, very few people pay *Zakat* for the *Mujahedeen*, but fighters depend on donations. The recruitment support strategy emphasizes the importance of such donations. Even if the *Mujahedeen* are rich, they are exempt from paying *Zakat* because they are 'the fighters in the cause of Allah'. Daesh has released many publications concerning *Zakat*, and publishes visuals of those who have paid their taxes. Again this strategy uses the social proof technique to influence regional and global sympathizers to do more for those who are actually participating in the fight. Moral support and encouragement for fighters is another important subject for the recruitment support strategy. Those on the front lines or those who are preparing to fight all need moral support. Advertising for support also

serves to reassure the *Mujahedeen* and to give them the strength they need to carry on with Jihad. Videos of foreign terrorist fighters encouraging others on camera to actively participate in the building of the 'Caliphate' is a common aspect of the recruitment support strategy.

Another way of providing support for Jihadists is to contribute to their medical needs. As many Daesh products stress, they are constantly in battle and therefore need any and all medical assistance that can be provided, including medicine, physicians, and hospital care.⁴³ Muslim medical students and recent graduates are called on to come to the 'Islamic State' and share their expertise and knowledge with others in order to support people in the 'Caliphate'. The main narrative says that the 'Islamic State' provides everything for people who can offer medical care.⁴⁴ The request for medical support is also aimed at women who want to help; they are advised to get specific medical training before arriving in the 'Islamic State'. According to their advertisements, many skills are beneficial for the *Mujahedeen*—knowledge of how to stop bleeding, how to dress wounds located on different parts of the body using a bandage and what to do if a bandage is not available, lifting and turning a person who cannot walk without bearing all the weight, and many other first-aid techniques.⁴⁵

42 Quran, Sura 9:60, 'Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer the (funds); for those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to Truth); for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of Allah; and for the wayfarer: (thus is it) ordained by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom.'

43 Dabiq #11, *Interview with The Delegated Leader for the Libyan Wilayat*, Daesh online magazine, p. 62.

44 Dabiq #9, *Healthcare in The Khalifah*, Daesh online magazine, p. 24.

45 A Sister's Role in Jihad, *Sisters' Role Off the Battlefield, Training in Combat Medicine and First-aid*, Propaganda booklet created for women, p. 15.

Since Daesh and other affiliated organizations are perceived as terrorists, the engagement of Jihadists and their supporters must be secured. Many Daesh products stress that the global coalition and others who are against the 'Islamic State' are infiltrating the Muslim *Ummah* to destabilise the Middle East.⁴⁶ Therefore, protecting Jihadists and their secrets is of utmost importance. Daesh narratives say that a Muslim should develop the habit of keeping secrets, both one's own and the secrets of those who are directly engaged in fighting. The group also recommends taking care with one's closest relatives because of their potential vulnerabilities. This advice is amplified by examples of what happens to people who allegedly spy against the 'Islamic State'.⁴⁷ Keeping the secrets of the 'Islamic State' and the *Mujahedeen* is seen as equally important as revealing the names of spies or other people potentially harmful to the cause.

Defending the *Mujahedeen* and protecting the reputations of committed Jihadists, perceived by world as terrorists, is praised. Daesh depicts its fighters as sacred people who fight for Allah's cause; standing up for those who defend the 'Islamic State' and the Muslim religion is an Islamic duty. Interviews with Daesh members, especially the ones who have given up their lives for the cause of the 'Islamic State', are used

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As many Daesh products stress, they are constantly in battle and therefore need any and all medical assistance that can be provided, including medicine, physicians, and hospital care.

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to remind the faithful of their duties.⁴⁸ The communication strategy stresses that fighters should not be forgotten and their good name must be defended. Interviews with foreign terrorist fighters are vital to the Daesh communication strategy because they have the potential to plant the desire to replicate such valued commitment. The desire to be perceived as an important fighter for the cause of the Caliphate and to be glorified in future publications could be a trigger for some followers.

Although terrorist fighters are glorified in official Daesh communications, the organisation is aware that some mistakes are being made, and may be used for discreditation. Therefore, Daesh encourages to provide an advice on how to improve them. Such advice can be delivered directly or posted on the Internet. To point out failings is not enough; new ideas and solutions should be suggested through constructive critique. Additionally, women

⁴⁶ Raqqa Province Media, *They Are the Enemy, So Beware of Them* #4, propaganda video released on 10 February 2016.

⁴⁷ Dabiq #7, *Interview With A Spy Working For The Israeli Mossad*, Daesh online magazine, p. 26.

⁴⁸ Dabiq #7, *The Good Example Of Abu Basir al-Ifriqi*, p. 68, and *Interview With Abu Umar al-Baljiki*, Daesh online magazine, p.72.

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The desire to be perceived as an important fighter for the cause of the Caliphate and to be glorified in future publications could be a trigger for some followers.

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are advised to encourage their men and to remind them of their religious duty and obligation towards other Muslims. However, the group emphasises that no one can be forced to do something against their will. If somebody goes unwillingly and under pressure, instead of being useful to the ‘*Mujahedeen*’ they may become an unwanted burden.⁴⁹

Media war

Since information sharing is so important to the cause, knowledge of how to spread the call for *Jihad* through media plays an important role. The group’s strategy embraces multiple media platforms and those who are willing to contribute and amplify Daesh’s narratives can find a place in the organisation. The narrative explains that western mainstream and moderate Muslim media are a threat to the ‘Caliphate’, because they are used to demonize the *Mujahedeen*, spread lies about them, and blow their mistakes out of proportion. The

media outlets of the ‘corrupt western world’ sow the seeds of disunity among Muslims, attempt to ruin the reputations of their leaders, and ignore or demonize the scholars of truth. They glorify and promote the scholars of falsehood, insulting Allah, and making fun of the one true religion.⁵⁰ Therefore, the next pillar for the Daesh communication strategy is the media—the communication channels through which news, entertainment, education, data, and other messages can be disseminated. Consequently, all those who want to support Daesh can fight the alleged lies spread by Westerners and the enemies of the ‘Caliphate’. Producing, following, and spreading the news of their soldiers’ successes are another way to support the ‘Caliphate’ and be actively engaged in Jihad, while sitting comfortably behind computer screens or cameras.⁵¹

The competition for information advantage has forced Daesh to create a special campaign designed to discredit channels of communication used to counter Daesh narratives. Since satellite TV does not lie within Daesh’s sphere of influence, the group prepared series of products about the destruction of satellite TVs for the regional populace. Through extensive communication efforts, Daesh explained the alleged dangers of possessing a satellite dish.⁵² To emphasize the commitment those who have already decided to follow

⁴⁹ A Sister's Role in Jihad, *Sisters' Role Off the Battlefield, Encourage Loved Ones to go for Jihad*, Propaganda booklet created for women, p. 10.

⁵⁰ Al-Naba #11, *The Enemy Within. The Dish: Some of Its Risks*, Daesh weekly newsletter, p. 4.

⁵¹ *Media Man, You Are a Mujāhid Too, Second Edition*, Daesh propaganda booklet released on 06 April 2016.

⁵² *Why Should I Destroy the Satellite?*, Daesh propaganda booklet released on 16 March 2016.



Fig. 4. The example of campaign anti-satellite TV.⁵³

the guidance of the religious police, Daesh created a further series aimed at negating other sources of information. The series was released before Ramadan—the timing also played an important role and was used to bring together two principles of influence—social proof and authority. Daesh encourages its ‘citizens’ to hand in or destroy their satellite television receivers to stop the influence of Western and moderate Muslim programming before the holy month.⁵⁴ Children and men were shown stomping on their satellite dishes and cable boxes, or destroying them with axes (Fig. 4).⁵⁵ The intensity of such images demonstrates the organisation’s desire to stop people

from learning about ‘Islamic State’ losses in Iraq and Syria from their satellite TVs and be inspired to stand against them. The campaign against satellite receivers came just as Iraqi forces, backed by US airstrikes, waged a major assault on the city of Fallujah. Before the liberation of Fallujah, Iraqi authorities had been broadcasting reports about Fallujah residents expressing anger at the brutal ‘Islamic State’ rule over their city as they fled the battle zone.⁵⁶ Journalists who collect information about Daesh brutality and its destructive ideology in order to show the true face of terrorism are also targeted by the Daesh communications strategy. To discourage people from taking any action against the ‘Islamic State’, Daesh uses every opportunity to make an example of such journalists. In a recent video, reporters

53 Khayr Province Media, *And Let the Believers be Cautious Regarding the Prevention of the Dish and Its Destruction*, propaganda video released on 31 May 2016.

54 Ninawa Province Media, *Dish and its Destruction*, propaganda video released on 31 May 2016.

55 Khayr Province Media, *And Let the Believers...*, propaganda video released on 31 May 2016.

56 S. Kalin, A. Rasheed, *Iraq announces start of Falluja operation, some residents flee*, The Reuters, article released on 22 May 2016.

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The Internet has become an excellent medium for spreading the call of Jihad and following news of the Mujahedeen.

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were forced to act as they allegedly acted against Muslims in Daesh-controlled territories. After the fabricated story, some of people were executed by beheading, an others blown up by bombs planted in their computers and cameras.⁵⁷ The general idea of the strategy was to depict journalists as intentionally creating a false picture of the ‘Islamic State’ to convince audiences of their guilt. It was also an invitation to supporters to actively participate and take action when the situation requires it.

There is separate, specifically designed aspect of the ‘media pillar’ for WWW Jihad. The Internet has become an excellent medium for spreading the call of *Jihad* and following news of the *Mujahedeen*. Links and resources are suggested for online supporters named the ‘*Internet Mujahedeen*’. Not all fighters are required to be on the ground because the ‘Caliphate’ can be supported virtually through establishing discussion forums and email lists that facilitate sharing of *Jihad*

news and literature. These groups emphasise that online support for *Jihad* is as important as boots on the ground. The importance of online Jihadists becomes even more apparent when we consider the fact that the group specifically targets those who can support them far from the battleground.⁵⁸ Online support includes a tremendous amount time that is devoted to spreading Daesh messages to Muslims everywhere and can have an important influence on events on the ground. Online *Jihad* is perceived as a constant battle with the lies of Westerners, and is strongly encouraged in Daesh publications. There are many examples of online Daesh supporters debunking allegedly false anti-‘Islamic State’ information, which is seen as misinformation spread by the West and its allies.⁵⁹

Many Daesh products show soldiers of the ‘Islamic State’ deployed on the ground fighting in the name of Allah and, despite many problems, succeeding. Similarly, online Jihadists are advised to create new accounts if the ones have been using are suspended or deleted. A special technique for such activities has been developed for Daesh supporters. Despite the efforts of many organizations, it helps the Daesh communications strategy to continue uninterrupted.⁶⁰ Sharing information through social media, mainly Twitter, also gives

58 Raqqa Province Media, *Message to the Knights of the Media*, propaganda video released on 08 March 2015.

59 *Islamic State burying children alive in Mosul*, Debunked made by Daesh supporter, information retrieved on 23 June 2016, source: https://justpaste.it/buried_debunked.

