IRAN’S PROXY WAR IN YEMEN: THE INFORMATION WARFARE LANDSCAPE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Yemeni conflict has been witnessing essential information warfare and propaganda front. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Houthi movement has been aware of the importance of the internet. Notably, they avoid adopting an aggressive sectarian lexicon on social media. Instead, following drone and missile strikes, the Houthi-associated accounts frequently emphasize IRGC-assisted game-changing military capabilities. This focus seems to follow Iranian priorities in Yemen, namely promoting the militarized political movement and portraying it in a less sectarian but more patriotic and battle-hardened fashion. This approach likely emanates from the different characteristics of the Shia faith in Yemen compared with the rest of the Middle East.

Houthi supporters on Twitter and Facebook post in both Arabic and English. It would be safe to assume that they have targeted two types of audiences: Arabic speakers (mainly Yemenis) and their sympathizers in the Middle East and English speakers in the international community. Iranian outlets focus on producing outputs in English.

Ansar Allah and their allies publish videos of almost any activity that shows their ballistic missile and drone capabilities. Successful hits on strategic sites and airports remain the most important propaganda items.

So-called indigenously manufactured ballistic missiles, such as Badr1-P, are portrayed as emblems of pride to mobilize supporters. This ‘missile vanity’ resembles the Iranian regime’s (and the IRGC’s in particular) military propaganda campaign revolving around hard power development efforts.¹
INTRODUCTION AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

This report offers a detailed assessment of Iran's political warfare and information operations revolving around Yemen against the backdrop of Tehran's proxy war activities through the Houthi militancy. This study assesses game-changing tactical missile and drone operations and how these efforts have contributed to Iranian and Houthi signatures in the cyber-cognitive battlespace.

We believe the findings are significant for two reasons. First, this report explores the correlation between Iranian political warfare efforts and information operations in Yemen within the specific framework of missile and drone activities. Second, it details the differences between Iranian sources and Tehran's proxy, the Houthi movement and Ansar Allah, in disseminating critical output.

Yemen remains a fierce arena for the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Yemeni Houthi movement and Ansar Allah—its armed branch hailing from the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam—have been carrying on a protracted civil war since 2015. The Iran-backed group has acquired a broad range of arms from Yemeni military stocks and from the black market. They also have weapons received from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The Iranian connection to Houthi arms has been documented in various sources, including the Final Report from the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen. Tehran no longer refrains from highlighting its proxy network, especially after its achievements on the battlefield. For example, following the Aramco attacks on 14 September 2019, in his Friday sermon on 20 September Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei named all the proxies across the Gulf and the Levant saying that they were all Iran in essence.

At the time of writing, Houthi forces control Yemen's capital Sana'a and the war-torn country’s western coastal gateway, projecting power to the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait. In March 2015, the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm was launched to confront the Houthi militia. Meanwhile, the Houthis initiated robust ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi and Emirati targets pursuing a war of attrition.

Iran's proxy warfare campaign in Yemen remains crucial for containing Saudi Arabia on its fragile southern frontier and for inducing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to overstretch their military capabilities in a protracted conflict. The Yemeni civil war also provides a hunting ground for Salafi-jihadist groups, first and foremost al-Qaeda and ISIL, where they can exploit social vulnerabilities to find new recruits.
MILITARY-STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

Open-source intelligence suggests that the IRGC, in particular its Quds Force and, to some extent, the Lebanese Hezbollah, has provided the Yemeni Houthi militias with arms, training, and political-military support. Some experts even consider these efforts to be Iran’s ‘train and equip program in Yemen’ or the project to raise a ‘Houthi Hezbollah’.

An essential part of Iranian assistance is centered on missile and drone transfers (know-how, operational concepts, and hardware). Although Iranian political commitment to the Houthis does not match the scale of its support for Shiite groups across Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, having a strategic foothold in Yemen provides the Iranians with strong and relatively low-cost leverage against Saudi Arabia and its allies.

