The post–Cold War diffusion of power, the rise of non-state actors, and rapid advances in disruptive technologies have reshaped the foundations of deterrence. Traditional models grounded in axiomatic rationality struggle to account for radical uncertainty, imperfect information, and strategic opacity, conditions that increasingly define contemporary geopolitics.
This paper examines the applicability of behavioural approaches that emphasise ecological rationality, proposing a theory of robust deterrence adapted to complex and unpredictable environments. We draw from research on fast-and-frugal heuristics demonstrating that simplified decision strategies can outperform complex optimisation models when uncertainty is profound, information is noisy, and stakes are asymmetric.
We argue that strategies emphasising satisficing, adaptability, and variance reduction provide more credible and stable deterrent postures against diverse and strategically ambiguous actors. This reconceptualisation enables Allies to mitigate failure while preserving deterrence credibility in a rapidly evolving global security landscape.
Existing deterrence concepts, developed in a more structured geopolitical context, now face greater strain as relative power shifts and emerging technologies disrupt strategic stability. We examine the relevance and applicability of behavioural approaches to deterrence in the contemporary strategic environment. Specifically, inspiration is drawn from the literature on cognitive heuristics, emphasising how cognitive shortcuts can be more effective than sophisticated probabilistic decision-making processes when applied to complex and uncertain situations.