60 Shaheen, Joseph, *Network of terror: how DAESH uses adaptive social networks to spread its message*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, December 2015.

57 Khayr Province Media, *Revelations of Satan*, propaganda video released on 16 June 2016.

Daesh the opportunity to use a technique commonly known as hashtag hijacking, which facilitates the global spread of Daesh narratives.⁶¹ After the terrorist attacks in Belgium orchestrated by Daesh, hashtags such as #Bruxelles and #Belgique were used to express support for the victims. However, Daesh supporters co-opted these hashtags for their own purposes and used them extensively to disseminate Daesh's products. People were looking for information and expressing solidarity in the fight against terrorism were instead exposed to content provided by Daesh supporters (Fig. 5).



Fig. 5. The example of video circulated after the attack in Brussels.⁶²

In addition to advice on how to sustain information flow on social media and how to be successful in the current information environment, Daesh also provides advice on avoiding interception and recognition by intelligence agencies, as well as protecting

sensitive information.⁶³ Examples of various protocols and methods for ensuring secure communications are shown and recommended. The publication of such products indicates that protecting the safety of their allies in the information space, especially in Europe, is still a concern for the terrorists.

Those who know how to communicate effectively and how to protect themselves while using electronic media are advised to follow *Jihad* news and spread the information in their neighbourhoods, either physical or virtual. The importance of such support is emphasised because, according to Daesh, the safe dissemination of information makes connections between supporters and those who are directly involved in fighting stronger, it also serves to keep people updated on the 'successes of the Islamic State'. In addition to the official products released by the regional media offices, Daesh has created a global media branch—the *Amaq News Agency*. *Amaq* prepares and disseminates short statements, infographics, and battlefield footage to shape the information environment. The majority of the information produced by *Amaq* is text in graphic format. This format is used to protect texts from being recognized and blocked by automated Internet robots, and they are convenient for social media circulation (Fig. 6).

61 Svetoka, Sanda, *Social Media As A Tool Of Hybrid Warfare*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, p. 18.

62 Screenshot from the Twitter account of Daesh supporter, taken just after the attack in Brussels.

63 Dār al-Islām #9, *Sécurité Informatique*, Daesh online magazine, p. 38.




Fig. 6. Example of an Amaq News Agency product.

According to Dosh news of the *Mujahedeen*⁶⁴ provides people with practical examples of how the theory is applied to contemporary word. The current engagement status of Jihadists and selected religious issues are used to draw supporters into the ranks of the foreign terrorist fighters. Moreover, in connection with the anti-satellite TV campaign, Daesh stressed that only authentic information from 'trustworthy Islamic State sources' can be used. Consequently, those who spread 'rumours and lies' are called hypocrites. Daesh's ongoing campaign clearly articulates that apostates must be defeated by the sword, but hypocrites must be defeated through a battle of words. Since moderate Muslim religious leaders try to counter Daesh religious narratives, Daesh stresses that the proper weapons against such 'acts of hypocrisy' are the *Quran* and the *Sunnah*, or body of traditional social and legal Islamic custom. To counter alternate religious explanations, Daesh encourages supporters to stand up to 'false Imams' expose their mistakes, and confront them with 'true information' coming from

the 'Islamic State'.⁶⁴ Daesh uses also its opponents and their actions against what they perceive to be Islam as examples of the kind of hypocrisy that must be uprooted and eliminated, providing an excellent excuse for the atrocities and executions they commit.⁶⁵ Conversely, the dissemination of good news about Jihadists is advised, since those stories can inspire others and create in them the desire to step forward, joining the movement, and emulate the courage of martyrs. Daesh media structures create news that can be disseminated by online Jihadists to get the attention of those who want to be actively engaged in the 'Islamic State remain and expand' strategy. To stress the importance of online engagement, Daesh claims that inviting others to engage in support for the cause is an act of worship.⁶⁶

The next aspect of media support is good cooperation between supporters and scholars, and their engagement through the

64 Dabiq #14, *Kill The Imams of Kufr in The West*, Daesh online magazine, p. 8.

65 Raqqa Province Media, *They Are the Enemy, So Beware of Them #4*, propaganda video released on 10 February 2016.

66 Furat Media, *You Are Not Responsible Except For Yourself*, propaganda video released on 19 June 2016.

media. Daesh stresses the importance of scholarly writings and their influence on the people. However, even scholars sometimes do not have enough knowledge about those who are actually engaged in fighting and their efforts for the cause. Therefore, if a supporter has good information about the *Mujahedeen*, they are advised to cooperate closely with scholars and *Imams*—to provide them with proper materials and discuss with them, but to avoid confrontation or asking controversial questions. By influencing the views of one scholar a person with valuable information could change the views of thousands of Muslims. Scholars who already are supportive of the vision of the ‘Islamic State’ are quoted as authorities. Daesh claims that many scholars support the idea of the Caliphate,⁶⁷ however, according to some, many scholars can’t speak freely because of governmental repressions. Therefore, ‘Islamic State’ activism also means handing out books and pamphlets in the neighbourhood, setting up websites and posting material online, advertising where scholarly writings can be found, and distributing such products in the private circles.

Issuing *fatwas* that support ‘Islamic State’ soldiers is also the part of the media battle.⁶⁸ According to Daesh, many scholars spread false *fatwas* and try to counter ‘the Caliphate’. Therefore, Daesh encourages the

⁶⁷ Dabiq #12, *Interview With Abu Muharib as-Sumali*, Daesh online magazine, p. 61.

⁶⁸ In the Islamic faith is the term for the legal opinion or learned interpretation of qualified jurist or mufti about the Islamic law. The person who issues a fatwa is called a Mufti. Since anyone trained in Islamic law may give an opinion, fatwa is not necessary a formal position, but only opinion.

“Amaq prepares and disseminates short statements, infographics, and battlefield footage to shape the information environment.”

amplification of *fatwas* that are supportive of ‘the Caliphate’; these should be widely distributed to followers and prospective supporters.⁶⁹ Through such communications Daesh is trying to reach those people that rely on scholars and their views about religious texts, and therefore can be easily ‘guided’.

The last aspect of the media battle is to inspire others through *Nasheeds*; these are songs that include a mixture of religious and social narratives. In this way Daesh hopes to inspire people who already support the ‘Caliphate’ and are actively engaged in literal *Jihad*. The organization believes that *Nasheeds* can be used to reach audiences who cannot be reached any other way or do not have time to read booklets and *fatwas*. Daesh is well aware that young people are susceptible to this kind of engagement, so most of the *Nasheeds* are prepared for

⁶⁹ Dabiq #10, *A Fatwā for Khurāsān*, Daesh online magazine, p. 18.



Fig. 7. YouTube channel 'Best Nasheed Channel' where *Ajnad Media* products can be found.⁷⁰

them.⁷¹ Through the popularisation of such products, Daesh wants to create a *Jihadi* culture, which can be perceived as a sense of life. *The Ajnad Media Foundation*, Daesh's global media branch specializing in *Jihadi* songs, is constantly working on new products for global consumption. Daesh stresses that Arabic is the main language, however they also work on translations and the development of *Nasheeds* in English, French, Russian, and many other languages to draw in people from different countries. All followers, and especially those who are talented singers, are invited to become involved.⁷² Daesh encourages covering topics such as martyrdom, youth *Jihad*, the inevitable victory of Islam, and the need to defend the religion. The majority of the analysed products focused on the power and success of the *Mujahedeen* through vocal music and visuals. Visuals amplify the soundtrack by showing the strong commitment of the 'soldiers' on the ground,

and their skilful use of heavy equipment. Young supporters are depicted as heroes who are ready to fight with smiles on their faces.⁷³ Many such products, created and circulated among Daesh sympathizers, can be found on social media (Fig. 7).⁷⁴

The 'Islamic State' needs you

The last aspect of the recruitment strategy is designed to give direct guidance to those who see themselves as an active part of the literal *Jihad*. Daesh communicates how such people can be engaged in the fight against its opponents—regionally, globally, or as operatives in their countries of origin. Daesh embraces spiritual preparation. Religious narratives and quotations from religious texts are used to empower the recruitment strategy, which stresses that the defeat of the 'Islamic State' would not be due to the strength of the enemy, but rather to the weakness of the people who are still hesitating to support them. The global coalition against Daesh will only be victorious only if they are able to remove the

⁷⁰ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKWoS3xk_J4bEjDQFS_MDrg, accessed on 17 August 2016.

⁷¹ Alhayat Media Center, *Blood for Blood*, propaganda *Nasheed* released on 29 April, 2016.

⁷² Raqqa Province Media, *Rather They Are Alive With Their Lord: Abū al-Zubayr al-Jazrāwī*, propaganda video released on 09 January 2016.

⁷³ Alhayat Media Center, *Make Takbir, Oh Muwahhid*, propaganda *Nasheed* released on 01 April 2016.

⁷⁴ Mainly YouTube.

Quran from the Muslims' hearts.⁷⁵ Therefore, spiritual preparation is the religious duty of every Muslim. For explanations about why it is necessary to take part in the global fight against the opponents of Islam, prospective supporters are directed to gain *fiqh*, or the deep human understanding of Sharia in terms of the observance of rituals and morals, and a good knowledge about the *fatwas*, or rulings, of Islamic scholars.

Wala' and *Bara'*, or loyalty to Allah and animosity towards all those who are against the 'Caliphate', are two more concepts that are central to the recruitment campaign.⁷⁶ The need for such personal commitment is repeatedly raised in various products, including the official statements of Daesh representatives and online magazines, such as *Dabiq*.




Fig. 8. The example of *Wala' And Bara'* poster.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Alhayat Media Centre, *That They Live By Proof*, p.5.

⁷⁶ Alhayat Media Centre, *Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful*, the speech of Daesh spokesman, and propaganda booklet released on 22 September 2014, p. 10-11.

⁷⁷ *Dabiq* #11, *Wala' And Bara'*, Daesh online magazine, p. 18.

Daesh uses all available channels to communicate the idea that all the believers should have a clear understanding of what religious loyalty means, and that hatred of the perceived enemies of Islam is crucial to the fight. Many examples loyalty are used in hopes of influencing those who are still hesitating.⁷⁸ Products are created to show the loyalty and sacrifice of those who are true to the cause—travelling to participate in Daesh engagement in Iraq or Syria, global support online,⁷⁹ and even including engaging in suicide missions against the enemy.⁸⁰

The organisation also needs qualified personnel and this is reflected in their communication strategy. Learning skills that are useful from 'the state perspective', such as medicine or engineering, is recommended.⁸¹ Daesh stress that *Jihad* is a complex undertaking and many different skills are needed in Daesh-controlled territories. Their strategy also amplifies the idea that everything taught by Daesh followers is done for the sake of religion and for the Muslim *Ummah*. The call to action is designed for experts in Islamic jurisprudence, especially judges, as well as people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and people of all different specializations and fields provide important

⁷⁸ *Dabiq* #10, *Among The Believers Are Men: Abu Malik At-Tamimi*, Daesh online magazine, p. 40.