In terms of targets set, assets used, and timing, Iran-backed Houthi missile strikes have proven to be very effective. The Houthi militia have used its Iran-enabled missile capability as a tactical asset, a weapon of terror, and, as observed in the September 2019 Aramco attack, as a strategic weapon in a strike against critical national infrastructure. On 4 November 2017, a Burkan 2H missile was launched from Riyadh and intercepted by Saudi Patriot missile defenses. The wreckage fell on the outskirts of the King Khalid International Airport in the northern tip of Riyadh, suggesting that the missile flew over the entire Saudi capital. On 19 November 2017, the Houthis conducted another Burkan 2H missile strike on the Saudi capital. Notably, this attack came hours before US President Donald Trump’s visit to the Kingdom.

From a military standpoint, the Houthi missile campaign has been used in achieving many strategic, operational, and tactical goals against the Saudi and Emirati led alliance. Since March 2015, it has been complimented by an equally important drone campaign. Tactically, saturation attacks and rocket barrages were the Iranian proxies’ most notable assets. On the strategic side, the Houthis have managed to modify Scud missile variants procured by the Yemeni government before the civil war thanks to support from Iran. The modified variants, including the Burkan 2 line, have now been given the range to hit Riyadh and beyond. The Houthis have also succeeded in converting air defense missiles (i.e. the SA-2) into offensive projectiles (i.e. Qaher-1). The Iranians applied the same conversion methods before converting Soviet SA-2 (S-75) air defense missiles into the Tondar-69 short-range ballistic missiles.

Apart from a large number of rockets, the Yemeni Houthi ballistic missile arsenal consists of the Burkan line (Burkan 1 designates Scud-B and Scud-C derivatives,
while Burkan 2 likely designates North Korean Scud-D derivatives with a range of more than 800km), Tochka tactical ballistic missiles, and Qaher-1 missiles converted from Soviet S-75 (SA-2 ‘Guideline’) air defense missiles.\textsuperscript{11}

An interesting element of the Houthi missile campaign is the Badr-1 rocket / tactical (quasi) ballistic missile. Originally, the Badr-1 was an unguided heavy artillery rocket. Capitalising on this baseline, the Houthis first developed Badr-1P, a more stable, guided, and longer-range (150km) version.\textsuperscript{12} Recently, Ansar Allah has managed to produce an air-burst variant (Badr-F) with a 160km range, detonating around 20m above the ground to spray 1,400 fragments across an area 350 meters in diameter.\textsuperscript{13} Houthi militias have also developed underground missile launchers to boost battlefield survivability against airstrikes.

In January 2018, the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen concluded that Tehran was in noncompliance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216 and failed to prevent Iranian ballistic missiles from falling into the hands of the Houthis. UN Experts traveled to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2018 to inspected missile debris; they concluded that the characteristics of the Houthi missiles were similar to those of missiles produced by Iran, and that there was a high probability of illegal transfers of parts and sub-systems to Yemen for assembly.\textsuperscript{14} In January 2019, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen assessed that individuals and entities in Iran had funded the Houthi purchases

\textbf{Figure 1.} Houthi Militia Underground Launcher for Badr line rockets / tactical ballistic missiles
of unmanned aerial vehicles and mixing machines for rocket fuel. Likewise, in early 2019, before the US Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US Director of Intelligence Daniel Coats stated that Iran’s support to the Houthi militia had enabled the attacks against shipping near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, as well as the ballistic missile and the UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) operations.¹⁵

Figure 2. Yemeni Ballistic Missile Threat to Saudi Arabia, retrieved from Jane’s Information Group
Figure 3. A Sample of Ballistic Missile Launch Sites from Yemen into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 4. Control of Terrain in Yemen, retrieved from Al Jazeera, 2019
IRANIAN & IRAN-BACKED POLITICAL WARFARE AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

The Iranian geopolitical ‘playbook’ strategy, as depicted by open-source intelligence reports, is to avoid direct confrontation with superior powers—first and foremost the United States. Instead, Tehran pursues a complex, nuanced, and indirect approach that includes dispatching the IRGC to flashpoints, recruiting allied proxy formations, delivering tactically game-changing weapon systems to the proxies, and boosting soft power capacity through different means.16