⁷⁹ Alhayat Media Centre, *Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful*, p. 11.

⁸⁰ Halab Province Media, *My Son Preceded Me*, propaganda video released on 19 February, 2016.

⁸¹ *Dabiq* #11, *Hijrah From Hypocrisy to Sincerity*, Daesh online magazine, p. 26.



Fig. 9. Visuals with examples of foreigners as doctors in the 'Islamic State'.⁸²

services to 'the state' Daesh wants to create.⁸³ To make the call to action even stronger, Daesh uses examples of people who travel to Syria and Iraq to let others know that there are already people who decided to support and be an actively engaged.⁸⁴ This pattern shows that Daesh manipulates its messages by making use of the social proof technique, designed to determine the appropriate mode of behaviour for a particular audience, driven by the assumption that some people already possess more knowledge about the situation under the 'Islamic State'. This influence technique is used to manipulate people into conforming

to the behaviour of others publicly, without necessarily believing that it is correct, but it also can be effectively used to encourage private acceptance of certain ideas and behaviours. One well-known example is the Australian doctor who decided to join and support the 'Islamic State'. He introduced himself in a video as *Abu Yusuf*, part of the medical team, and calls for other medical professionals to travel to Syria.

Another example is the man known by the name *Abu Amir al-Muhajir*, the person responsible for the recruitment of medical support. He urges Muslim medics from England and Sudan to join the 'Islamic State', and practice *Jihad* by providing medical help for those who are in need (Fig. 10).⁸⁵ The story of nine doctors and medical students

82 Raqqa Province Media, Health Services in The Islamic State, propaganda video released on 24 April, 2015.

83 Dabiq #1, *A Call To All Muslim*, Daesh online magazine, p. 11.

84 Raqqa Province Media, *Health Services in The Islamic State*, propaganda video released on 24 April, 2015.

85 Khayr Province Media, *Medical Care in Wilāyat al-Khayr*, propaganda video released on 12 June 2015.



Fig. 10. Visual showing an example of a foreigner working as doctor in the 'Islamic State'.

deciding to support Daesh in Syria confirms that the principle of social proof works.⁸⁶

The actor who plays a doctor in the video is also shown teaching medical students in English. During his statement in front of the camera, he criticizes Muslim doctors in the West for caring too much about themselves, and claims himself as an example of a supporter who doesn't care about money, a big house, or expensive cars. The video also uses al-Awlaki lesson urging Muslims who have been educated abroad, '*not to serve their pockets and be selfish*', but to think about those engaged in global *Jihad* and provide selfless help.

Teaching or learning battlefield skills is another way to reinforce 'the state'. Physical fitness, weapons training, and first aid training are recommended for those who are preparing to join. Training camps that address these needs are advertised as the prelude to a great adventure.⁸⁷ Prospective 'soldiers' go through a series of training exercises to build strength and stamina, and to gain new skills.⁸⁸ Even if a supporter has not yet joined, dedicated training and self-preparation for the upcoming *Jihad* are emphasised. The strategy focuses on training endeavours such as walking for long hours, running long distances—important for guerrilla warfare, and sprinting, which may be useful for urban warfare in the cities

⁸⁶ Henn, Peter, et al., *Nine 'brainwashed' British medical students join ISIS as desperate families travel to Turkish border to beg them to return*, The Mail One, published on 22 March, 2015, source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3006085/Nine-brainwashed-British-medical-students-join-ISIS-desperate-families-travel-Turkish-border-beg-return.html>

⁸⁷ Khayr Province Media, *Whether Light or Heavy*, propaganda video released on 25 June, 2016.

⁸⁸ Sayna Province Media, *Preparation of the Defiant to Defeat the Tyrants*, propaganda video released on 31 March, 2016.




Fig. 11. Visuals show and simplify the correlation of *Jihad* and *Hijrah*.⁸⁹

and streets of Europe.⁹⁰ Many examples of the dangers of insufficient training, in which ‘soldiers of the Caliphate’ might be surrounded and trapped by the enemy, are also given. Since social proof plays such an important role, encouragement for good physical training uses stories of people whose physical fitness and battlefield preparation gave them an advantage during battles.⁹¹ Al-Awlaki’s lesson stresses that ‘*luxury is the enemy of Jihad*’, and Daesh supporters must avoid it. To be prepared for *Jihad*, people have to be able to sleep on the floor, be impervious to cold weather, and do many other things they have never done before. Breaking habits and controlling desires is necessary for those who are going to support the cause and put themselves in the line of fire.

⁸⁹ Visuals and slogan taken from Dabiq online magazine.

⁹⁰ *How to Survive in The West, Mujahid Guide*, Propaganda booklet, 2015, p. 19.

⁹¹ Dabiq #12, *Amongst The Believers Are Men: Aby Shurayh As -Silani*, Daesh online magazine, p. 57.

It is clear that Daesh’s campaign relies on the commitment of foreign terrorist fighters and other supporters from around the world. Therefore, the presence of those who have joined the ranks, as well as overseas support, plays an important role. Global engagement requires movement to and from the places where Daesh wants support. Therefore, part of the recruitment strategy advertises *Hijrah*, or *Jihad* by emigration. Daesh emphasises the correlation between *Hijrah* and *Jihad*—there is no life without *Jihad*, and there is no *Jihad* without *Hijrah*.⁹² Daesh simplifies Islamic history and uses stories about Muslims currently living among non-Muslims who have put themselves at the mercy of non-believers. This setting gives rise to a narrative that encourages Muslims to prepare themselves for

⁹² Dabiq #3, *There Is No Life without Jihad and There Is No Jihad without Hijrah*, Daesh online magazine, p. 31.




Fig. 12. Percentage of effort spent by Daesh to influence global and regional audiences.⁹³

migration to the safe and newly established 'Caliphate'. However, preparation for *Hijrah* is not restricted to Muslims living in non-Muslim countries, but applies to every Muslim. Although the organisation maintains that sometimes supporters need to migrate to the countries of the disbelievers, or to stay put, so that they can take action against those who oppose the idea of Caliphate.⁹⁴ On the other hand, examples of successful *Hijrah* are popularised to provide evidence of global support, and to show that people from many countries successfully fulfil their historical obligations, including well-known supporters, such as 'Jihadi John' from the UK.⁹⁵ Through such stories, Daesh wants to show that despite the many hurdles put in place by anti-Daesh security agencies, preparation for and migration to the 'land of

believers' is still important and achievable. The recruitment support strategy provides examples of people faced problems in their countries, and gives advice on how to safely prepare for the journey to the 'Islamic State'.⁹⁶

The follow-up to *Hijrah's* strategy is about joining the Caliphate, and being a part of collective work of 'the state'. Daesh knows how *Jihad* should be depicted, therefore in each product amplifies how important is such obligation for every Muslim. The history and authority of the Muhammad and his followers' first journey from Mecca to Medina is extensively used.

Research on the Daesh communication strategy shows that the majority of messaging is directed at the Middle East, where Arabic is the main language (Fig. 12).⁹⁷

⁹³ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

⁹⁴ Dabiq #13, *Foreword*, Daesh online magazine, p. 3.

⁹⁵ Dabiq #13, *Among The Believers Are Men: Abu Muharib Al-Muhajir*, Daesh online magazine, p. 22.

⁹⁶ Dabiq #14, *Among The Believers Are Men: Aby Jandal Al-Bangali*, Daesh online magazine, p. 50.

⁹⁷ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

Therefore, learning Arabic is another way people can support the 'Islamic State'. The organization emphasises the importance of members being able to communicate by means of a common language, the first choice being Arabic. However, the translation of the *Jihadi* literature into other languages helps the organization to shape the non-Arabic information environment as well. Most Daesh products are published in Arabic, but those who speak an additional language are encouraged to translate the most important texts so that potential supporters everywhere can gain access to these ideas. Daesh also recommends that children should learn Arabic from an early age, speak Arabic as youths, and later study another language such as Hebrew, Persian, English, etc. in order to spy on enemy communications or execute operations on enemy territory.⁹⁸

Daesh skilfully juggles its opportunities by leveraging the best strategy for the situation. The communication strategy comprises 8-30% of monthly products designed for recruiting new members. However, the percentage of products likely to be instrumental in attracting potential supporters ranges from 30% to 48% (Fig. 13).⁹⁹




Fig. 13. Percentage of products with recruitment messages.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Dabiq #15, *Contemplate. The Creation By Abul Harith ath-Thaghri*, Daesh online magazine, p. 8.

⁹⁹ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

DAESH TARGET AUDIENCES

Knowledge of the indigenous population in the Middle East, as well as the information possessed by the foreign terrorist fighters gives Daesh an excellent foundation for understanding how to shape perceptions around the world. The skills of its members allow the organization to choose the best audience for each part of their communication strategy. The four lines of effort Daesh has been using in its campaign require different demographic sets. Generally, we can differentiate between four main audience groups: foreign and domestic terrorist fighters, westerners, Sunnis, and people of other religions. The groups are further refined to select the most appropriate candidates for achieving specific objectives in a designated area. The main target audience for the overall Daesh communication strategy is the Muslim Sunni population. According to the research, 87-95% of products are aimed the Sunni population (Fig. 14).¹⁰¹

However, keeping in mind various aims coming from Daesh products, it cannot be claimed that all Sunnis were encouraged to

support the cause of the 'Caliphate'. Daesh has published products showing brutal executions of Sunnis who allegedly worked with the global coalition as operatives. The aim of such products is to single out non-compliant individuals from the Sunni demographic and make an example of them for not fully accepting the rules imposed on the locals. Daesh products are unique in terms of multi-threading, meaning that various audiences may be targeted by one product. Therefore, the percentage of products designed specifically to draw the attention of new foreign and domestic terrorist fighters or those who have already joined, ranges from 25-53% of products released. The wide range in this case depends on the use of narrative strategy built around religious events, as well as current situation on the ground. It is important to understand that one of the objectives of the terrorist group is to neutralise internal adversaries.¹⁰² Thus, physical and psychological actions against different religious fractions, as well as the secular population, are seen in 17-27% of

101 Ibid.

102 Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, *Daesh information campaign and its influence* (Riga: NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, 2016), p. 28.




Figure 14. Percentage of products designed for specific audiences.¹⁰³

monthly products. The number of products designed exclusively for Westerners remains relatively low at 3-11%.

In its recruitment support strategy Daesh targets both regional and global audiences, focusing on groups of people with specific motivations and psychographics. Daesh knows very well how to leverage their fears, anger, dissatisfaction, and frustration, selecting those most susceptible to their recruitment strategy. Those vulnerabilities are used to provoke an emotional response from the targeted audience. The target audiences include non-practicing Muslims,

Muslims who have recently returned to the practice of Islam, and practicing Muslims. The most vulnerable sector of this audience is the Muslims who aren't fully devoted to their religion. They are perceived as the group most easily inspired by selectively chosen religious quotations supported by social narratives; such recruits are guided relatively easily from the early stages to full commitment to Daesh. Young men make the most desirable candidates, and are also the safest targets for recruitment. The second audience, Muslims who have recently returned to the practice of Islam, are perceived as the group that respects their religion; this is evidenced by the rejection of their desires as they return to religious practice. They are also seen as people who are motivated by a specific purpose and are easily pulled into a group driven by religion ideology. The last audience consists of deeply devoted Muslims, who don't need to be convinced about their religious obligations. By refining their audience into specific segments, Daesh can successfully target specific demographics sets whose characteristics and vulnerabilities are well understood. Therefore, potential supporters who are already driven by religion are seen as excellent candidates for recruitment; already susceptible to religious instruction they are more likely to be convinced of 'Islamic State' superiority. Daesh emphasizes the differences and divisions between religious groups, and often tries to discredit its opponents.¹⁰⁴ For such audiences,

¹⁰³ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

¹⁰⁴ Dabiq #7, *Dozens Of 'Nusrah' And 'Ahrār' Fighters Repent And Join The Islamic State*, Daesh online magazine, p. 38.

Daesh uses the testimonies of people who have changed their affiliations. The main arguments being that other groups don't properly implement Sharia law and that they treat their ordinary members unjustly. Ironically, Daesh uses the term 'so-called Islamic' for such groups to diminish their importance and convince audiences that the 'Islamic State' is the only right option. The next segment consists of youths who live far from the developed urban areas. They are thought of as marginalised and neglected, especially by Western countries. Daesh uses its social narrative to engage the attention of young people who don't see a path forward. They are often driven by lack a sense of purpose or belonging to their own neighbourhood. The religious environment plays a vital role in shaping the perceptions of rural youth so that may have a disposition for Daesh's religious interpretation. High school and university students are also suitable targets for Daesh's recruitment strategy. Schools often isolate students from their families for long periods of time and are full of young people harbouring anti-government sentiments. Young people above 15 years of age are perceived as most susceptible to the cultivation of Daesh's *Jihad* ideology. Early radicalization can eventually lead to the creation of an army of followers. Therefore, Daesh encourages early recruitment.

Unintended or accidental recruits also have a place in the recruitment strategy. Non-practicing Christians or secular individuals are also sometimes attracted by Daesh communications activities. Daesh sees such converts as an opportunity for amplifying

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Daesh products are unique in terms of multi-threading, meaning that various audiences may be targeted by one product.

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their strategy.¹⁰⁵ Radicals perceive them to be struggling with their identity, confused and caught between the Western world and devotion to the 'Caliphate'.¹⁰⁶ Recruiters can leverage the confusion and have a good chance of luring this segment into radicalization. The major advantage of converts for Daesh is their European appearance.¹⁰⁷ This is seen as useful for engagement in Western countries, especially in mono-cultural societies. This is the reason that some products are designed to spark the interest of anyone who may be fascinated by Daesh's most recent achievements, the dedication of 'fighters' on the battlefield, or even by the crimes allegedly perpetrated by the anti-Daesh global coalition.

Based on an analysis of the content of Daesh products, including a deductive approach to identifying possible motivating factors, solicitations of support for the 'Islamic State' appear in 62% of messaging.

¹⁰⁵ Converts are people who consciously accept a new religion.

¹⁰⁶ *How to Survive in The West, Mujahid Guide*, Propaganda booklet, 2015, p. 18.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.




Fig. 15. Median for possible motivating factors in Daesh media products.¹⁰⁸

In some products Daesh specifies the kind of support needed, but the majority of products do not. Analysis of visual framing and applied persuasive strategies confirmed the importance of informative messages in the communication strategy.¹⁰⁹ The terrorist organization spreads as much news as possible about the success of the 'Islamic State'. Daesh embraces the rule 'we have something for everyone', and works on informative products to flood the information environment. Audience curiosity sparks the desire to have more information about the situation on the ground. Over the

half of Daesh products are designed to keep their audiences up-to-date. Regional support seems to be the second most important issue addressed in the products. The need to be strong and keep supporters' morale high in the face of approaching enemies could be a motivator driving over 40% of products. Daesh glorifies martyrs to increase dedication and encourages its own people to be even more committed to the fight on the front lines. Followers and sympathizers are also continuously informed that there is still room for new members.

Other motivating factors that are important for the recruitment strategy include finding one's personal identity, being part of an

¹⁰⁸ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence: *Daesh Strategic Narrative*, January/June 2016.

¹⁰⁹ Maj Rafał Zgryziewicz, *Daesh information campaign and its influence* (Riga: NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, 2016), p. 35.

incredible adventure, as well as the appeal of changing one's way of life to something more fulfilling. To address these themes Daesh uses motivational speeches from the 'fighters on the ground', FPS-type products, and perpetuated the idea of the West being a 'rotten place without future prospects'. Daesh uses visuals of wounded children and attacks on necessary infrastructure, allegedly caused by global coalition airstrikes, to reach into the hearts of potential candidates. By showing heavy losses on the ground and claiming that the western coalition and

many Arab countries are against the idea of the Caliphate, Daesh hopes to trigger the desire for revenge from people who may support them. The use of frightening messaging aims at evoking feelings of weakness in Daesh's adversaries. This could also motivate those who want to be a part of 'indestructible state' driven by their self-proclaimed Caliph. The use of products with religious narratives, especially during the time of Ramadan and other religious events, helps Daesh effectively target religious beliefs.




Fig. 16. Reasons some young people are attracted to Daesh.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ White Paper on the Findings of the ASDA'A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey 2016, published in 2016 by ASDA'A Burson-Marsteller, source: www.arabyouthsurvey.com, p. 13.

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Motivating factors that are important for the recruitment strategy include finding one's personal identity, being part of an incredible adventure.

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Followers of Daesh publications are exposed to religious themes, which might inspire deeply religious devotion and personal support for the group.

In comparison with the research done among Arab youths,¹¹¹ the aforementioned analysis shows interesting connections. Almost one-quarter of respondents believe that the lack of jobs and opportunities for young people are among the most important reasons some people are attracted to Daesh. Other reasons include ‘the belief that Daesh’s interpretation of Islam is superior to others’, ‘religious tensions between Sunnis and Shias’, as well as the ‘rise of secular western values’ in the Middle East.¹¹²

Nearly half of young Arabs think Sunni-Shia relations have deteriorated over the past five years. This perception exists across the Arab world, and the vast majority of Arab youth believe the Sunni-Shia divide is a significant driver of unrest in the Middle East.¹¹³ Polling

results and data received from deductive analysis leads us to conclude that Daesh is able to effectively shape the perception of young people through social narrative. Those with no future prospects perceive joining the ‘Islamic State’ as an opportunity. Familiar religious narratives, the promise of the *Ummah* flourishing under the ‘Caliphate’, and the chance to be recognised as heroes drive the decisions of young audiences. The invasion of Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as current engagement of the anti-Daesh global coalition forces are used to evoke feelings and instigate a desire for revenge. The presence of western troops in the Middle East may be also seen as fulfilling the prophecy announced by the ‘Islamic State’.

Since the ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ phenomenon has become an area of concern, many institutions are working on gaining a deeper understanding of recruitment and radicalisation. The typical age range for recruitment is 18-29, although there are many instances of 15-16 years old being recruited, as well as people in their 30s.¹¹⁴ The youngest US citizen arrested for Daesh-related activities was a 15-year-old boy. Two others were minors, aged 16 and 17 at the time of their arrests. The oldest was a former Air Force officer who was 47 at the time of his arrest. However, the average age of the American Daesh supporter

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid. p.13.

113 Ibid. p. 17.

114 Barrett, Richard, et al., *Foreign Fighters In Syria*, The Soufan Group, June 2014, p. 16 and Richard Barrett et al., *Foreign Fighters, An Updated Assessment...*, The Soufan Group, December 2015, p. 13.

at this time is 26.¹¹⁵ Almost all foreign terrorist fighters are male, although a certain number of women, particularly from Western countries, have been discovered among the radicalised. The motivations of women may be identical to that of their male counterparts (i.e. search for a personal identity, and the desire to build a strict Islamic society), but others are specific to women (i.e. being the wife of a Jihadists or a mother to the next generation).¹¹⁶ Recent examples of Middle East engagement show that even younger children are a part of Daesh's successful 'recruitment support strategy'. A child suicide bomber, aged approximately 12 or 13, was captured after his attempt to detonate an explosives belt in Kirkuk, Iraq. This followed two other bomb attacks in Kirkuk.¹¹⁷ Another suicide bomber was a 12 year old who was behind an attack at a wedding in Turkey that left 51 dead.¹¹⁸ Stories about children and their commitment to the 'Caliphate campaign' are commonly used to influence youngsters. However, Daesh uses also older people to underline that not only children can play an important role in the 'Caliphate'. Some products use older fighters as the main actors to show that there is time even during the twilight years of life to take action

“Some products use older fighters as the main actors to show that there is time even during the twilight years of life to take action against the opponents of the 'Caliphate'.”

against the opponents of the 'Caliphate'.¹¹⁹ According to Iraqi officials, the average age of a foreign terrorist fighter is between 12 and 25, and the majority of suicide missions are done by Iraqis who are no older than 18.¹²⁰

On the face of it, it seems that Daesh is working to recruit anyone from a Muslim society who can be dragged into the organization and can become an active part of the campaign. However, those responsible for recruitment are advised to beware of those who might reveal information, lead them to jail, and eventually disturb the chain of recruitment. Those not qualified for recruitment exhibit certain characteristics; one of them is cowardice. According to Daesh, cowards are afraid to speak openly against those perceived by Daesh to be apostates, including prominent politicians from opposing countries. Daesh stresses

115 Vidino, Lorenzo and Hughes, Seamus *ISIS in America: From Retweets To Raqqa*, George Washington University, December 2015, p. 5.

116 Ibid. p.7.

117 Press TV, *Police thwart child bomber attack in Iraq's Kirkuk*, retrieved on August 22, 2016, source: <http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/08/22/481093/kirkuk-kurds-explosive-belt-child>.

118 Richardson, Cara, *Suicide bomber as young as 12 behind attack at Turkey wedding that left 51 dead*, USA Today, retrieved on August 21, 2016, source: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/21/turkey-wedding-suicide-bomber-isis-dead/89072702/>

119 Anbar Province Media, *An Aspect of Abu Tayba al-Ansari Battle*, propaganda video released on 07 March 2016.

120 The Second International Conference on Psychological and Media Operations to counter Daesh, Iraq, Baghdad 10-11 August, 2016.

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Lack of jobs and opportunities for young people are among the most important reasons some people are attracted to Daesh.

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that such people are ready to praise the terrorists for their own personal safety, not out of commitment to the cause. Cowardice is also perceived as a deadly vulnerability for a future fighter.¹²¹ And on the path to paradise there is no place for the fearful.¹²² The next undesirable characteristic is talkativeness. According to Daesh, such people are focused only on speaking to show that they know everything. It is discouraging to have such people in the organization, since they speak about things that do not concern them and could reveal matters, which would harm the recruitment process. On the other hand, critical thinking may not be a desirable characteristic for a Daesh recruit, because such people usually seek their own answers to the questions they may have. This could cause doubts and raise more inconvenient questions, and eventually lead to a hostile attitude toward what Daesh expects from its supporters.