Iran’s political warfare efforts and information operations, especially targeting Middle Eastern and Arabic-speaking communities, are complex and multifaceted. In Shi’a Muslim populated countries, Iranian and Iran-backed proxy political warfare strategies focus on promoting Shia solidarity in sectarian fashion. In countries with no Shia majority, the narrative shifts to a Pan-Islamist agenda (as observed in the Iranian information operations targeting the Palestinian audiences). Interestingly, in Latin America and Africa, non-Muslim countries, Iran’s political warfare concept tends toward the development of anti-imperialist and anti-American propaganda17 Within this complicated information operations landscape, Yemen remains unique. Nearly one-third of Yemenis hail from the Zaydi sect—part of the Shiite world but not identical with the Twelver Shiite zeal of Iran.18 Historically, there have been no sharp theological divergences between different sects in Yemen. The sight of Sunni and Zaydi Muslims praying in the same mosque was not uncommon. This explains why in Yemen the Iranian information efforts have focused on the Houthi tribal network and aimed at spreading a more favorable Shiite approach through this channel in the course of the armed conflict. Some experts argue that the involvement of the Lebanese Hezbollah in the Yemeni proxy war was an important aspect of the policy of ‘carefully’ setting the sectarian environment.20

Tehran has pursued ambitious policies in the post Arab Spring period, especially taking advantage of the power vacuum and of rising sectarianism. Following the Houthi rebels’ military push in 2014 and 2015, some Iranian figures even claimed that Sana’a would become the fourth capital to fall into Iran’s zone of influence (following Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut).21

Iran and Iran-backed proxies have longstanding interests in information
operations and political warfare activities both in Arabic-speaking social media and in the English-speaking global internet community. A 2019 study (analyzing 770 Twitter accounts traced to Iran of 3,841 accounts identified as affiliated with the Russian information ops hub—the Internet Research Agency) by the Computational...
Propaganda Research Project at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, concluded the following:

- 1,122,936 tweets were detected from the 770 Iran-affiliated (suspended) accounts
- 40% of these accounts were created in 2017, corresponding with the Iranian presidential elections in May 2017 (as well as the January 2018 elections)
- These 770 accounts had 862,003 followers
- The most-followed accounts, interestingly, claimed to be located in Saudi Arabia
- These 770 accounts were following 805,550 accounts; approximately 56% of the followed accounts were following fewer than 500 users
- Of the 770 accounts, 392 had tweeted at least once in Arabic—14% of the tweets were in Arabic, 25% were in English, 29% were in French, and 8% were in Farsi
- Notably, 154,326 Arabic-language tweets (receiving 337,379 likes) were tweeted by the abovementioned 392 accounts. More than 23,000 hashtags were associated with the Arabic-language tweets.
- The most frequently used hashtag was #SaudiArabia, the second most popular hashtag was #Yemen

In tandem with the abovementioned study, in 2018, the cyber security company FireEye uncovered a detailed network of Iranian cyber influence operations aiming at North American, Latin American, British, and Middle Eastern audiences. According to FireEye, the core objective of these operations was to promote political narratives in line with Iranian strategic interests in a broad array of hot topics including anti-Saudi and anti-Israeli sentiment, and nuclear issues. It is significant that Yemen and related topics also played an important part in the operation.

Apart from Iran’s political warfare and information operations strategies, as Tehran’s Yemeni proxy, the Houthi movement and its military arm have been developing capabilities in these fields. An Atlantic Council article from 2017 touches upon this:

Controlling the local and international narrative is crucial for the Houthis. When Houthi forces took over Sanaa in 2014, they shelled the Yemen state TV station, and soon after they replaced media professionals with Houthi-affiliated media groups. While this was happening in Houthi-controlled areas, newspapers and
broadcasts in the north and south were suspended, such as the formerly state-owned Althawra and 14 October newspapers. Instead, the Houthis captured Althawra and turned it into a pro-Houthi outlet circulated only in the north, and 14 October had a similar experience under the southern coalition. In Houthi-controlled areas, there has been a crackdown on media groups, the Yemeni internet service provider, Yemennet, which has blocked certain anti-Houthi websites, and the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Information accused media outlets of ‘inciting treason’. Controlling the media became even more prevalent in 2015 after the Saudis started their air campaign.25
ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Linguistic assessment of Houthi information activities vis-à-vis kinetic actions on the ground

We can distinguish two types of Arabic used in the Arab world/Middle East today. The first is Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) (al-Fus’ha) or literary Arabic, which is used in reading, writing, and formal speeches. The second is vernacular Arabic (al-Ammiyah), the dialect spoken by the indigenous people in a particular country or region. Generally, native Arabic speakers mix both literal and vernacular styles when speaking in daily life or on TV, more importantly, when posting on social media.