¹²¹ Dabiq #6, *Advice For The Soldiers Of The Islamic State*, Daesh online magazine, p. 13.

¹²² Dabiq #8, *The Twin Halves Of The Muhājirīn*, Daesh online magazine, p. 36.

Those who are hostile toward literal *Jihad* are excluded from the recruitment process. If they oppose Daesh's conception of *Jihad*, they are seen as potentially exploiting the weaknesses of every Muslim that supports the cause of the 'Caliphate'.

Daesh is afraid of groups that can be used by its opponents to fight their ideological narratives. Daesh needs money for its own purposes; therefore recruiters are advised to avoid people who are not ready to spend their money in full support of the 'Caliphate'. Such people are depicted as having a shamefully cowardly and stingy nature, they are Muslims who are secretly unsympathetic to the cause of the Caliphate and actively try to undermine the 'Islamic State'.¹²³

The last unsuitable type for recruitment is a person who is always alone and doesn't try to cooperate in groups. According to Daesh, loners don't have opinions on important issues and usually live traditional lives. On the other hand, Daesh happily makes use of those not affiliated with them, but fascinated by the vision of the 'Caliphate'. Such candidates can be used in their countries of their origin without having to go through full recruitment process. This segment can also be used as supplementary support for amplifying narratives without endangering the chain of recruitment support.

¹²³ Dabiq #14, *Lesson From The Fitnah Of The Mongols*, Daesh online magazine, p. 47.

THE STAGES AND TECHNIQUES OF RECRUITMENT

Traditional Jihadists organizations we have faced in the past decade used to spend months evaluating and radicalizing potential recruits. Old-fashioned ways of communicating, combined with Internet-based technologies and an understanding of the global audience, have accelerated support for the Daesh recruitment process. Since electronic media plays such an important role in the Daesh communications strategy, even those who weren't originally part of the audience intended for recruitment can be drawn in. The variety of products disseminated through electronic media with interesting narratives may serve to construct an audience's desire for additional information. This could certainly be the first step toward recruitment. If a person feels excited by the things Daesh is doing, he may try to seek additional guidance through electronic media. There are many publications on the Internet that provide all the necessary information on how to join the ranks and become a supporter of the 'Islamic State'. Information-seeking behaviour is the consequence of a need to

satisfy some conscious goal.¹²⁴ In the course of seeking, the individual may interact with manual-based information systems (such as newspapers or library resources), or with computer-based systems, foremost social media platforms. When the attention of a potential supporter has been successfully captured, and that person is sufficiently self-educated, the next step would be the search for a community that can lead him through the remaining steps of the recruitment process. At this stage a person is much more susceptible to Daesh influence than someone who isn't interested in providing support. Nowadays, it is more common for volunteers to contact Daesh handlers online directly, rather than the other way around.¹²⁵ The wannabe Jihadists come through social media networks, already self-radicalized thanks to the successful Daesh's strategic communication. A typical recruitment starts with a conversation over Twitter or Facebook, where the

124 Wilson, T.D., *Human Information Behaviour*, Informing Science. 3 (2), p. 49.

125 Bardin, Jeff, *What It's Like To Be Recruited By ISIS Online*, The Business Insider, May 22, 2015, source: <http://www.businessinsider.com/what-its-like-to-be-recruited-by-isis-2015-5>.

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Nowadays, it is more common for volunteers to contact Daesh handlers online directly, rather than the other way around.

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Daesh content is promoted. Information-seeking behaviour will most likely cause an interaction between those who are seeking information and the recruiters. This initial stage is a very important stage, but it is also as easy to track if it takes place on a public platform. Therefore, the next step is to move the conversation to one of the encrypted platforms where the recruitment can continue in private.¹²⁶ However the ideal situation, in which the potential supporter initiates the recruitment process, is sometimes perceived as a threat to the organization. Daesh is well aware of being tracked. Therefore the potential recruit is approached carefully with many questions. Such methods not only help Daesh to find the proper placement for a new candidate, but also help screen for intelligence operatives working to counter violent extremism.¹²⁷

The direct approach for recruitment is when the recruiter's aim is to attract and lure members of an audience that may be useful from the perspective of the organisation. The process Daesh uses is much shorter than that used by any other terrorist organization. However, it has specific steps that must be accomplished one after the other (Fig. 17). The first stage is careful observation of people with desired characteristics, avoiding anyone who may be harmful. Daesh provides advice on certain important principles that must be followed during the observation phase such as morals, manners, etc. In order to be a good candidate for replenishing the ranks of the foreign terrorist fighters and future acts of terrorism, the prospective recruit should be courageous, not very talkative, and ready to fully commit to the group when asked. Moreover, prominent and authoritative people are sought out for their ability to influence others. Demographic characteristics are also important which could help to communicate between recruit and recruiters (i.e. the same age, socioeconomic status, level of education, etc.). It has been scientifically proven that those who are alike are better able to influence one another. There are three specific things used by Daesh, similarities, compliments and look for cooperative efforts for the 'Caliphate' cause. Family connections and financial stability are investigated at this stage. Recruiters know that those who seek social acceptance and are opposed to Western values are highly susceptible to recruitment and further radicalisation. Frustration and dissatisfaction with economic, ethnic, racial, and political issues can be used to encourage

¹²⁶ Svetoka, Sanda, *Social Media As A Tool Of Hybrid Warfare*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, p. 38.

¹²⁷ *How to Survive in The West, Mujahid Guide*, Propaganda booklet, 2015, p. 7.




Fig. 17. Recruitment approaches used depending on environment.

such people to transform their own system of beliefs to conform with Daesh ideology.

The information environment is essential at this stage, however many other forums may be used for observation. Mosques are places of worship where candidates and their reactions to the Imam's messages can be observed as they may provide Daesh recruiters with valuable information.¹²⁸ However, since mosques are now often under surveillance, Daesh has turned to unconventional places for recruitment activities, such as the football field.¹²⁹ Universities have also become hunting grounds where young people quietly share Daesh products in dormitories, sports clubs, or other youth venues.¹³⁰ Both Islamic and

secular universities provide a great market of curious individuals who question society as well as their own beliefs, making them ideal vulnerable candidates. The refugee crisis that is still taking place in Europe became a great opportunity for Daesh. The heterogeneous nature of the Arabic-speaking Islamic community in Europe, and the refugees' strong desire to feel a sense of community in a new place, created a chance for Daesh to recruit dissatisfied youths.¹³¹ Prison, a place with many disenfranchised young men, has also become a good place for spreading the recruitment support strategy.¹³²

If a candidate comes from the territories seized by Daesh, the observation phase is slightly different. It makes the recruitment

128 Eddie, Rachel, *Extremist Islamic State preacher recruiting potential terrorists at mosques in Jakarta*, The Daily Mail Australia, 22 February 2016, source: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3457542/Islamic-State-running-recruitment-drive-mosques-Jakarta.html>

129 Abi-Habib, Maria, *Jordan Struggles With Islamic Extremism at Home*, The Wall Street Journal, published on 14 Aug, 2016, , source: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/jordan-struggles-with-islamic-extremism-at-home-1471225840>

130 Ibid.

131 Robertson, Codi, *German Intelligence: Islamic State Is Recruiting Refugees*, The Clarion Project, 16 August, 2016, source: <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/german-intelligence-islamic-state-recruiting-refugees>

132 The Telegraph, *It's easy to recruit extremists in prison, notorious convert claims*, 12 May, 2014, source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10823517/Its-easy-to-recruit-extremists-in-prison-notorious-convert-claims.html>

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Recruiters work on a candidate's concerns about religion, elaborate on a vision of paradise, and warn about the punishment of hellfire.

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path much shorter. After 20 days of observation to weed out poor prospects, Daesh puts the new recruit into a training camp for another 15 to 40 days.¹³³ During their stay at training camp candidates are taught military techniques and the Daesh-sanctioned interpretation of the Quran.¹³⁴

During the second stage, a recruiter's objective is to approach the candidate through daily routines such as happening to be at the same place, pretending to have the same hobbies, or going to the same Mosque to pray. The recruiter is advised to invite the candidate for a common meal to break the ice, engage in conversation, and find out about the personality of the candidate.¹³⁵ Since religion plays tremendous role during this stage, recruiters are recommended

to speak about Islamic topics. Inspiring religious ideas and stories are at the heart of Daesh's strategy and the power of such stories is used to manipulate people in service of the terrorists. Thus, in this phase almost every aspect of the candidate's life must be subsumed by religion. However, recruiters are advised not to over-emphasise religion, but to leave room to discover more details about the person in question. Their concerns, interests, and relationships are used to determine an individual's suitability. This takes an average of one to three weeks, depending on the personality.

The next step is to form an acquaintance in order to build mutual trust and deepen friendship. From the socio-psychology perspective it is important to build relationships and mutual respect, because this brings people closer to the same cause. People are more likely to comply with requests made by people they like.¹³⁶ The meaning of 'people we like' can range from one's closest friends to attractive strangers. This approach explains why individuals trust word-of-mouth recommendations and stories passed on by chosen recruiters. This phase is likely to last for one to two months. Recruiters work on a candidate's concerns about religion, elaborate on a vision of paradise, and warn about the punishment of hellfire. The obligatory prayers are seen as a tool to increase a candidate's devotion to the recruitment process. Literal *Jihad* and *Martyrdom* are depicted as the virtues of every good Muslim. Therefore, recruiters are

¹³³ Dr. Saad Maan Al-Musawi, *Recruiting Terrorists*, Adwaa Consulting Office For Research And Studies, Iraq, 2016, p. 99-192.

¹³⁴ Gadowski, Witold, et al., *Blood Of The Martyrs, Part 1: Daesh*, Youth for the World - Salesian Voluntary Service production, 20 October 2015, source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2_tgDaotdE

¹³⁵ Dr. Saad Maan Al-Musawi, *Recruiting Terrorists*, life testimonies of accused Iraqi, p. 139.

¹³⁶ Dr. Robert Cialdini's 6 Principles of Persuasion: *Liking*.

recommended to use all available books and publications, including a series of products in which ‘fighters’ are glorified. Such publications depict ‘soldiers’ praying before a battle, their commitment to the battlefield, and finally achievement, to underline the effectiveness of the ‘Islamic State’. Daesh creates a series of products with specific titles such as *‘Protectors of Religion’*, *‘Raids of the Predators’*, or *‘Knights of Victory’*, etc. to influence an individual’s behaviour and help recruiters achieve their aims. Examples of martyrs and the ‘Islamic State’ operations, as well as every step taken against Muslims are advised to use in order to increase the desire of stronger commitment.¹³⁷ Emotional speeches of religious leaders, underlining the alleged oppression of Muslims in the Western world, are used to deepen devotion. Many such products can be easily found on the Internet. Another aim at this stage is to affirm the perception of the ‘Day of Judgement’ as the beginning of a life everlasting. Daesh wants to create the perception that direct support for the ‘Islamic State’ ensures reward in the afterlife and entry into paradise. Those who are killed while committing acts of terrorism are treated as examples of holy martyrs that are part of a narrative in which they smile and talk about beautiful things they see and feel before they enter paradise, i.e. before they die.

Candidates are informed about security agencies and the challenges of possible arrest during the acquaintance phase.

Recruiters are warned that this information may give rise to the questions and doubts the candidate may have. Giving simple answers is advised in order not to confuse the candidates and to avoid topics that may be difficult to explain. According to Daesh recruitment instructions, all answers must have a connection with the Quran and should be followed by a simplification of the quoted passage. In addition, a deep reassessment of the meaning of *Jihad* is suggested, during which various incidents, such as the cartoon controversy in Denmark or the Charlie Hebdo case must be mentioned. When this stage is complete the recruit will have a deep understanding and acceptance of the ideology and its objectives. The length of this phase depends on the personality of recruit and may last up to two months.

The remaining ‘recruitment support steps’ commonly take place in the information space, as well as through direct engagement. The first step is focused on isolation. The aim is to cut all connections that may disturb the indoctrination process.

Moderate religious leaders who use the Quran to demystify Daesh’s confused interpretation are perceived to be the main threat, so Daesh strategy relies on undermining the opinions of opposing religious leaders. Isolation from one’s former life also means cutting off friends and family members who may negatively influence the recruitment process. The isolation stage marks a dramatic change in the life of a recruit, creating a vacuum where the opinions of friends and advisors once were, leading the recruit to seek more

¹³⁷ Many examples can be found on YouTube where influential scholars give speeches and urge for taking action to protect Muslims.

guidance from their new-found terrorist friends. Micro-communities of like-minded people deepen devotion and reinforce convictions. At this stage people are much more susceptible to Daesh products that showcase the alleged effectiveness of the group.¹³⁸

Turning to Daesh ideology relies on deep indoctrination. Indoctrination is complete when a candidate has accepted the radical ideology, understands his place in the Daesh strategy, and is ready for active engagement. Therefore, the obligation to engage in *Jihad*, either defensive or offensive is shown as the religious duty of all supporters. The concept of *Hijrah*, as well as those of *Wala'* and *Baraa'*, are extensively used to shape the perception of the candidates.



Fig. 18. Visuals created by Daesh as a call to *Hijrah*.¹³⁹

Since many Arab and Western countries are opposing the idea of violent *Jihad*, this stage aims to defend the concept of *Jihad* as the literal battle against the opponents of Daesh. Narratives alleging that Allah has revealed

Islam to be the religion of the sword are used to endorse Daesh violence.¹⁴⁰ Recruitment methodology mandates calling candidates 'believers' or 'followers of the Messenger'. Manipulation techniques press candidates to think that they are among the chosen meant to control what goes on in the world; that they hold the greatest power and any opponents should think twice before crossing them. During this stage the candidate should accept the self-proclaimed Caliph as the leader of the 'Islamic State'. Jihadi forums are advised to put candidates in connection with others who hold the same fascination. Indoctrination activities involve individual participation in small groups that encourages candidates to recognize their own potential for upcoming engagements.¹⁴¹ At this stage candidates are evaluated to decide if they are ready for the specific role Daesh requires of them.




Fig. 19. Visuals created to explain the violence of the Daesh strategy.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ For instance al-Naba weekly newsletter, as well as some video products show how effective the organization was (military operation, *Zakat* distribution, lesson for regional population, etc.).

¹³⁹ Dabiq #3, Front Page of the online magazine.

¹⁴⁰ Dabiq #7, *Islam Is the Religion of the Sword, Not Pacifism*, Daesh online magazine, p. 20.

¹⁴¹ Gadowski, Witold, et al., *Blood Of The Martyrs, Part 1: Daesh*, Youth for the World - Salesian Voluntary Service production, 20 October 2015, source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2_tgDaotdE

¹⁴² Dabiq #7, *Islam Is the Religion of the Sword, Not Pacifism*, Daesh online magazine, p. 20.

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Narratives alleging that Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword are used to endorse Daesh violence.

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The stage where a specific task for the followers is chosen may be integrated with the indoctrination stage. This period is vital for understanding about a task the exclusively chosen for supporter (See the chapter ‘Recruiting Support’). The final stage is taking action, either violent or non-violent. The deep personal commitment of a candidate also drives him to be consistent with his promises and his actions; such commitment makes his decision easier by reducing the amount of things he has to think about. Daesh uses this basic principle, because making a single conscious decision and using it as reference for subsequent related choices works to manipulate human nature. Keeping that in mind, Daesh is fully aware that candidate will be ready if the ‘big expectations’ will come.

CASE STUDIES

This report provides a comprehensive analysis on this how Daesh influences its audiences and works toward radicalization. However, a comparison of the collaborative work, done by various institution and individuals who work on countering violent extremism (CVE), shows the complexity of recruitment support. Research has revealed important areas for Daesh recruitment strategy, and life testimonies are only a proof how Daesh works. It also shows that all of the steps mentioned in this report may vary depending on targeted audience, place of recruitment, and designated task.

The first case study we will examine is that of the Middle Eastern audience, focusing on Iraq and neighbouring countries. Dr Saad Maan Al-Musawi's publication describes Al-Qaeda/Daesh recruitment methods, and includes the testimonies of people who have been lured into violence against the Iraqi population.¹⁴³ The publication focuses on those who decided to act as fighters, jurists, logisticians, etc. Al-Musawi's paper lists both internal and external reasons Middle Easterners are joining Daesh. Many people are internally motivated by their own desperation and

desire to escape an unhappy reality. Religious leaders preaching extreme ideology seem to provide the answers they are seeking. Moreover, some want to prove to themselves that they are ready to defend their faith. Others seek revenge for friends and relatives who lost their lives for various reasons, including military engagements with the West. As external reasons, the author mentions dissatisfaction with the living environment, the daily grind, the tribe he belongs to, as well as relationships with others. Daesh has home-grown cultural awareness of the region and an understanding of the local way of life and way of thinking. Taken together this makes for fertile ground for their recruitment support strategy.

An analysis of the interviews with those charged for cooperating with terrorist organizations reveals that the younger generation is mainly attracted by Daesh's communications strategy, but older people are motivated by taking revenge on those perceived as invaders of Iraq. Their testimonies show that in some cases, people didn't need to be contacted by recruiters to join the organization. They were self-motivated to defend their country against invaders and the 'corrupted government'. The support

¹⁴³ Dr. Saad Maan Al-Musawi, *Recruiting Terrorists*, Adwaa Consulting Office for Research And Studies, Iraq, 2016.

SEX	DOB	Country	Status	Children	Motivation	Motivated	Job	Speciality	Region	Group
M	1981	Iraq	Married	Y	Revenge (US)	Himself	Jurist	Give speeches on Mosque and prison, provide logistical support	Diyala Mosul Baghdad Tikrit Fallujah	AQ
M	1998	Iraq	Single	N	Attracted by Daesh Media Points	Recruiter	Fighter	Suicide mission	Ramadi Fallujah Baghdad	Daesh
M	2000	Syria	Single	N	Religion	Recruiter	Fighter	Suicide mission	Mosul Baghdad Ramadi	Daesh
M	1977	Iraq	Married	Y	Revenge (US)	Himself	Supplier	Logistical support Protection of Jihadists families	Fallujah Baghdad	AQ
M	UNK	Tunisia	Single	N	Revolution activists	Himself	Fighter	Media man forced to be a suicide	Halab Ramadi	Daesh
M	1996	Saudi Arabia	Single	N	Attracted by products	Himself	Fighter	Fighter	Anbar	Daesh
F	1991	Iraq	Married	N	Situation in Palestine and Syria	Recruiter	Wife	Force for suicide mission	Fallujah	Daesh
M	1992	Iraq	Single	N	Products on Social Media	Recruiter	Fighter	Suicide mission	Mosul	AQ Daesh
M	UNK	Iraq	Single	N	Financial situation	Recruiter	Supporter	Logistic, (house service)	Fallujah	Daesh
M	1994	Saudi Arabia	Single	N	Products on Social Media	Recruiter	Fighter	Hold checkpoint Suicide mission	Rutbah Deir ez-Zor Kobane Manbij	Daesh
M	1968	Iraq	Married	Y	Revenge (US)	Himself	Supporter	Logistical support	Anbar Baghdad	Daesh
F	1978	Yemen	Married	Y	None	None	Wife	Married to AQ member	Karradah Baghdad Diyala Fallujah Mosul	AQ
M	1981	Iraq	Single	N	Brother influence	Himself	Supporter	Quran teacher Jurist	Prison Shurqat Mosul Fallujah	AQ Daesh
M	1976	Iraq	Married	Y	Financial situation	Himself	Supporter	Press Logistic	Fallujah Baghdad Mosul	Daesh

Table 3. People charged for cooperating with terrorist organizations.¹⁴⁴

provided by each individual depended on his/her background. Those that know the Quran are tasked with giving religious speeches; others could prove themselves as fighters, logisticians, etc. It is interesting that religious narratives are not the main drivers for those who carry out suicide missions. Religious leaders influence only a small percentage of such decisions, while recruitment videos posted on the Internet have a huge impact

on future suicides. In some cases, finances were the main motivator, even when recruits didn't agree with Daesh ideology.

The second region vulnerable to recruitment and desirable for Daesh is Europe. There are many documented examples of Europeans who have been lured into joining the terrorists. Clashes between Shia and Sunni, as well as the presence of Western forces in the Middle East, play a dominant role for Arabic audiences, but Europeans are

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, based on Interview with imprisoned people, p. 92-192.

attracted by social and religious narratives. Social narratives are designed to create sense of belonging, and religious narratives are designed to answer the 'holy call'.¹⁴⁵ Religion was the main factor influencing Harry Sarfo, a German citizen, to join Daesh. He was also motivated by the idea of uniting with other races under the one flag to protect the Muslim way of life.¹⁴⁶ Sarfo was placed under surveillance by intelligence agencies after his converting to Islam from Catholicism, and later detained. His radicalization took place during the time he spent in the Bremen jail.

Although the majority of Daesh supporters come from the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, we should not forget that North American countries are also affected by their information campaign. Even if it is not such fertile ground for recruitment as Europe, Daesh is aware of the US weapons policy. The terrorists have no need to smuggle weapons; they need only attract gun owners for use in their strategy. A variety of examples were published by George Washington University at the end of 2015.¹⁴⁷ The study concluded that electronic media and social networks play a vital role in the recruitment support strategy designed specifically for

US citizens.¹⁴⁸ A recent publication from the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society published findings based on what the terrorist themselves have said: that they are 'pulled' to the Middle East by religious ideas, rather than being 'pushed' by the realities of the living in the West.¹⁴⁹ The paper indicates that none of the people interviewed said that their socio-economic situation played a significant role in motivating them to become foreign terrorist fighters. Research indicates that religion provides the dominant framework, is the driving factor for behaviour, and leads recruits to interpret of every aspect of life through the delusion of religious extremism. The paper also reports that Canadians tend to be radicalized in clusters and travel to the conflict zones in small groups, and that roughly 15 women left Canada to support Daesh.¹⁵⁰ Some of them gave a birth to babies as a result of the marriages to Daesh terrorists.