Houthi information activity on the internet has mainly taken place on Twitter, and later on Facebook. While Iran’s direct efforts tend to use English as the primary language when reporting Yemeni missile strikes, Houthi accounts post predominantly in Arabic. Our evaluation suggests that while the Iranian outlets promote Houthi military activities to international audiences, the Houthi movement focuses on attracting Arabic-speaking people. This also presents Houthi efforts as defensive.
endeavors, not Iran-backed proxy warfare activities to outflank the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, as shown below, current studies suggest that the Iranian outlets under the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) have been more active on Facebook than on Twitter.

Pro-Houthi accounts use a mix of literal formal Arabic and the Yemeni dialect, one of the Gulf region’s spoken dialects. The Houthi narratives have some religious touch in their preferred rhetoric, but the predominance of pious wording cannot be compared to other Iran proxies across Syria and Iraq.

Our research has not observed a very pronounced sectarian attitude in the Houthi Arabic posts, especially on Twitter. Although, the Saudi-led coalition was often named as ‘the aggressors’ [al-ghozah] and the ‘hypocrites’ [al-munafeqin] by the pro-Houthi accounts, there is no frequent use of discriminatory or derogatory remarks targeting non-Shia Muslims. The primary aim is to portray the Houthi military movement as a patriotic salvation front fighting the Saudi-led alliance, and avoiding emphasizing the Iran proxy character of Ansar Allah militia. As the paper touched upon earlier, we believe this finding is in firm consistency with the unique sectarian character of the conflict in Yemen, as well as the genuine theological aspects of the Zaydi sub-sect of the Shiite faith.

The Houthi propaganda prefers a mixed-use of Arabic. One can clearly notice that the literal Arabic was used as a firm tone to show how serious the situation was, for instance, when announcing a breaking news like missile launches or the UAV strikes. The spoken dialect is preferred when expressing opinions or using anti-Saudi rhetoric.

Assessment of pro-Iranian actors in the information space

The research was conducted in English and Arabic. Required data was harvested mainly from Twitter, as well as from Iranian and Houthi news outlets. Facebook accounts were also incorporated when additional input was needed. The time frame covers the period between 1 January 2018 and 30 April 2019. Research was limited to themes of Houthi militia activities involving missiles and UAV.

Individual user accounts (not news networks) were selected based on their links with Houthi rebel groups. Some of these users belong to the Houthi tribes directly. Other selected users’ tweets suggest close ties with Ansar Allah and the Houthi political movement.

The websites of Arabic and English TV channels and online news outlets that were frequently referred by the selected social media accounts were also incorporated in the research.

The research focused primarily on the Houthi accounts with a large number of followers. To develop a better understanding
of the propaganda strategy in Yemen, a further analytical study is needed to map bot activity with respect to Houthi social media efforts.

Some notable Houthi/pro-Houthi Twitter accounts include: @hussinion (131k followers); Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, president of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee/Council (Ansar Allah's governing body) @Moh_Alhouthi (115k followers); Abdul Salam Mahmoud Jahav, member of Ansar Allah and of the national dialogue conference @abdulsalamjahav (59.1k followers); Abd Al-Bassit Al-Sharafy, @shrffe (57.2k followers); Yemeni 'journalist' Mohammed Ben Rawdan Khawlan @moh_rawdan_ye (20.5k followers); Mazen Hebah, member of Ansar Allah @MazenHebah (13.3k followers); an activist journalist and Ansar Allah supporter.

Some of the Yemeni network and TV channel accounts that play an important role in Houthi propaganda are: the official Twitter account for AnsarAllah Media Centre @AnsarAllahMC (94.2k followers) and @MasirahTV (572k followers), which, according to Reuters, is the 'Houthi-run Yemeni TV channel' that shares important breaking news about the situation in Yemen.