Based on three different regional examples we can conclude that demographic characteristics, psychographics, as well as the susceptibility of potential recruits differ from each other. That is why we cannot generalize that for whole campaign Daesh selected only a specific audience. The organization refines its recruitment choices based on the region in question and current needs for the overall campaign.

145 Callimachi, Rukmini, *How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers*, The New York Times, 3 August, 2016, source: http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-recruit-interview.html?_r=0

146 Dearden, Lizzie, *Former Isis militant describes his journey from Royal Mail postman to 'Islamic State' jihadist*, The Independent, 3 May, 2016, source: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/former-isis-militant-harry-sarfo-describes-his-journey-from-uk-london-royal-mail-postman-to-islamic-a6950706.html>

147 Vidino, Lorenzo and Seamus Hughes, *ISIS in America: From Retweets To Raqqa*, The George Washington University, December 2015.

148 Ibid.

149 Dawson, Lorne L., Amarnath Amarasingam, and Alexandra Bain, *Talking to Foreign Fighters: Socio-Economic Push versus Existential Pull Factors*, TSAS, Working Paper Series No. 16-14, July 2016.

150 Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS

Daesh has proven to have an effective pattern for its recruitment strategy, which has been used to attract supporters from around the world. Manipulative techniques in connection with extraordinary narrative themes provide Daesh with an informational advantage about the interests of potential supporters and where to find them. Although, support for extremist efforts is clear among those who commit to being foreign fighters, many other indicators must be taken into consideration. The methods Daesh uses to communicate with its audiences and lure people into the recruitment support line of effort, shows that the scope of the problem is much larger than the engagement of foreign fighters alone. Do we know how many people, driven by ideology, secretly support radical organizations? Do we know how many people have just begun thinking about committing their support to those who are planning acts of terror? We can easily measure number of people who have travelled to the conflict zones, but it is impossible to measure what people think, all the more so because terrorists will

naturally hide their true identities. Daesh provides advice in the form of online and printed matter and their supporters provide personal guidance about how to avoid exposure. It has become extremely difficult to track those who have been caught on the hook of extremism. However, over time, as an individual loses himself to the Daesh mindset, it is more likely that he will reveal his intentions and make a simple mistake that will allow intelligence agencies to act.

The scheme for recruitment support described in this publication may be used by any other violent extremist organization driven by literal *Jihad*. Given the success of the Iraqi fight against Daesh backed by the global coalition, it is highly possible that the battlefield will be moved from that region into Western countries. One of Daesh's goals is to shift focus to hide its failures; others are to influence the perception of Westerners and to find the next generation of supporters. Other terrorist groups have already recognized that clearly stated objectives and selectively chosen channels for communications play a vital role in the communications strategy.

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The scheme for recruitment support described in this publication may be used by any other violent extremist organization driven by literal Jihad.

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computer or smartphone screens. A growing marketplace of social media platforms may help spread recruitment, however it is not the best medium for everything. The skilful juggling of narratives, together with knowledge about how to access a targeted audience, lets radicals take the first effective steps toward influencing new recruits. All the actions that follow are used to amplify the effect and achieve support for the radicals' cause.

Therefore, statements, visuals, and actions are carefully selected to amplify desired effects. Communication matters and perception becomes reality; terrorists use increasingly sophisticated products in connection with skilfully adjusted narratives to shape the perception of both their supporters and their adversaries.

Many institutions are working to answer questions about how to identify potential recruits, what their motivations are, and how lethal an act planned by potential supporter might be. There are no simple answers in our multicultural world. As previously discussed, some people can be pushed into extremism by social factors such as poverty, lack of a clear future, or the neglect of their specific demographic segment. Others are more strongly pulled by religion, a vision of the perfect world, or even the desire to be glorified for their own commitment.

The Internet also speeds the process of recruitment, helping the most susceptible to radicalize themselves in front of their

RECOMMENDATIONS

Be aware of Daesh's recruitment strategy.

The terrorists don't only want support from fighters, engaged in acts of terrorism. Their strategy is much more sophisticated and aims at a much broader spectrum of support. Understanding the problem of the 'recruitment support line of effort' may stimulate a new approach for counter-strategy.

Understand Daesh's target demographics.

Although it is not an easy task, each country should strive to understand its own people and be able to identify which segments of society may potentially be vulnerable to Daesh communications. Knowledge of the current and desired behaviour of existing and potential Daesh operatives will assist security institutions in identifying indicators of behavioural change. Motives and psychographics, as well as demographics and symbols are crucial and could be used to influence susceptible segment of society. Characteristics such as fears, attachments, cultural norms, and values are important factors for recruiters.

Build alternative narratives that challenge those messages, which are attractive to susceptible audiences. A great deal of research is being done on the recruitment and radicalization processes, including the identification of a broad spectrum of methods for building an effective narrative. Successful narratives will not directly address Daesh propositions or question the wisdom of supporting extremists. A successful alternative narrative will require people to think critically and put the burden for responding on Daesh.¹⁵¹ Explanations and examples of the manipulative nature of Daesh have proven to be the most successful type of counter-messaging.

Build awareness among media personnel.

Journalists must be aware of Daesh techniques and the methods they use to manipulate messaging taken from the mainstream media. Not every photo, video, interview, or quotation should be used to

¹⁵¹ A good example is the Global Coalition series with hashtag *#DaeshLies* about lack of water, school and basic needs on the territories seized by Daesh. Daesh wanted to show an utopian situation of flourishing Caliphate, responded by many products, and one of them was the video created by Ninawa Province Media, *Abundant Water*, released on 14 April, 2016.

create the news, especially in the wake of an attack. Daesh is aware that the media compete with each other for attention-getting news, sometimes showing controversial products or spending airtime or column inches on news items that in effect function as advertisement for the attackers. Headlines about successful terrorist operations and reports concerning faulty security amplify Daesh's communication strategy provide more opportunities for Daesh to capitalise on the work of their adversaries and create products without being present. Therefore, all people who work with the mainstream media have to be aware of the danger such messages can cause.

Use appropriate language. The lack of consistency in our communication strategy to counter Daesh is an additional problem. Many people are still using the name '*Islamic State*', which gives the terrorists credibility, and supports the perception that Daesh is sincere in its desire and competence to form a functioning country. All of this is a successful amplification of Daesh political narratives. Words matter. A unified language has to be a part of the counterstrategy.

Support moderate religious leaders. Daesh knows that many people are looking for answers on religious issues; therefore Daesh simplifies its messages to fulfil all needs. At the first stage of recruitment moderate religious leaders can provide answers for people in need that can lead to healthy solutions.

Educate through example. As recruits become radicalized, typical changes in their behaviour can be observed. Therefore, family members play a vital role in countering Daesh

recruitment and prevention measures. This is why educating families about the emerging threat is important. Sharing the stories of those lured into supporting Daesh—the methods used, the steps taken—is the best way to increase awareness about Daesh's multi-faceted approach to recruitment and the consequences of falling victim to them. Testimonies can also increase the resilience of those who hesitate to support the cause of the terrorists. The stories of those who abandoned Daesh or escape from seized territory should also be engaged to educate the public, especially those who are most vulnerable.

Disrupt the Daesh recruitment support chain.

Influential religious leaders with extreme ideologies must certainly be watched, and since social media plays a significant role in providing access to vulnerable audiences, our analysts should broaden their scope to include not only those who communicate publically in the name of Daesh, but also the micro-communities that form around active social media users, as well as anything in between. Internet providers as well as social media owners must cooperate fully with governments and be ready to react quickly.

Share intelligence about potential supporters who are travelling from the Middle East countries, as well as foreign terrorist fighters already actively engaged in the Daesh's strategy. This will allow security forces to build a network of people who are committed to the cause of global terrorism, and at the same time to intercept and prevent actions they may take.

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91. Tarabulus Province Media, *Of Their Goods, Take Alms*, propaganda video released in February, 2016.
92. Alhayat Media Center, *For the Sake of Allah*, Nasheed released in February, 2016.
93. Janub Province Media, *Allah Will Torment Them at Your Hands*, propaganda video released in February, 2016.
94. *Summary of the Provisions for Qur’ānic Recitation, Third Edition*, Daesh booklet released in February, 2016.
95. Raqqa Province Media, *Their Assembly Will Be Defeated, And They Will Turn Their Backs*, propaganda video released in February, 2016.
96. *Abū Ḥamzah al-Muhājir: The Thirty Commandments for the Leaders and Soldiers of The Islamic State, Second Edition*, Daesh booklet released in March, 2016.
97. Homs Province Media, *al-Zakat: Right of the Money and Duty of al-Imam*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
98. Salah al-Din Province Media, *Those Who Carrying the Wounds of Their Ummah #10 – Abu Shayba al-Jazrawi*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
99. Ninawa Province Media, *Orphan Care in Patronage of the Islamic State*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
100. Al-Qawqaz Province Media, *Profit That Will Never Perish*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
101. Al-Qawqaz Province Media, *Ailment and Cure*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
102. Anbar Province Media, *An Aspect of Abu Tayba al-Ansari Battle*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
103. *The Duties: The Knowledgeable Obligations Upon All Muslim Men and Women*, Daesh booklet released in March, 2016.
104. Diyala Province Media, *Fight Against the Allies of al-Shaytan*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
105. Tunisia Province Media, *Tunis For Us and Not For the Apostates*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.

106. Dimashq Province Media, *Defenders of the Honour*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
107. Sinai Province Media, *Fragrance of Life #2*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
108. Raqqa Province Media, *Oh Grandchildren of al-Sahaba in Lebanon*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
109. Furat Province Media, *So Let the Hypocrites Beware*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
110. Kirkuk Province Media, *Abu Suhayb al-Iraqi Battle*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
111. Benghazi Province Media, *Messages to Benghazi*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
112. Khayr Province Media, *Victory from Allah and an Imminent Conquest #4*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
113. Fallujah Province Media, *Knights of Victory #7*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
114. Barqah Province Media, *Oh People of al-Islam in Libya, Adhere to al-Jama'a*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
115. Janub Province Media, *Monthly Statistics for Military Operations – Jumada al-Awwal 1437 H*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
116. Janub Province Media, *Harvest of the Military Operations for the Month of Jumada al-Awwal 1437 H*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
117. Ninawa Province Media, *But Allah Will Perfect His Light*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
118. *Questions and Rulings on Prayer and Fasting*, Daesh booklet released in March, 2016.
119. Anbar Province Media, *With their Blood, They Advised #2 – Abu Farouq al-Ansari*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
120. *The Exile of Islam and Brussels Attacks*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
121. Ninawa Province Media, *An Exact Recompense*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
122. Khayr Province Media, *If You Are Suffering, Then Surely They Too Are Suffering As You Are Suffering*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
123. Tarabulus Province Media, *And What Is to Come, Will Be More Devastating and Bitter*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
124. Raqqa Province Media, *And Cast Terror Into Their Hearts*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
125. Furat Province Media, *An Eye for An Eye*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
126. *Why Should I Destroy the Satellite?*, Daesh booklet released in March, 2016.
127. Ninawa Province Media, *So That They May Desist*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
128. Salah al-Din Province Media, *Picking the Heads*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
129. *Teaching Boys Monotheism*, Daesh booklet released in March, 2016.
130. *The Three Fundamental Principles, The Six Fundamental Principles, and the Four Foundations of Polytheism*, Daesh booklet released in March, 2016.
131. Tarabulus Province Media, *To Establish the Religion*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
132. African Province Media, *Ascertain the Truth*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
133. Sinai Province Media, *Preparation of the Defiant to Defeat the Tyrants*, propaganda video released in March, 2016.
134. Alhayat Media Center, *Make Takbīr Oh Monotheist*, Nasheed in video style released in April, 2016.

135. Kirkuk Province Media, *But They Plan, And God Plans*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
136. Raqqa Province Media, *A Tour Through the Offices of the State*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
137. Alwa'ad Media Production, *Fight Them, Allah Will Punish Them by Your Hands*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
138. Anbar Province Media, *Abu Mustafa al-Ansari Battle*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
139. *Slavery: Provisions and Issues, Second Edition*, Daesh booklet released in April, 2016.
140. Ninawa Province Media, *Preserving Virtues in Order to Prevent Depravities*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
141. *Media Man, You Are a Mujāhid Too, Second Edition*, Daesh booklet released in April, 2016.
142. Ninawa Province Media, *Glad Tidings in Support of the Tribes*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
143. Najd Province Media, *Execution of the Apostate Kattab Majid al-Outaybi, Director of General Investigation in al-Quway'iya*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
144. Alhayat Media Center, *Selected 10 Videos from the Wilayats of the Islamic State*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
145. Jazirah Province Media, *Aspect of Ongoing Battles in Shandukha Village*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
146. *al-Ajurūmiyyah Introduction' and 'Qaṭar al-Nadā and Without the Echoes', Second Editions*, Daesh booklet released in April, 2016.
147. Janub Province Media, *Statistics of the Military Operations for the Month of March-April 2016*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
148. Salah al-Din Province Media, *Clattering of the Swords*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
149. Ninawa Province Media, *Abundant Water*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
150. Somalia Province Media, *The Commander Shaykh Abū Nu'man Military Training Camp*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
151. Furat Province Media, *Guardians of the Citizens*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
152. Fallujah Province Media, *Where to Flee?*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
153. Kirkuk Province Media, *Course of Battles – Attack Upon the Barracks of al-Rafida Committees Near Ajil Field*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
154. *Constantinople #6*, Daesh online magazine released in April, 2016.
155. Salah al-Din Province Media, *al-Karraroun (Who Never Escape from War)*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
156. Khayr Province Media, *Whether Light or Heavy*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
157. Alhayat Media Center, *Dār al-Islām #9*, Daesh online magazine released in April, 2016.
158. Dijlah Province Media, *Their Assembly Will Be Defeated, And They Will Turn Their Backs*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
159. Raqqa Province Media, *Then Allah Will Enrich You Out of His Grace*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
160. Alhayat Media Center, *Blood for Blood*, Nasheed in video style released in April, 2016.
161. Hama Province Media, *Fight Them, for They Are Polytheists*, propaganda video released in April, 2016.
162. *Istok #4*, Daesh online magazine released in May, 2016.

163. Fallujah Province Media, *And Give Glad Tidings to the Patient*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
164. Baghdad Province Media, *So They Kill and Are Killed*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
165. Furat Province Media, *The Greatest Losers*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
166. Jazirah Province Media, *Terrible Destruction of the Agents of the Cross*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
167. Halab Province Media, *Conquering the Villages to Prevail the Guidance*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
168. Salah al-Din Province Media, *Steadfastness Messages to the Land of Discourse (Sinai)*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
169. Furat Province Media, *And You Are the Upper Ones*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
170. Anbar Province Media, *Through Certainty and Patience, You Will Be Victorious*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
171. Ninawa Province Media, *Sinai, Have Patience. Victory Is Surely Coming*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
172. Dijlah Province Media, *Sinai of Honour and Steadfastness*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
173. Jazirah Province Media, *Sinai of Pride and Defiance*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
174. Halab Province Media, *From Halab to Sinai*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
175. Fallujah Province Media, *Surely, With Every Difficulty, There Is Ease*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
176. Homs Province Media, *Sinai, The Gateway of Jerusalem*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
177. Kirkuk Province Media, *The Return of al-Sahab's Descendants*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
178. Dimashq Province Media, *Sinai, Land of Epics and Sacrifices*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
179. Hama Province Media, *Message to Our Brothers in Sinai*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
180. Tarabulus Province Media, *And the Outcome Is For the Righteous*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
181. Khayr Province Media, *Glimmer of Hope and the Sword*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
182. Janub Province Media, *Abu Sabah al-Zouba'i Battle*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
183. Anjad Media Foundation, *For the Sake of Allah*, Nasheed released in May, 2016.
184. Alhayat Media Center, *Selected 10 Videos from the Wilayats of the Islamic State (Rajab 1437)*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
185. Barqah Province Media, *So Fight Against the Allies of al-Shaytan*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
186. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Nour*, recitation released in May, 2016.
187. Ninawa Province Media, *Civilians Retaliation from the Apostates*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
188. Janub Province Media, *Monthly Statistics for Military Operations – Rajab 1437*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
189. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Tahrim*, recitation released in May, 2016.
190. Halab Province Media, *On the Traces of My Father*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.

191. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Jathiya*, recitation released in May, 2016.
192. Barqah Province Media, *The Generation of Epics*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
193. Homs Province Media, *Course of Battles on the Outskirts of Tadmur City*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
194. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Dukhan*, recitation released in May, 2016.
195. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Hijr*, recitation released in May, 2016.
196. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Yassine*, recitation released in May, 2016.
197. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Saffat*, recitation released in May, 2016.
198. Barqah Province Media, *He Will Surely Establish for Them Their Religion*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
199. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Ahqaf*, recitation released in May, 2016.
200. Homs Province Media, *Land of India Between Pain and Hope*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
201. Yemen Province Media, *Crush the Enemy*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
202. Alhayat Media Centre, *That They Live By Proof*, booklet and speech of Daesh spokesperson released in May, 2016.
203. Kirkuk Province Media, *The village of al-Bashir and piles of stone*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
204. Salah al-Din Province Media, *Torch redemption #1*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
205. Khorasan Province Media, *Tajik mujahedin of Transoxiana swear allegiance to the caliph al - Baghdadi*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
206. Fallujah Province Media, *Fallujah, the City of Steadfastness*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
207. Raqqa Province Media, *Die in Your Rage*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
208. Tarabulus Province Media, *From Humiliation to Glory*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
209. Baghdad Province Media, *Kill and kill two*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
210. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Ghafir*, recitation released in May, 2016.
211. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Tawba*, recitation released in May, 2016.
212. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Al Sheba*, recitation released in May, 2016.
213. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Al-Mu'min*, recitation released in May, 2016.
214. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Repentance*, recitation released in May, 2016.
215. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Al-Isra*, recitation released in May, 2016.
216. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Yusuf*, recitation released in May, 2016.
217. Anjad Media Foundation, *Al Father*, recitation released in May, 2016.
218. Anjad Media Foundation, *We want the Islamic state*, Nasheed released in May, 2016.
219. Khayr Province Media, *And Let the Believers be Cautious Regarding the Prevention of the Dish and Its Destruction*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
220. Raqqa Province Media, *To Break Satellites*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
221. Ninawa Province Media, *Dish and its Destruction*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.

222. Alhayat Media Center, *The Religion of Kufr Is One*, propaganda video released in May, 2016.
223. Dijlah Province Media, *Epic steadiness #2*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
224. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat al-Zumar*, recitation released in June, 2016.
225. Anjad Media Foundation, *Surat Fusilat*, recitation released in June, 2016.
226. Ninawa Province Media, *Between the Two Migrations*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
227. Anjad Media Foundation, *Sūrat al-Aʿrāf*, recitation released in June, 2016.
228. Anjad Media Foundation, *Sūrat al-Ḥujarāt*, recitation released in June, 2016.
229. *Ramadan, The Month of Conquest*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
230. Fallujah Province Media, *The Promise of Victory*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
231. Anjad Media Foundation, *Sūrat al-Naḥl*, recitation released in June, 2016.
232. Halab Province Media, *Progress of the Battle in the Vicinity of Aʿzāz City*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
233. Furat Province Media, *Protectors of Religion #3*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
234. Anbar Province Media, *Raids of the Predators #2*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
235. *Sharīʿah Committee for Crescent Observation: On the Crescent For the Month of Ramaḍān and the Declaration of Monday is the Beginning of the Month*, sound file released in June 2016.
236. Ninawa Province Media, *The Axe of Abraham*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
237. Furat Province Media, *Patience, Fallujah of Glory*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
238. Alhayat Media Center, *Selected 10 Videos From the Provinces of The Islamic State – May/June 2016*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
239. Salah al-Din Province Media, *But God Will Perfect His Light*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
240. Anjad Media Foundation, *Our Black Flag*, Nasheed released in June, 2016.
241. *Abū Ḥamzah al-Muhājir: The Commander Prophet, Second Edition*, Booklet released in June, 2016.
242. Jazirah Province Media, *Deterring the Offenders #2*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
243. Albattar Media, *Orlando Attack*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
244. Khayr Province Media, *And Capture Them And Besiege Them*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
245. Dijlah Province Media, *Those Who Gave Shelter and Aided*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
246. Raqqa Province Media, *Foothold of the Conquerors*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
247. Raqqa Province Media, *And the Outcome Is For the Righteous*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
248. Halab Province Media, *Demise of the Body and the Extension of the Ḥisbah*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
249. Khayr Province Media, *Carrying of the Musk and the Blowing of the Bellows*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
250. *Ramaḍān: The Month of Fasting and the Night Prayer*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
251. Furat Province Media, *You Are Not Responsible Except For Yourself*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.

252. Ninawa Province Media, *Ramadan atmosphere*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
253. Khorasan Province Media, *You Won't Dream of Being Secure*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
254. Furat Media Center, *Fatihin #1*, Daesh online magazine released in June, 2016.
255. Indonesia Province Media, *The Solid Edifice*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
256. Homs Province Media, *Exposing the Disguised Ones*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
257. Salah al-Din Province Media, *Who Never Escape From War #2*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
258. Khayr Province Media, *Revelations of Satan*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
259. Ninawa Province Media, *The Most Effective For Us and the Most Horrible For Them*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
260. Halab Province Media, *Two Years Since the Caliphate*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
261. Furat Province Media, *Slaughter Story*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
262. Raqqa Province Media, *Guiding the people*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
263. Halab Province Media, *Front Line of the Mujāhid in the Fortified Strongholds of the Muslims*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.
264. Bosnia Province Media, *Kill the Clerics of Disbelief*, propaganda video released in June, 2016.