The international Iranian network deserves attention as well: @PressTV (172.2k followers) is 'the first Iranian international news network, broadcasting in English on a round-the-clock basis' as stated on its official Twitter account. It remains a notable non-Yemeni source covering the Houthi missile and UAV strikes posting photographs and videos. The Tasnim news agency, close to the IRGC, follows a similar pattern.

A notable non-Yemeni outlet posting in Arabic is: @AlMayadeenNews (1.33M followers). This is a pro-Iran and pro-Syrian-Baath-regime Lebanese news network.

It is noteworthy that influential accounts related to Ansar Allah prefer using hashtags promoting the designations of missile and drone systems used in the strikes.

Some hashtags used by the active Houthi propaganda accounts when posting about the strikes are:

- #Badr1P
- #BallisticDay
- #TheBallisticYear
- #TheMissileForce
- #Samad3StrikesAbuDhabi
ANNEX. A SELECTION OF STRIKE-RELATED PROPAGANDA FROM THE TWITTER DATASET

This photo, posted with the tweet, shows the opening of the smart missile Badr-P exhibition. It contains the watermark The Military Media [al-ilam al-harby].

Using the hashtag #TheBallisticPower, @almasirah posted a video for a Yemeni tv channel on the statistics of the ballistic power in January 2019 [https://twitter.com/almasirah/status/109281896510918144]

“The best joke I read today was that the mercenary [murtazaqaz] army found the following long-range Houthis missiles: 6 missiles, one weighs 500 kg and the other 5 missiles weigh 200 kg. Hahaha! Are these long-range missiles or 4 bags of wheat????!!”

(@hussinion, 131k followers, 78 likes, 14 Feb 2018)

According to Houthi media, Houthi forces attacked the Saudi Aramco facilities in Riyadh on 18 July 2018 with the Samad 2 drone. Houthi propaganda
praised the qualities of the new ‘long-range drone’ and how far it could fly over its target, while Iranian propaganda used more visuals, such as this drone video: https://twitter.com/PressTV/status/1020123635707727872

A select Ansar Allah propaganda below:

"Targeting the Aramco Refinery with a ‘Long-Range Drone’ transmits strong and disturbing messages to the enemy and his tools. Yemeni aviation, with its available and simple capabilities, is now able to soar over their palaces, in other words, over their heads. More important is that it is #Samad type. I wonder, who is going to be the next target for this terrifying type of Yemeni drone?"

(abdulsalamjahav, 59.1k followers, 217 likes, 18 Jul 2018).

Al-Mayadeen News adopted a similar approach:

"#MayadeenConnects social media sites were shaken up by the economic targets of Ansar Allah in Riyadh, when the hashtag #TheExplosionSoundInRiyadh and #MissileInterceptionInRiyadh began trending in many countries. Activists confirmed they heard the sound of explosions that shook the Saudi capital. What do you think?"

(@AlMayadeenNews, 1.33M followers, 492 likes, 128 Retweets).

This account also promoted Houthi propaganda, shared biased news, and praised the accuracy of the Burkan 2H missile.

"#Yemen Ansar Allah: We confirm that the Burkan 2H missiles attacked their targets in the Saudi capital with high accuracy."

(@AlMayadeenNews, 1.33M followers, 263 likes).
When reporting missile and drone strikes by Houthi militants the Iranian international news network Press TV preferred using English with added photos and videos. Press TV cites Al-Masirah television, a local pro-Houthi Yemeni source, for credibility, posting and sharing their photos and videos.

The Twitter link for the video is: https://twitter.com/PressTV/status/950814094495543296

The post shows the Burkan 2 missile—the missile used in attacking King Khalid International Airport.
Press TV depended on Al-Masirah television as their main source of videos. The post below shows Ansar Allah’s attack video with the Al-Masirah label in the top right corner.
The pictures below show military capabilities of Ansar Allah:
The Twitter link to the video is: https://twitter.com/PressTV/status/1011605023720173570
"As we said two days ago, that #AlSamad would be there in reaction to the economic and military war and here it is #Samad3StrikesAbuDhabi. And today we can say that it is nothing compared to what is coming. Al-Samad will be there in other military types that will be painful for the enemy in their homeland."

(@hussinion, 131k followers, 30 Sept 2018)

"We are warning the aggressive powers [Saudi Arabia and the international coalition] that from now on the Missile Power had already given you a harsh warning. The next days will be full of surprises #Badr1P."

(@shrffe, 57.2k followers, 46 likes, 27 Oct 2018)
"The missile #Badr1P is one of the top new missiles technologies that the Yemeni people possess, with capacities and local industry. It is distinguished by its high precision. It has an error percentage of only 3 meters, and it is just a possibility in some launch situations. However, the precision error percentage is zero." (@hussinion, 131k followers, 28 Oct 2018)

"It is not that easy, and the military experts know very well the importance of Yemen possessing a smart missile using solid fuel. What is more important is that we have the capability to produce large quantities of this fuel, we have already produced a lot. More importantly, we are making smart missiles that have the same accuracy as middle and long-range missiles."

“We can say that we made another smart system using solid fuel with middle and long-ranges that we will announce at the right time. We are still improving with high rhythm, since we promised ourselves to do our best with effort and capacities to build the Yemeni military capacities in a very different way than the entire region.”

(@hussinion, 131k followers, 28 Oct 2018)
“Breaking news, thank God, the missile force [al-qowa al-saroukiyah—the Houthi name for the Yemeni missile unit] has launched a number of #Badr1P missiles, and has targeted the Apache landing site and the pilots’ accommodation/residence in Bir Askar in #Najran. Confirming that the missiles successfully attacked their targets with accuracy, two pilots are dead and a number of Apaches were destroyed in the targeted location in Najran.”

(@AAlwajih2014, 14k followers, 28 Nov 2018)

“A number of ballistic missiles [sawarikh ballistia] type #Badr1P destroyed the second most important air base for the Saudi enemy in the southern region [al-manteqa al-janoubiyah] of Saudi Arabia. They specialize in attacking Apache Helicopters. This attack is massive due to the results of what these missiles did in the Najran fire.”

(@ahmedayed2000, 15.7k followers, 158 likes, 28 Nov 2018)
“The missile force [al-qowa al-saroukhiyah] is back to its activity, there is no way for the hypocrites [munafeqin]!!! Breaking News: The missile force [al-qowa al-saroukhiyah] launches a ballistic missile type #Badr1P over a group of aggressors and hypocrites in the west of Bir Askar #Najran.”

(@abdulsalamjahav, 59.1k followers, 171 likes, 14 Jan 2019)

“Thank God, the Missile Force [al-qowa al-saroukhiyah] launches a ballistic missiles type #Badr1P over the training and mobilization camp in Assir. Some sources in the Missile Force confirm the attack on the missile’s target with high accuracy and precision, causing deaths and victims from the hypocrites’ group.”

(@zaeidalie, 2831 followers, 21 Jan 2019)


(@sanadalkumaim, 2538 followers, 3 Mar 2019)

“Breaking news: A few minutes after launching the ballistic missile #Badr1P over the Saudi army’s training camp, the mercenaries [murtazaqa] in Nar Mountain [jabal al-nar] of #Jizan, the Missile Force launches a second missile of the same type over a group of Saudi Army mercenaries close to #AlHoubah in Jizan, with good attacks.”

(@MazenHebah, 15k followers, 136 likes, 19 Mar 2019)
The account @AnsarAllahMC, Ansar Allah Media center, posted a video on their Twitter account to promote the Badr P1 as a Yemeni-made smart missile. The video was also published on the Houthi propaganda channel Al-Masirah television. The video is available at:

https://twitter.com/AnsarAllahMC/status/1068203622452871170

"The Yemeni sniper [qannas] missile attacks again, the ballistic missile #Badr1P attacks again, and the target is important as usual, a meeting of the aggressor’s leaders and mercenaries [murtazaqa] in #AlGouf. The attack is precise as usual. This precise sniper missile was the best hand of the Missile Force for the fourth year of aggression. Thank God for this victory."

1. For a close analysis of Iranian propaganda efforts see Jones and Newlee, *The United States’ Soft War with Iran*.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
26. Duffy, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Yemen War Isn’t About Sectarianism’.
29. ‘Yemeni Rebels Enhance Ballistic Missile Campaign’.
32. Jones and Newlee, *The United States’ Soft War with Iran*. 
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